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THE  ENUMERATED-RIGHTS  READING  OF  THE
PRIVILEGES  OR  IMMUNITIES  CLAUSE:
A  RESPONSE  TO  BARNETT  AND  BERNICK
Kurt T. Lash*
INTRODUCTION
In 1871, John Bingham explained the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause—a clause Bingham himself
drafted and had successfully convinced his colleagues to add to the Four-
teenth Amendment in 1866.  According to Bingham, the privileges or immu-
nities of national citizenship were not those protected by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV.  Instead, the rights of national citizenship
were those “guarantied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumer-
ated in the Constitution.”1  Bingham’s explanation tracks what I have called
the “enumerated-rights” reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.2
This reading understands “the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States” as involving only those rights enumerated in the citizen’s Con-
stitution.  This includes, but is not limited to, those rights enumerated in the
Bill of Rights.  In a series of books and articles published over the last few
years, I have presented historical evidence suggesting that the public likely
shared Bingham’s understanding when they discussed and ratified the Four-
teenth Amendment in the years 1866 to 1868.
In their new article, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A Critique
of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment,3 Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick
insist that this historical evidence does not support the enumerated-rights
reading.  Instead, Barnett and Bernick embrace what I call the “fundamental-
© 2019 Kurt T. Lash.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* E. Claiborne Robins Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Richmond
School of Law.
1 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
2 See KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNI-
TIES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 279 (2014).
3 Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Privileges or Immunities Clause, Abridged: A
Critique of Kurt Lash on the Fourteenth Amendment, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (2019).
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rights” reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.4  This view maintains
that the Clause should be understood as protecting a set of absolute rights
nowhere expressly enumerated in the text of the Constitution, for example
the unenumerated economic right to contract or to pursue a trade.5
Rather than agreeing with John Bingham, Barnett and Bernick declare
that they “side with Jacob Howard.”6  This is somewhat surprising, given that
Republican Senator Jacob Howard opposed Bingham’s Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause,7 voted against submitting it to Congress for debate,8 and favored
a far narrower version of Article IV, Section 1 than the one drafted by Bing-
ham and ratified by the people of the United States.9  One presumes that
Barnett and Bernick side with Howard, not because of his constitutional pref-
erences, but because of one particular speech that Howard delivered to the
Senate on May 23, 1866.  On that day, acting as a last-minute stand-in for
William Pitt Fessenden,10 Jacob Howard introduced the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Senate.11  In his speech, Howard explained that the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States included rights secured
by the Comity Clause and described in cases like Corfield v Coryell,12 as well as
rights secured “by the first eight amendments of the Constitution.”13
In my writing on the subject, I explain that Howard’s speech is perfectly
consistent with the enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  Howard mentioned only enumerated constitutional rights as
4 See LASH, supra note 2, at 283–84 (describing Randy Barnett’s reading of the “Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause” as the “Fundamental Rights reading”).
5 See Randy E. Barnett, After All These Years, Lochner Was Not Crazy—It Was Good, 16
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 437, 438, 442 (2018) (“[T]here can be little doubt that, historically,
the rights of property and contract were among the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States to which the Fourteenth Amendment referred.”).  By “absolute,” I mean
rights receiving more than mere procedural (due process) or equal protection.
6 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 589.
7 See BENJAMIN B. KENDRICK, JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECON-
STRUCTION 98 (1914).  Although Howard had originally joined the majority of the commit-
tee in voting in favor of Bingham’s proposal, he then changed his mind and voted to
remove Bingham’s proposal from the amendment, and voted against allowing Bingham to
submit his proposal as a separate amendment. Id. at 87, 98–99.  When Bingham convinced
the majority of his colleagues to readopt his version, Howard joined two other members in
voting against Bingham’s draft. See id. at 106.
8 Id. at 99.
9 Howard voted in favor of a version originally submitted by Robert Dale Owen, which
read, “Section 1.  No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as
to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” Id.
at 83.  Howard’s preferred proposal established nothing other than a limited set of equal
rights.  Bingham’s proposal, on the other hand, protected absolute rights (the Privileges or
Immunities Clause), Due Process Rights and the rights of Equal Protection.
10 As chair of the Joint Committee, Fessenden had been chosen to present the pro-
posed draft to the House of Representatives, but he fell ill at the last minute. See CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–65 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
11 Id. at 2764–67.
12 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
13 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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protected privileges or immunities.  The right protected by the enumerated
Comity Clause involves nothing more than the right of sojourning citizens to
receive equal treatment when it comes to a limited set of state-secured rights
(those designated as “fundamental” state-secured rights).14  The relative pro-
tection provided sojourning citizens by the Comity Clause, in other words, is
simply one of a number of enumerated constitutional rights Howard named
as protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Barnett and Bernick insist that I have misread Howard’s speech.  Accord-
ing to Barnett and Bernick, Howard was not simply naming enumerated con-
stitutional rights; he was declaring that the Privileges or Immunities Clause
protected an unenumerated set of absolute “fundamental” rights.  Moreover,
they insist that this was the original public understanding of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.  Although Barnett and Bernick decline in their article to
explain exactly how the historical record supports their theory, they never-
theless insist that the historical record does not support my enumerated-
rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The substance of their argument involves five basic claims:
(1) The antebellum historical record does not contain evidence of a wide-
spread understanding of the term “privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States” as referring solely to constitutionally enumerated rights.
(2) There is no evidence that anyone in the Thirty-Ninth Congress under-
stood the term “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States” as
referring solely to constitutionally enumerated rights.  This includes the
man who drafted the Clause, John Bingham.
(3) It is anachronistic to view Reconstruction-era references to the Bill of
Rights as referring solely to constitutionally enumerated rights since there
was no fixed understanding of the term “Bill of Rights” during
Reconstruction.
(4) There is no evidence that those supporting the proposed amendment
during the ratification process understood the Privileges or Immunities
Clause as solely referring to enumerated rights.  Otherwise advocates would
have used this understanding to defeat claims that the proposed amend-
ment guaranteed the unenumerated right to vote.
(5) The enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
must be incorrect since such a reading would not authorize legislation like
the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
In this Article, I address each of these arguments in turn.  I realize that
Barnett and Bernick also make a number of claims regarding the postadop-
tion historical record.  I have addressed such evidence elsewhere, and length
constraints prevent my repeating those arguments here.  Nor is there need to
do so.  All postratification evidence is necessarily weak as a source of original
understanding.  The substantial body of preratification evidence provides suf-
ficient guidance for determining the original understanding of the Clause—
sufficient, that is, unless one is seeking a different meaning.  For those inter-
14 See LASH, supra note 2, at 26–37.
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ested, one of the clearest examples of the enumerated-rights reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause is John Bingham’s 1871 speech explaining
the Clause to his colleagues—a speech I quoted in the opening of this Arti-
cle.15  For the purposes of this Article, I am content to rest my case on an
analysis of preratification evidence.  The fact that Barnett and Bernick insist
on relying on postratification evidence simply illustrates the weakness of their
argument.
One final prefatory note.  In their canvass of almost everything I have
written over the years on this subject—from books to articles to short essays
to blog posts—Barnett and Bernick repeatedly point out that, over time, I
have changed my views on a number of matters relating to the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Of course I have.  As I
continued to research and uncover the original history of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Thirty-Ninth Congress, I found myself abandoning or
modifying some of my earlier thoughts about that history.  It would be rather
remarkable (and rather suspicious) if this were not the case.  However much
I might wince at some of my early speculations about the complicated events
of Reconstruction, I am nevertheless deeply grateful that I have worked at
institutions that have given me the time and support necessary to continue
my investigations and increase my understanding of this extraordinary
period of legal and constitutional creativity.
I. THE ANTEBELLUM PERIOD
Determining the communicative meaning of 1866 legal texts containing
the terms “privileges” and “immunities” requires an investigation of how
these terms were understood in the period leading up to the Civil War.  This
is because these terms and phrases were not wholly new in 1866, but had
been the subject of substantial discussion and debate between the Founding
and the Civil War.
My investigation of the antebellum usage of the terms privileges and
immunities reveals that they were used generally to refer to specially con-
ferred rights or, as I put it, “particular rights conferred on a certain group or
a particular institution,” rather than “natural rights belonging to all people
or all institutions.”16  This specially conferred right understanding of privi-
leges and immunities remained common right up to the time of the ratifica-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment.  For example, according to Judge
George W. Paschal in his influential annotated Constitution of the United
States, “[p]rivileges are special rights belonging to the individual or class,
and not the mass.”17  Barnett and Bernick do not directly dispute this well-
15 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 83–86 (1871) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
16 LASH, supra note 2, at 20.
17 GEORGE W. PASCHAL, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CARE-
FULLY ANNOTATED 225 (Washington, D.C., W.H. & O.H. Morrison 1868) (emphasis
omitted).
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supported antebellum understanding of “privileges and immunities” as spe-
cially conferred rights.  Instead, they suggest that the distinction between spe-
cially conferred rights and natural rights “might not be as sharp as Lash
makes it out to be.”18  Here, they cite the work of Professor Eric Claeys on
Blackstone’s use of the terms “privileges” and “immunities.”19  But Claeys by
his own admission focuses on Blackstone’s use of the terms “privileges” and
“immunities” and texts found in colonial charters.20  Claeys goes out of his
way to say that he does not explore antebellum American usage of the terms
and that “a complete analysis of privileges and immunities would need to deter-
mine whether the terms evolved in meaning from 1600 to 1868.”21  Accord-
ing to Claeys, antebellum study of these terms is important because “[i]t is
also probable that American usages of privileges and immunities evolved signif-
icantly from 1766 to the post–Civil War period.”22  In sum, while Professor
Claeys’s work on Blackstone is interesting,23 it has nothing to do with ante-
bellum usage of the term privileges and immunities, much less undermine
my claims regarding antebellum usage of the same.
The common antebellum usage of the terms privileges and immunities
as referencing a specially conferred set of rights is important.  It tells us that
particular sets of privileges and immunities might differ depending on the
rights-holding person, group, or institution.  This in turn suggests that the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states might have been under-
stood as referring to a different set of “privileges or immunities” than those
held by citizens of the United States.24
A. The Privileges and Immunities of Article IV
I make two key claims in regard to the antebellum period that I believe
are important to understanding the original meaning of the Privileges or
18 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 509.
19 Id. at 509–10 (citing Eric R. Claeys, Blackstone’s Commentaries and the Privileges or
Immunities of United States Citizens: A Modest Tribute to Professor Siegan, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
777 (2008)).
20 See Claeys, supra note 19, at 781 (“This essay surveys colonial charters and relevant
provisions of the Articles of Confederation—but most of all Sir William Blackstone’s Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England.”).
21 Id. at 789.
22 Id. at 782.
23 Claeys focuses on the original meaning of Blackstone’s use of “privileges and immu-
nities,” a meaning that Claeys links to individual natural rights.  My own study of the Com-
mentaries shows that sometimes Blackstone uses the individual terms “privileges” and
“immunities” as references to individual natural rights, but at other times he uses the
paired term “privileges and immunities” to refer to the government conferred collective
rights of a corporation. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129, *468; see also
LASH, supra note 2, at 15.
24 Barnett and Bernick try to extend their use of Claeys’s work by pointing to uses of
Blackstone during the debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  None of their references,
however, involve uses of the terms “privileges” and “immunities.” See Barnett & Bernick,
supra note 3, at 510 at n.62.
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Immunities Clause and its relationship to Article IV (and Article IV cases like
Corfield v. Coryell).  First, the historical evidence overwhelmingly indicates that
judges and constitutional commentators viewed Article IV and cases like
Corfield v. Coryell as protecting nothing more than the relative rights of
sojourning state citizens.  Not only did this view remain stable up to and after
the Civil War, the “equal-rights-only” reading of the Comity Clause became
increasingly important to antislavery Republicans.  It was essential to their
constitutional theory that Article IV, Section 2 be understood as providing
nothing other than the relative rights of sojourning citizens.  Barnett and
Bernick address none of this in their critique.
Second, antebellum historical evidence reveals the existence of an alto-
gether different category of rights, privileges, and immunities—those belong-
ing to “citizens of the United States.”  In some of the most high-profile
constitutional debates between the Founding and the Civil War, antislavery
advocates described the rights of national citizenship as involving only the
constitutionally enumerated rights of American citizens.  As the Civil War
approached, antislavery Republicans continued to use this “enumerated-
rights-only” argument in opposition to the claims of slave holders that Ameri-
can citizens had an unenumerated absolute right to carry their “property”
into the territories.  Barnett and Bernick’s attempt to use antebellum prosla-
very arguments to counter this evidence simply reinforces my claim that the
enumerated-rights understanding of the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States would have been both well known and robustly adhered
to by antislavery Republicans.  And it would be this group who framed and
embraced the Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Article IV and the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States
It is important to understand the antebellum understanding of the Com-
ity Clause of Article IV.  This same understanding will inform the debates of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress in general and Jacob Howard’s speech in particu-
lar.  Thankfully, the antebellum understanding of the “Privileges and Immu-
nities of Citizens in the several States”25 is not difficult to discover.  The
consensus antebellum understanding of the Comity Clause is so well repre-
sented by the historical record that Barnett and Bernick concede the issue.26
As explained by Justice Bushrod Washington in the 1823 case, Corfield v.
Coryell,27 the Comity Clause of Article IV provides sojourning citizens equal
access to a limited set of state-secured rights (those deemed “fundamen-
25 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
26 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 531 (“Lash’s exegesis of leading antebellum
cases is generally convincing.”).  Barnett and Bernick question my analysis of a 1797 Mary-
land court case. See id. at 531 n.203 (“We are not, however, convinced by his analysis of
Campbell v. Morris.”).  They do not, however, dispute my account of the consensus “limited
equal rights” understanding of Corfield and Article IV, Section 2, which prevailed at the
time of the Civil War and Reconstruction.  Nor do I expect them to, since the evidence of
such a consensus understanding is overwhelming.
27 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
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tal”).28  For example, if a state allowed its own citizens to pursue a certain
trade, then that state must provide the same right to visitors from other
states.29  Article IV, Section 2 was early on referred to as the Comity Clause
precisely because it establishes a degree of “comity” between the states by
guaranteeing visiting citizens from other states a degree of equal treatment.30
Today, when courts use the term “fundamental” rights, they are often refer-
ring to absolute rights that no state may abridge absent special justification
(such as the fundamental right to freedom of speech, or the free exercise of
religion).  Justice Washington’s reference to the fundamental rights of Arti-
cle IV had a completely different meaning.  The “fundamental” rights Wash-
ington described in Corfield involved a limited set of state-secured rights,
which, if a state granted them to its own citizens, then that state should also
grant them to visiting citizens from other states.  The fundamental rights of
the Comity Clause thus are not absolute rights, they are relative rights: one’s
Article IV right to “the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire
and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and
safety”31 is wholly dependent on the degree to which a state grants its own
citizens those rights.  In Corfield, Justice Washington presented a partial list of
rights he believed should count as “fundamental” rights deserving relative
protection:
Protection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pursue and
obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such restraints as the
government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole.  The
right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in any other state,
for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to
claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of
property, either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or
impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the state; may be men-
tioned as some of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens, which
are clearly embraced by the general description of privileges deemed to be
fundamental . . . .32
28 LASH, supra note 2, at 2–47.
29 This explanation was repeated in every major constitutional text of the period that
addressed the Comity Clause. See, e.g., 1 JOHN BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 66
(Philadelphia, Robert E. Peterson & Co. 2d ed. 1854); THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 15 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868); 2 JAMES KENT,
COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 35 (New York, William Kent 7th ed. 1851); 3 JOSEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 674–75 (Fred B. Roth-
man & Co. 1991) (1833).
30 Referring to Article IV, Section 2 has a history going back to the antebellum period.
See, e.g., Chief Justice Taney at School to a Colored Oyster Dealer, ALBANY EVENING J., Mar. 25,
1857, at 2.
31 Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551–52.
32 Id.
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Washington provided this list in order to “confine” the potential scope of
the Comity Clause and reject the claim being made in Corfield itself that out-
of-state visitors could demand any local right given to local citizens “merely
upon the ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens.”33  As Justice Joseph
Story put it in his Commentaries on the Constitution, the Comity Clause as
interpreted by cases like Corfield v. Coryell “confer[ed]” on visiting citizens “all
the privileges and immunities, which the citizens of the same state would be
entitled to under the like circumstances.”34  Similarly, according to antebel-
lum legal scholar and judge James Kent,
The provision that the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privi-
leges and immunities of citizens in the several states . . . means only that
citizens of other states shall have equal rights with our own citizens, and not
that they shall have different or greater rights.  Their persons and property
must, in all respects, be equally subject to [state] law.35
The historical evidence establishing the equal treatment reading of the
Comity Clause as the consensus antebellum understanding of the rights of
Article IV, Section 2 is broad and deep.36  Not surprisingly, Barnett and
Bernick concede the issue.37  They could not reasonably do otherwise.  Their
concession is nevertheless important.  It means that Barnett and Bernick
agree that the set of rights protected under the antebellum understanding of
the Comity Clause are altogether different from the set of absolute rights they
claim are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  Barnett and Bernick, of course, believe that, at some point,
Republicans came to believe that the relative rights of the Comity Clause had
been transformed into absolute national rights.  There is no evidence, how-
ever, that any such transformation occurred at any point during the antebel-
lum period.  In fact, antislavery Republicans were deeply committed to the
idea that the Comity Clause provided nothing more than equal access to a
limited set of state-secured rights.  The reason involved slavery.
In Dred Scott v. Sandford,38 the Supreme Court considered whether slave
owners had an unenumerated absolute right to carry their slaves into federal
territory.  A majority of the Supreme Court concluded they did, and they
33 Id. at 552.
34 3 STORY, supra note 29, at 675 & n.1 (citing Corfield, 6 F. Cas. 546).
35 Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 577 (N.Y. 1812) (opinion of Kent, C.J.); see
also 2 KENT, supra note 29, at 35 (“The article in the constitution of the United States,
declaring that citizens of each state were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states, applies only to natural-born or duly naturalized citizens; and if
they remove from one state to another, they are entitled to the privileges that persons of
the same description are entitled to in the state to which the removal is made, and to none
other.” (footnote omitted)).
36 In addition to Story, see Wiley v. Parmer, 14 Ala. 627, 631–32 (1848) (opinion of
Collier, C.J.); Abbott v. Bayley 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827); Livingston, 9 Johns. at 507,
577 (opinion of Kent, C.J.); Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH 535, 565 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1797);
2 KENT, supra note 29, at 35.
37 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 531.
38 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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declared unconstitutional the Missouri Compromise, which excluded slavery
from the northern territories.39  While the Court was considering the issues
in Dred Scott, another case was under review in the state of New York—one
with an even more politically explosive claim by slave owners.  In Lemmon v.
People,40 the New York state courts considered whether the Comity Clause of
Article IV granted out-of-state citizens the absolute unenumerated right to
carry their slaves into free states as they moved from one state to another.
According to the slave owners in Lemmon, the property rights protected by
Article IV and described as fundamental rights in Corfield v. Coryell ought to
be interpreted as absolute “privileges and immunities” that the state of New
York must respect regardless of its local prohibition of slavery.41  In its deci-
sion, the highest court in New York rejected the absolute fundamental-rights
reading of Article IV.  Instead, the court embraced the traditional antebel-
lum reading of the Comity Clause as providing no more than relative protec-
tion to Corfield’s “fundamental” rights.  According to New York’s Justice
Wright, Article IV “was always understood as having but one design and
meaning, viz., to secure to the citizens of every State, within every other, the
privileges and immunities (whatever they might be) accorded in each to its
own citizens.”42  Because New York law prohibited the importation of slaves
by anyone, including its own citizens, the court ruled that there had been no
violation of Article IV.43
Lemmon v. People attracted nationwide interest.  Republicans feared the
U.S. Supreme Court would hear the appeal of the slave-owning plaintiffs in
Lemmon and use the opportunity to extend the holding of Dred Scott and
interpret Article IV as establishing an unenumerated privilege or immunity
to carry slaves into the free states of the North.44  When Civil War broke out,
the case became moot.  But the New York court’s decision in Lemmon, which
maintained the traditional understanding of the Comity Clause, was viewed
as both a correct reading of the Constitution and an important victory by
antislavery Republicans.  In his 1868 treatise, The Constitution of the United
States Defined and Carefully Annotated, Republican civil rights advocate Judge
George Paschal used Lemmon as the primary precedent for understanding
the rights of the Comity Clause.45 As we shall see, even the most radical of
Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress conceded that the Comity Clause
39 Id. at 452.
40 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
41 Id. at 578.
42 Id. at 626–27.
43 Id. at 632.
44 See, e.g., The Dred Scott Case, HARPER’S WKLY., Mar. 28, 1857, at 193, 193 (comment-
ing on the possible future of the Lemmon case and complaining that “all these slave cases
are sour enough”); The Issue Forced Upon Us, ALBANY EVENING J., Mar. 9, 1857, at 2 (“The
Lemmon case is on its way to this corrupt fountain of law.  Arrived there, a new shackle for
the North will be handed to the servile Supreme Court, to rivet upon us. . . . [It] shall
complete the disgraceful labors of the Federal Judiciary in behalf of Slavery . . . . The Slave
breeders will celebrate it as the crowning success of a complete conquest.”).
45 See PASCHAL, supra note 17, at 225–26.
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and cases like Corfield v. Coryell protected nothing more than the relative
rights of out-of-state visitors.
In other words, when Jacob Howard in 1866 quoted Corfield and
included the enumerated protections of the Comity Clause as privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States, he was speaking from a tradition,
and to an audience, that expressly embraced the “equal-rights-only” interpre-
tation of Corfield and Article IV.
C. Antebellum Privileges and Immunities “of citizens of the United States”
Article IV involves the privileges and immunities of state citizenship—
whether they exist depends on state law.  The privileges and immunities of
national citizenship, rights independent of state law, became the subject of
national debate during the political controversy attending the admission of
Missouri.  Missouri was to be carved out of the original Louisiana cession,
which, under the treaty with France, guaranteed the inhabitants the “rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”46  Under the so-
called Tallmadge Amendment, Missouri would be admitted as a free state.47
Proslavery advocates opposed the Amendment on the ground that it violated
the Louisiana treaty’s guarantee that the inhabitants of the territory would
receive all the “rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the United
States.”48  One of these rights and immunities, proslavery advocates insisted,
was the right to permit slavery in their state if they wished to do so.49
In response, antislavery advocates like Daniel Webster, David Morril, and
Rufus King insisted that the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of
the United States” involved only those rights rooted in the text of the federal
Constitution.  Slavery was a creature of state law, and therefore could not be
considered a treaty-protected right of national citizenship.  According to
Daniel Webster, for example, the “rights, advantages and immunities” of citi-
zens of the United States “must, from the very force of the terms of the
clause, be such as are recognized or communicated by the Constitution of
the United States.”50  Similarly, Senator David Morril of New Hampshire
explained that “[a]ll the rights [citizens of the United States] possess, as
such, are derived from the Constitution.”51  Finally, Rufus King echoed the
46 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
498–505 (Hunter Miller ed., 1931).
47 See 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1170 (1819).
48 Id. at 1200 (statement of Rep. Scott); see also id. at 1173 (statement of Rep.Taylor).
49 See id. at 1173 (statement of Rep.Taylor) (“Gentlemen have said the amendment is
in violation of the treaty, because it impairs the property of a master in his slave.”).
50 DANIEL WEBSTER ET AL., A MEMORIAL TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, ON
THE SUBJECT OF RESTRAINING THE INCREASE OF SLAVERY IN NEW STATES TO BE ADMITTED INTO
THE UNION 15 (Boston, Sewell Phelps 1819).
51 See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 146 (1820) (statement of Sen. Morril); see also Mr. Morrill’s
Speech—Concluded, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER (D.C.), Feb. 5, 1820, at 2; Remarks of Mr.
Morrill, in the Senate of the United States, on the Missouri Question (Jan. 17, 1820), in
HILLSBORO’ TELEGRAPH (Amherst, N.H.), Mar. 4, 1820, at 1 [hereinafter Remarks of Mr.
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same argument: “[The amended admission bill] will impart to the inhabi-
tants of Missouri ‘all the rights, advantages and immunities,’ which citizens of
the United States derive from the constitution thereof:—these rights may be
denominated federal rights, are uniform throughout the union, and are
common to all its citizens.”52
The idea that national rights involved only those rights “communicated”
or “derived” by the Constitution was essential to their argument.  The inhabi-
tants of the Louisiana Territory were promised nothing more than the consti-
tutionally enumerated rights, advantages, and immunities of citizens of the
United States.  As a creature of state law, one that differed from state to state,
the right to own slaves by definition was not one of these constitutionally
enumerated rights.  As David Morril declared, “[a]ll the rights [that citizens
of the United States] possess, as such, are derived from the Constitution.”53
These were not one-time arguments about an obscure treaty provision,
long forgotten by the time of the Civil War.  To begin with, the antislavery
advocates prevailed and Missouri was admitted as a free state.54  The lan-
guage of the Louisiana treaty was repeated in later treaties, including the
Alaska treaty of 1866.55  Most importantly, the arguments by Webster, Morril,
and King that the rights “of citizens of the United States” were only those
“derived” or “communicated” by the Constitution were republished in the
years just before the Civil War.  Webster’s speech was republished in 1854,
1856, and 1857,56 Rufus King’s speech was reprinted in 1857,57 and David
Morril’s speech was republished by Washington, D.C.’s Daily National Intelli-
gencer in 1859.58  The multiple republications of these arguments in books
and major newspapers on the threshold of the Civil War illustrate the longev-
ity of these arguments among antislavery Republicans.  This makes it quite
likely that they would be known among antislavery Reconstruction Republi-
Morrill].  Years later, as the nation’s struggle over slavery in the territories reached a boil-
ing point, newspapers republished Morrill’s speech. See The Territorial Question—No. III,
DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER, Sept. 15, 1859, at 3 (citing 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 145, 146
(1820)).
52 Rufus King, Mr. King’s Speeches, The Missouri Question (Nov. 22, 1817), in 17
NILES’ WKLY. REG. 209, 215 (1819); see also 2 NATIONAL RECORDER 388 (Philadelphia, Littell
& Henry 1819); Rufus King, Observations on the Slavery Question (Nov. 22, 1819), in
CONN. J., Dec. 21, 1819, at 1.  Rufus King’s speech was reprinted in 1857 as part of a collec-
tion of American political speeches.  Rufus King, Remarks on the Missouri Bill, in 2 FRANK
MOORE, AMERICAN ELOQUENCE 44, 46 (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1857).
53 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 146 (1820) (statement of Sen. Morril) (emphasis added).
54 See generally Missouri Compromise, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (1820).
55 Treaty Concerning the Cession of the Russian Possessions in North America by His
Majesty the Emperor of All the Russians to the United States of America, Russ.-U.S., art. III,
Mar. 30, 1867, 15 Stat. 539.
56 See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 50, as reprinted in THE NEBRASKA QUESTION 9 (New
York, Redfield 1854); see also HORACE GREELEY, A HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR SLAVERY
EXTENSION OR RESTRICTION IN THE UNITED STATES 22–23 (New York, Dix, Edwards & Co.
1856) (reprinting Webster’s speech, including his discussion of the Louisiana Cession Act).
57 See MOORE, supra note 52, at 46.
58 See The Territorial Question—No. III, supra note 51.
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cans.  This is particularly true of John Bingham, a Republican who regularly
praised and quoted Daniel Webster in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.59
Barnett and Bernick point out that the arguments of Webster, Morril,
and King were not the only arguments raised against proslavery opponents of
the Tallmadge Amendment.60  This is true, but irrelevant.  First of all, my
work explains in detail the various views in play during the Missouri admis-
sion debates.61  It is simply a fact, however, that one of those arguments relied
on an “enumerated-rights-only” understanding of the national rights of citi-
zens of the United States.  This particular argument was made repeatedly
during the Missouri debates and it was not contradicted by a single opponent
of slavery.  Most of all, it is the longevity of this argument, and its continued
importance among the opponents of slavery, that makes it especially impor-
tant to those seeking the original understanding of legal texts produced by
antislavery Republicans.
Barnett and Bernick suggest that since Webster, Morril, and King specifi-
cally mentioned only enumerated structural rights (such as the right of the
people in each state to be represented by two senators), they may have been
arguing that only structural rights counted as the rights of national citizen-
ship.62  No one, of course, made such an oddly restrictive claim.  Instead,
Morril himself declared that both structural rights and “all other rights derived
from the Constitution of the United States” were the rights “of citizens of the
United States.”63  Barnett and Bernick’s suggestion not only is implausible, it
is expressly contradicted by the evidence.
Barnett and Bernick attempt to undermine the importance of this evi-
dence by highlighting the arguments of proslavery advocates who insisted on
the unenumerated right to bring slaves into Missouri.64  Obviously, the views
of proslavery advocates tell us nothing about the antebellum constitutional
ideas most likely to have informed the efforts of antislavery Republicans in
the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  In fact, the proslavery arguments cited by Barnett
and Bernick highlight why antislavery advocates would embrace an “enumer-
ated-rights-only” understanding of the rights of national citizenship.
Barnett and Bernick also claim to have identified four antebellum cases
in which courts seem to adopt an unenumerated-rights understanding of the
“rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”65  Upon
examination, however, none of these cases stand for the proposition cited by
Barnett and Bernick.
59 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (speech of John Bingham).
60 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 532–33.
61 See LASH, supra note 2, at 52–61 (describing and quoting the different arguments by
proslavery and antislavery advocates).
62 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 535.
63 See 35 ANNALS OF CONG. 146 (1820) (statement of Sen. Morril) (emphasis added);
see also Mr. Morrill’s Speech—Concluded, supra note 51; Remarks of Mr. Morrill, supra note 51.
Years later, as the nation’s struggle over slavery in the territories reached a boiling point,
newspapers republished Morril’s speech. See The Territorial Question—No. III, supra note 51.
64 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 532–33.
65 Id. at 537–40.
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For example, Barnett and Bernick claim that in Desbois’ Case,66 Louisiana
courts held that “the rights and priviledges of a citizen of the United States”67
included the “federally unenumerated privilege of practicing law in Louisi-
ana.”68  An examination of Desbois, however, reveals no such holding.  Jean
Baptiste Desbois claimed that, because the Louisiana Cession Act made him a
citizen of the United States, he was entitled to practice law in the state of
Louisiana.  The Louisiana court ruled in favor of Desbois, but not on the
basis of an unenumerated federal privilege.  According to the court in
Desbois, “[b]y one of the rules of this Court, the application [to practice law]
is not to be admitted, unless he be a citizen of the United States.”69  After a
lengthy discussion, the court concluded that Desbois, as an inhabitant of the
territory of Louisiana at the time of the Louisiana treaty, became a citizen of
the state upon its admission into the Union.70  As Joseph Story would later
agree, when Desbois became a citizen of one of the several states he was ipso
facto made a citizen of the United States.  Therefore, according to the rules
of the state court, Desbois had the state-conferred right to practice law in Loui-
siana.  There is no discussion anywhere in Desbois regarding an unenumer-
ated federal right to practice law.71
United States v. Laverty,72 the next case cited by Barnett and Bernick,
involved whether inhabitants of the Louisiana Territory at the time of the
treaty became citizens of the state.73  If so, then they also became citizens of
the United States and were not subject to laws regulating enemy aliens.  The
Laverty decision explores who counts as an “inhabitant” under the treaty and
congressional statutes.  The federal court concluded that, “by the several acts
of congress, and the admission of the state of Louisiana into the Union, all
the bona fide inhabitants became citizens of this state.”74  There is nothing in
Laverty about “rights, privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States” including unenumerated federal rights.
Desbois and Laverty are the only two cases identified by Barnett and
Bernick as involving the actual enforcement of an unenumerated “right,
advantage and immunity of citizens of the United States.”  As we have seen,
they do no such thing.  The only other cases cited by Barnett and Bernick
involve nothing more than dicta that the authors claim imply the existence of
unenumerated rights “of citizens of the United States.”  These claims fare no
better.
66 Desbois’ Case, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 185 (La. 1812).
67 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 538 (quoting Desbois, 2 Mart. (o.s.) at 201–02).
68 Id.
69 Desbois, 2 Mart. (o.s.) at 185.
70 Id. at 201–02.
71 Professor Christopher Green makes the same mistaken assertion about Desbois as
“contradict[ing] Webster’s constitutional-rights-only construction [of the Louisiana treaty
language].”  Christopher R. Green, Incorporation, Total Incorporation, and Nothing but Incorpo-
ration?, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 93, 113 (2015).
72 26 F. Cas. 875 (D. La. 1812) (No. 15,569a).
73 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 538.
74 Laverty, 26 F. Cas. at 877.
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For example, Barnett and Bernick argue that dicta in Chief Justice John
Marshall’s opinion in City of New Orleans v. Armas75 carries the “implica-
tion . . . that the constitutionally unenumerated right to have titles decided
by the tribunals of one’s own state was among the ‘rights, advantages and
immunities of citizens of the United States.’”76  This is a remarkable interpre-
tation of dicta in a case involving an otherwise unremarkable point: disputes
over title are matters of state law, and therefore are not among the “rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States” over which fed-
eral courts have Article III jurisdiction.77  Wrote Chief Justice John Marshall:
“The inhabitants of Louisiana enjoy all the advantages of American citizens,
in common with their brethren in their sister states, when their titles are
decided by the tribunals of the state.”78  To Barnett and Bernick, Marshall’s
reference to the reserved power of the states to decide local property-title
disputes is actually an implied declaration that “citizens of the United States”
have an unenumerated federal right to have title disputes decided by state
tribunals.79  But there is nothing in the opinion that justifies, much less
requires, such an understanding of Marshall’s brief reference to constitu-
tional federalism and the rights of citizens to local self-government.  If there
is any implication in Marshall’s dicta, it is an implied reference to the Tenth
Amendment.80
Barnett and Bernick also cite Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Delassus
v. United States.81  Here, the authors quote Marshall’s statement that the Loui-
siana treaty’s language of “rights, advantages and immunities” included “the
perfect inviolability and security of property.”82  Once again, the authors
believe they have found dicta implying Marshall’s belief in unenumerated
absolute federal rights.  Marshall’s opinion, however, discusses whether the
Louisiana treaty preserved preexisting vested property rights.83  The protec-
tion of vested property rights, of course, is an antebellum doctrine associated
75 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 224 (1835).
76 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 539.
77 Armas, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 235.
78 Id.
79 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 539.
80 Even if Marshall’s dicta could be read as implying the existence of such a right, he
would be referring to the federally enumerated right not to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law.  I have the same response to Barnett and Bernick’s
attempt to make something out of Justice Curtis’s reliance on Armas in his Dred Scott dis-
sent. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 539–40.
81 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 117 (1835).
82 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 537 n.235 (quoting Delassus, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at
133).
83 Delassus, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 133 (“The right of property then is protected and
secured by the treaty; and no principle is better settled in this country, than that an incho-
ate title to lands is property.  Independent of treaty stipulation, this right would be held
sacred.  The sovereign who acquires an inhabited territory, acquires full dominion over it;
but this dominion is never supposed to divest the vested rights of individuals to property.
The language of the treaty ceding Louisiana excludes every idea of interfering with private
property . . . .”).
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with the enumerated right not to be deprived of life, liberty, and property with-
out due process of law.84  At most, Marshall is signaling his belief that vested
property rights are one of the enumerated rights of citizens of the United
States protected under the enumerated Due Process Clause.  In any event,
Marshall simply holds that that property right at issue “is protected and
secured by the [Louisiana] treaty” because “[t]he language of the treaty ced-
ing Louisiana excludes every idea of interfering with private property.”85
There is no language anywhere in Delassus suggesting that the treaty’s phrase
“rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States” refers to
rights nowhere enumerated in the Constitution.
Having failed to undermine the express statements and continued influ-
ence of the theories of Webster, Morril, and King, and having failed to pro-
duce a single example of an antislavery advocate (politician or judge) who
held an unenumerated-rights reading of the treaty language, Barnett and
Bernick are reduced to trying to amplify the sounds of silence.  For example,
they emphasize the failure of Justices John McLean and Benjamin Curtis to
use the enumerated-rights reading of the “rights . . . of citizens of the United
States” treaty language in their response to Justice John Catron’s concur-
rence in Dred Scott. According to Barnett and Bernick “[s]uch an argument
would have been expected, had the antebellum legal meaning of ‘privileges
or immunities’ been limited to enumerated guarantees.”86  The fact that
these Justices did not use this argument in response to Catron contributes to
what Barnett and Bernick characterize as a “deafening” judicial silence.87
This is not the only time in their critique that Barnett and Bernick attempt to
use silence as evidence.88  As we shall see, none of these attempts are
persuasive.
In the case of Dred Scott, for example, a close examination of Justice
Catron’s concurrence reveals that he was not discussing the treaty’s Article III
reference to the “rights . . . of citizens of the United States.”89  Catron instead
was discussing the same Article’s promise to territorial inhabitants that,
although they could anticipate receiving the rights of national citizenship in
the future, “in the mean time,”90 their property rights would be guaranteed.
As Catron put it:
84 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 423 (2010).  For a discussion of antebellum vested rights doctrine as a due process
separation-of-powers principle, see Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Pro-
cess as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672 (2012).
85 Delassus, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) at 133 (emphasis added).
86 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 540.
87 Id.
88 See, e.g., id. at 533 (discussing Missouri debates); id. at 545–46 (the supposed “dog
that did not bark” in John Bingham’s discussion of suffrage); id. at 551 (similar argument
regarding Howard’s treatment of suffrage); id. at 569–70 (same argument regarding
Republican’s treatment of suffrage issue).
89 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 524 (1857) (Catron, J., concurring).
90 Id. (emphasis added).
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[T]he treaty as expressly provided as it did for the inhabitants residing in the
province when the treaty was made. All these were to be protected ‘in the mean
time;’ that is to say, at all times, between the date of the treaty and the time
when the portion of the Territory where the inhabitants resided was admit-
ted into the Union as a State.
At the date of the treaty, each inhabitant had the right to the free enjoy-
ment of his property, alike with his liberty and his religion, in every part of
Louisiana; the province then being one country, he might go everywhere in
it, and carry his liberty, property, and religion, with him, and in which he
was to be maintained and protected, until he became a citizen of a State of the
Union of the United States.91
As the final sentence makes clear, Catron was not discussing the rights of
national citizenship.  He was making a claim about rights guaranteed to
inhabitants by the treaty at the time of the original cession.  In their dissents,
McLean and Curtis similarly addressed the treaty’s guaranty of inhabitants’
property rights at the time of cession, and not the rights of national citizen-
ship.92  All of these justices were “silent” about the enumerated rights of
national citizenship because that issue was not being discussed.  So much for
a “deafening” silence.
In sum, I have produced evidence of high-profile, nationally published
arguments that the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the
United States” involved only those rights enumerated in the Constitution.
These arguments remained influential among antislavery advocates right up
to the time of Civil War.  I also have produced persuasive evidence that the
term “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states” was broadly
viewed as referring to nothing more than equal access to a limited set of
state-secured rights—again, even Barnett and Bernick concede the existence
of this very different set of “privileges and immunities.”
Barnett and Bernick, on the other hand, have failed to produce a single
example of anyone, either politician or judge, who during the antebellum
period described the “rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the
United States” as involving unenumerated constitutional rights other than pro-
slavery advocates.  Far from undermining my claims, their own evidence illus-
trates why the “only-enumerated-rights” understanding of the “privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States” would have influenced the think-
ing of antislavery Republicans.
Unable to deny the existence of two strains of antebellum “privileges
and immunities,” Barnett and Bernick hedge their claims by denying the
existence of an antebellum “consensus” regarding these two strains, and by
91 Id. at 525 (first and fourth emphases added).
92 See id. at 557 (McLean, J., dissenting) (“[B]y no admissible construction can the
guaranty be carried further than the protection of property in slaves at that time in the
ceded territory.”) (emphasis added); id. at 631 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (“[I]ts sole object
was to protect individual rights of the then inhabitants of the territory.  They are to be
‘maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the relig-
ion they profess.’”).
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denying that an enumerated-rights understanding was “widely held.”93  But
these hedges simply dodge the importance of antebellum historical evidence
distinguishing “privileges and immunities” of Article IV from the “privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.  This evidence establishes
that there was a clear consensus that Article IV’s “privileges and immunities
of citizens in the several states” involved state secured rights and did not
involve absolute national rights (enumerated or otherwise).  It also estab-
lishes that antebellum discussions of the term “privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States,” invariably referred to nationally secured rights,
with antislavery advocates linking the phrase to constitutionally enumerated
rights.  Slavery advocates, of course, promoted very different understanding
of the rights of national citizenship.  Their definition, however, did not sur-
vive the Civil War.
D. Enumerated Rights and Antebellum Republican Theory
As the Missouri debate illustrates, northern abolitionists had good rea-
son to commit themselves to an enumerated-rights reading of national privi-
leges and immunities.  This not only refuted slaveholder claims of an
unenumerated right to hold slaves, it also laid the ground work for a constitu-
tional theory opposing slavery.  In the years prior to the Civil War, abolition-
ists increasingly cited rights enumerated in the first eight amendments as
representing national privileges and immunities that states had no right to
ignore.  For example, consider the following passages from abolitionist Joel
Tiffany’s A Treatise on the Unconstitutionality of American Slavery (1849).  As you
read, notice that Tiffany clearly and repeatedly defines the “privileges and
immunities of citizenship of the United States” as constitutionally enumerated
rights:
What are the privileges, and immunities of citizenship, of the United
States?
We have already seen that to be a citizen of the United States, is to be
entitled to the benefits of all the guarantys of the Federal Constitution for
personal security, personal liberty and private property. . . .
. . . .
But what further guarantys, for personal security and liberty, could a
government provide, than the constitution of the United States has already
provided?  It has secured the right of petition,—the right to keep and bear
arms, the right to be secure from all unwarrantable seizures and searches,—
the right to demand, and have a presentment, or indictment found by a
grand jury before he shall be held to answer to any criminal charge,—the
right to be informed beforehand of the nature and cause of accusation
against him, the right to a public and speedy trial by an impartial jury of his
peers,—the right to confront those who testify against him,—the right to
have compulsory process to bring in his witnesses,—the right to demand and
have counsel for his defence,—the right to be exempt from excessive bail, or
93 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 540 (emphasis added).
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fines, &e., from cruel and unusual punishments, or from being twice jeop-
ardized for the same offence; and the right to the privileges of the great writ of
Liberty, the Habeas Corpus.  And all these guarantys preceded by the express
declaration, that they are given to establish justice, provide for the common
defence, and secure the blessings of liberty.94
In the above, Joel Tiffany cites only enumerated constitutional rights as
the “privileges and immunities of citizenship of the United States.”  Although
Tiffany lists rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, he also includes other
enumerated rights such as the habeas corpus rights found in Article I, Sec-
tion 9, Clause 2.  We shall see Jacob Howard in the Thirty-Ninth Congress
take the same approach.
Despite antebellum cases such as Barron v. Baltimore, which held that the
Bill of Rights bound only the national government,95 Tiffany insisted that
these enumerated constitutional rights also bound the states.96  Tiffany was
not the only antebellum constitutional theorist to insist that the “privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States” enumerated in the Bill of
Rights ought to bind both state and federal governments—as other scholars
have documented.97  We will find this same idea in the antebellum speeches
of John Bingham, the man who would eventually draft the Privileges or
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. The Fifth Amendment, the Declaration of Independence,
and Abolitionist Constitutional Theory
The enumerated constitutional right of greatest interest to abolition
constitutionalists was the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Tif-
fany, for example, argued that the Due Process Clause could not be recon-
ciled with the existence of chattel slavery since “[i]t cannot be claimed that
the word ‘person’ [in the Due Process Clause] does not include the so called
slave.”98  In the years prior to the Civil War, antislavery advocates increasingly
focused on the Due Process Clause as proving that the Constitution was fun-
damentally a profreedom document.99  Frederick Douglass, for example,
94 JOEL TIFFANY, A TREATISE ON THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 97–99
(Cleveland, J. Calyer 1849).
95 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833).
96 TIFFANY, supra note 94, at 106 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law.  No person shall be held to answer to a capital. or other-
wise infamous crime, but upon presentment or indictment &c.  No. person shall be twice
put in jeopardy of life, or limb, &c., &c., &c., all these, and such like guaranties. are
National in their character, and binding upon the State, as well as the National
Government.”).
97 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 142
(1998).
98 TIFFANY, supra note 94, at 120.
99 In addition to other sources cited in this section, see Speech of Hon. D.E. Maxon, of
Allegheny, on the Personal Liberty Bill (Mar. 14, 1800), in ALBANY EVENING J., Mar. 19,
1860, at 1 (discussing the Virginia bill of rights, the Preamble to the Constitution, the
rights of habeas corpus, and the Fifth Amendment as all opposing slavery).
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broke from the anti-Constitution theories of William Lloyd Garrison and
argued that a plain reading of the Due Process Clause and other enumerated
constitutional rights could not be reconciled with the existence of slavery.100
Likewise, the 1860 Republican Party Platform declared that the Due Process
Clause obligated Congress to oppose slavery in the territories.101
To many antebellum abolitionists, the Due Process Clause formed the
bridge between the natural rights asserted in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and the enumerated legal requirements of the American Constitution.
To these abolitionists, the Due Process Clause was the embodiment of the Dec-
laration of Independence.  As the 1844 Liberty Party Platform declared:
Resolved, That the fundamental truths of the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, was made
the fundamental law of our National Government, by that amendment of the Consti-
tution which declares that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.102
When Congress debated the Thirteenth Amendment, abolitionists
repeatedly linked the natural rights asserted in Declaration of Independence
to the enumerated Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law.  For example, Senator Charles Sum-
ner of Massachusetts declared that “the distinctive elements of a republic
according to the idea of American institutions” were found,
first, in the Declaration of Independence, by which it is solemnly announced
“that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”  And they
will be found, secondly, in that other guarantee and prohibition of the Con-
stitution, in harmony with the Declaration of Independence; “no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”103
This melding of the Declaration of Independence and the Due Process
Clause is also apparent in Owen Lovejoy’s speech in the Thirty-Eighth Con-
gress, introducing a bill to end the practice of slavery.  On December 14,
1863, Representative Owen Lovejoy of Illinois “introduced a bill to give effect
to the Declaration of Independence, and also to certain provisions of the
Constitution of the United States” by abolishing slavery in the territories.104
As reported in the Congressional Globe:
100 See Frederick Douglass, “The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-
Slavery?” (1860), in ANTISLAVERY POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1833–1860, at 144, 153–54 (C. Brad-
ley Thompson ed., 2004).
101 Republican Party Platform, in A POLITICAL TEXT-BOOK FOR 1860, at 26, 26–27 (New
York, Tribune Ass’n 1860), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 363, 364 (Henry
Steele Commager ed., 6th ed. 1958).
102 REINHARD O. JOHNSON, THE LIBERTY PARTY, 1840–1848: ANTISLAVERY THIRD-PARTY
POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 316–17 (2009) (second emphasis added).
103 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1480 (1864) (statement of Sen. Sumner)
(emphasis omitted).
104 Id. at 20.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 20  2-JAN-20 13:28
610 notre dame law review [vol. 95:2
[Lovejoy’s] bill was read.  It recite[d] that all men were created equal,
and were endowed by the Creator with the inalienable right to life, liberty,
and the fruits of honest toil; that the Government of the United States was
instituted to secure those rights; that the Constitution declares that no per-
son shall be deprived of liberty without due process of law . . . .105
Notice that Lovejoy substituted the phrase “the fruits of honest toil” for
the Declaration’s term “pursuit of happiness,” and then he quoted the Due
Process Clause as an example of how the Constitution secures the rights to
“life, liberty, and the fruits of honest toil.”  This equating of natural (inaliena-
ble) due process property rights with “the fruits of honest toil,” was a com-
mon Republican trope.  In an 1857 speech opposing slavery in Kansas, for
example, John Bingham repeated the common abolitionist argument that
slavery was incompatible with the equal rights of life, liberty, and property
enumerated in the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.106  Accord-
ing to Bingham, the Due Process Clause prohibited wrongful deprivations of
the “production of labor” and the “fruit[s] of his toil.”  He stated:
The Constitution provides, as we have seen, that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.  It makes no distinc-
tion either on account of complexion or birth—it secures these rights to all
persons within its exclusive jurisdiction.  This is equality.  It protects not only
life and liberty, but also property, the product of labor.  It contemplates that
no man shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of
his life.107
In their “critique,” Barnett and Bernick insist that Bingham’s references
to the rights of labor and the fruits of one’s toil are references to unenumer-
ated absolute rights.108  They are wrong.  Such references instead echo a
long Republican tradition of describing the constitutionally enumerated
right not to be deprived of property without due process of law as including
“the production of labor” and each man’s right not to be wrongfully deprived
of the “fruit of his toil.”
Barnett and Bernick’s failure to understand Bingham’s use of phrases
relating to the fruits of one’s toil causes a cascade of mistakes in their analysis
of John Bingham and the arguments in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  Because
Bingham later appears to include Article IV as part of the Bill of Rights, and
because Barnett and Bernick incorrectly believe Bingham included the
unenumerated “right to the fruits of one’s toil” in Article IV, they conclude
Bingham used the phrase “Bill of Rights” to include unenumerated rights.109
For example, Barnett and Bernick write:
What about Bingham’s references to the “bill of rights”?  We have seen
that the phrase “bill of rights” was not deployed by Bingham solely to refer to
what Lash regards as enumerated rights.  Thus, in the course of defending
105 Id. (reporter’s account of the reading of the bill).
106 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140 (1857) (speech of Rep. Bingham).
107 Id.
108 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 544.
109 See id.
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his initial proposal, Bingham had characterized the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV—which he described in 1859 as affording protection
to the (unenumerated) right to “work and enjoy the product of . . . toil”—as
part of the “bill of rights.”110
Barnett and Bernick’s failure to understand Bingham’s reference to the
constitutionally enumerated due process right not to be deprived of the
products of one’s “toil” in his 1859 speech causes their entire chain of rea-
soning to collapse.  Bingham never described the Bill of Rights, or any of the
privileges and immunities of national citizenship, as involving anything other
than enumerated rights.
F. John Bingham and the Natural Right of All Persons to Due Process
Some enumerated rights, of course, involved principles that John Bing-
ham and other Reconstruction-era Republicans viewed as natural rights.
This was particularly true of Bingham’s view of the Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.
In his 1857 speech opposing the allowance of slavery in Kansas, John
Bingham insisted that “no man should be deprived of liberty or property but
by the judgment of his peers and the law of the land.”111  According to Bing-
ham, the enumerated rights protected by the ordinance were affixed to the
text of the Constitution through the adoption of the Bill of Rights.  “The fifth
and sixth of these amendments,” Bingham explained, “contain substantially,
and almost literally, the provisions of the articles of the ordinance, and, like
them, declare that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law . . . .”112  These rights of all persons, Bingham
insisted, were natural rights:
The Constitution is based upon the Equality of the human race. . . .  Its
primal object must be to protect each human being within its jurisdiction in
the free and full enjoyment of his natural rights.
. . . .
It must be apparent that the absolute equality of all, and the equal protec-
tion of each, are principles of our Constitution, which ought to be observed
and enforced in the organization and admission of new States.  The Consti-
tution provides, as we have seen, that no person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law.  It makes no distinction either
on account of complexion or birth—it secures these rights to all persons
within its exclusive jurisdiction.  This is equality.  It protects not only life and
liberty, but also property, the product of labor.  It contemplates that no man
shall be wrongfully deprived of the fruit of his toil any more than of his
life.113
110 Id. (omission in original).
111 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 137 (1857) (speech of Rep. Bingham).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 139–40.
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To Bingham, the Due Process Clause guaranteed to all persons the equal
protection of their natural rights.  These rights included the equal right of every
man not to be deprived of the “fruit of his toil” without due process of law.
As we shall see, this idea will inform Bingham’s due process understanding of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act—an act responding to the South’s failure to equally
protect the property and labor rights of all persons.  In the above passage,
one sees the theoretical origins of Bingham’s eventual draft of the Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection Clauses—provisions both protecting what Bing-
ham understood to be the natural rights of all persons.
G. John Bingham’s Antebellum Theory of Article IV and the Bill of Rights
(the Oregon Speech)
John Bingham’s theory of the privileges and immunities of national citi-
zenship—a theory that would inform his first draft of Section 1—is clearly
evident in his 1859 speech opposing the admission of Oregon.114  Although
Oregon’s proposed state constitution banned slavery, it also excluded free
blacks from entering the state and prohibited blacks from owning property,
entering into contracts, or filing suit in Oregon state court.115  To Bingham,
these restrictions amounted to a denial of the right to due process of law as
declared by the Fifth Amendment to the federal Constitution.116  Bingham
insisted that a combination of Article IV and the Supremacy Clause obligated
every state in the Union, including the proposed state of Oregon, to enforce
the enumerated rights in the first eight amendments, including the Fifth
Amendment.
Bingham’s theory relied on a passage in Joseph Story’s influential Com-
mentaries on the Constitution where Story noted that citizens of the states are
“ipso facto [citizens] of the United States.”117  As Bingham explained, if citi-
zens of a state are, by necessary implication, citizens of the United States,
then Article IV may be read as if it contains an “ellipsis,” or an implied paren-
thesis: citizens (of the United States) of each state shall be entitled to all
privileges and immunities of citizens (of the United States) in the several
states.118
114 Readers may find the full speech at CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85
(1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
115 See id. at 984.
116 See id.
117 3 STORY, supra note 29, §§ 1687–1688, at 565–66; see also CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong.,
2d Sess. 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“It has always been well understood
amongst jurists in this country, that the citizens of each State constitute the body politic of
each community, called the people of the State; and that the citizens of each State in the
Union are ipso facto citizens of the United States.” (citing 3 STORY, supra note 29, at 565)).
118 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(“There is an ellipsis in the language employed in the Constitution, but its meaning is self-
evident that it is ‘the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States in the
several States’ that it guaranties.”).
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When read with this implied “ellipsis,” Article IV obligates the states to
respect all of the rights of U.S. citizens, including the enumerated equal
right of all persons not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.  According to Bingham, because the racially discriminatory
provisions in the proposed Oregon Constitution violated this enumerated
right of national citizenship, it should be rejected.  As we shall see, John Bing-
ham relied on the same “ellipsis” theory of Article IV in support of his first
(and ultimately unsuccessful) submitted draft of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.119
As he had done in 1857, Bingham again explained that the Fifth Amend-
ment guaranteed natural rights belonging to all persons.  According to Bing-
ham, “natural or inherent rights, which belong to all men irrespective of all
conventional regulations, are by this constitution guarantied by the broad
and comprehensive word ‘person,’ as contradistinguished from the limited
term citizen—as in the fifth article of amendments.”120  In this case, the dis-
criminatory provisions of the proposed Oregon Constitution violated the
equal right of every person “to work and enjoy the product of their toil”121—
language echoing Bingham’s previous description of the Fifth Amendment
right not to be deprived of the “product of labor” or the “fruit of his toil”
without due process of law.122
Throughout his Oregon speech, Bingham mentions a number of “privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States,” including the Fifth
Amendment right not to have “private property . . . taken without just com-
pensation,”123 and the First Amendment “right to know; to argue and to
utter, according to conscience.”124  Every “privilege and immunity” of
national citizenship Bingham names involved rights expressly enumerated in
the federal Constitution.  It was precisely because these privileges and immu-
nities were enumerated in the Constitution that Bingham could argue that
“[n]o State may rightfully, by constitution or statute law, impair any of these
guarantied rights” without violating the Supremacy Clause of the federal Con-
stitution.125  By limiting his argument to provisions in the proposed Oregon
Constitution that violated the enumerated constitutional privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, Bingham could plausibly insist, “I
ask no change of the law as it is written in the Federal Constitution.  I leave
the States as that constitution leaves them . . . .”126
119 See infra notes 169–81 and accompanying text. .
120 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
121 Id. at 985.
122 CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140 (1857) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
123 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
124 Id. at 985.  Bingham expressly connected these rights with the First Amendment.
See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 124 (1856).
125 CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 983 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
126 Id. at 985.
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Bingham’s Oregon speech is important for several reasons.  It lays out a
number of constitutional theories that will reappear in Bingham’s speeches
in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, including his “ellipsis” theory of Article IV, his
distinction between the privileges and immunities of citizens and the natural
rights of all persons, and his singular focus on the enumerated rights of the
Constitution as provisions to which states ought already be bound.  When
viewed in conjunction with his other antebellum speeches, it also reveals par-
ticular turns of phrases like a man’s right to the “fruits of his toil” and the
“right to know; to argue and to utter, according to conscience” as references
to enumerated constitutional rights.
H. Summary of Part I
Despite their best efforts, Barnett and Bernick have failed to undermine
any aspect of the antebellum evidence that supports the enumerated-rights
understanding of the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.  They concede that antebellum courts and commentators broadly
understood Corfield v. Coryell and Article IV’s “privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states” as providing no more than relative protection
for a limited set of “fundamental” state secured rights.  This set of “privileges
and immunities” has been shown to be distinct from those national privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States discussed in public controver-
sies like the debates over the admission of Missouri.  Those debates show
antislavery activists deploying an enumerated-rights reading of the “rights,
advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States.”  According to
these antislavery advocates, the rights of national citizenship were only those
enumerated in the Constitution.  These antislavery arguments remained
influential, and repeated, right up to the time of the Civil War.  Most signifi-
cantly, the future draftsman of Section 1, John Bingham, described the rights
of national citizenship in terms that involve only enumerated rights.
Barnett and Bernick not only have failed to call into question any of this
evidence, they have failed to identify a single instance of an abolitionist, an
antislavery constitutionalist, or an antebellum Republican expressing any-
thing other than an enumerated-rights understanding of the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.  Their attempt to find such evi-
dence in antebellum caselaw is unpersuasive and their arguments about ref-
erences to unenumerated rights in the speeches of John Bingham are simply
wrong.
It was against this antebellum theoretical background that members of
the Thirty-Ninth Congress began their discussions of provisions that would
form Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As we shall see, time and
again, these members referred back to the consensus antebellum under-
standing of Corfield v Coryell and Article IV, Section 2.  Most importantly, John
Bingham’s theory of the constitutionally enumerated rights of national citi-
zenship, and the natural rights of all persons to the equal protection of their
rights of due process, became constitutionalized in the text of Section 1 of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
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II. THE THIRTY-NINTH CONGRESS
A. Introduction to Part II
Although this Article necessarily focuses on discussions involving the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, it is important to keep in mind the broader
context of Congress’s work in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  Within days of the
opening roll call on December 4, 1865, Secretary of State Seward announced
the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.127  The Senate Judiciary
Committee immediately began work on what would become the 1866 Civil
Rights Act—legislation Judiciary Committee Chairman Lyman Trumbull
would insist was an appropriate exercise of power under Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment.128  In the House, meanwhile, Representative Thad-
deus Stevens called for the creation of a Joint Committee made up of mem-
bers from both the House and Senate.129  The Joint Committee would be
tasked with determining what actions had to be taken before Congress would
allow the readmission of representatives from the former Confederacy.  This
committee, of which John Bingham was a member, would draft and submit a
variety of proposed constitutional amendments.  None of these proposals
would gain sufficient support until May 1866, when Stevens convinced the
Joint Committee to combine the separate proposals into a single five-section
amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment.130  In the meantime, the Senate
would spend the opening weeks of its session debating Trumbull’s proposed
Civil Rights Act, and the House would spend its opening weeks debating pro-
posed constitutional amendments submitted by the Joint Committee, includ-
ing an amendment drafted by John Bingham.131  From the beginning,
therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act were on dif-
ferent tracks, drafted by different people, and reflected different agendas.
B. John Bingham and the First Submitted Draft of Section 1
On December 6, 1865, only two days after the opening of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress, John Bingham introduced two joint resolutions proposing
amendments to the Constitution.  The first forbade assuming the war-
incurred debts of the rebel states.132  The second was meant to “empower
Congress to pass all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in
every State of the Union equal protection in their rights, life, liberty, and
127 See Proclamation No. 52, 13 Stat. 774 (Dec. 18, 1865) (Secretary of State William H.
Seward).
128 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474–76 (1866) (statement of Lyman Trum-
bull) (discussing the proposed Civil Rights Bill).
129 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1865) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
130 See KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 82–88.
131 For a general description of these events and their timing, see Kurt T. Lash, Enforc-
ing the Rights of Due Process: The Original Relationship Between the Fourteenth Amendment and the
1866 Civil Rights Act, 106 GEO. L.J. 1389 (2018).
132 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1865) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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property.”133  Although the Congressional Globe does not give us the exact
language of Bingham’s proposed amendment, we know that this was an
effort to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  In his
antebellum speeches, Bingham had repeatedly described the Due Process
Clause as embodying the principle of equality and the natural right of all
persons to the equal protection of their right not to be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law.134  Ultimately, Bingham sepa-
rated the ideas of equal protection and due process into the final two clauses
of Section 1.  Even in their final form, however, these clauses continue to
reflect Bingham’s belief that the principles of equal protection and due pro-
cess protect natural rights belonging to all persons.
Bingham’s initial proposals were sent to the House Judiciary Committee.
That committee, however, would not be tasked with the job of discussing
proposed constitutional amendments in the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  Instead,
the House and Senate formed the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, and
selected John Bingham as one of its fifteen members.135 This committee was
tasked with drafting and submitting proposed constitutional amendments
that the committee believed must be added to the Constitution before
allowing the readmission of the former rebel states.136
On January 9, 1865, in a speech addressing President Johnson’s policies,
John Bingham laid out the basic constitutional theory that would guide his
efforts that session towards securing a specific constitutional amendment.
“[I]n view of the fact that many of the States . . . have flagrantly violated the
absolute guarantees of the Constitution of the United States to all its citi-
zens,” Bingham declared, “it is time that we take security for the future, so
that like occurrences may not again arise to distract our people and finally to
dismember the Republic.”137  Using the same “ellipsis” theory of the Comity
Clause that Bingham first articulated in his 1859 speech opposing the admis-
sion of Oregon,138 Bingham explained how Article IV, Section 2 already obli-
gated the states to respect the privileges and immunities “of citizens of the
United States”:
When you come to weigh these words, “equal and exact justice to all
men,” go read, if you please, the words of the Constitution itself: “The citi-
zens of each State (being ipso facto citizens of the United States) shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens (supplying the ellipsis
‘of the United States’) in the several States.”  This guarantee is of the privi-
leges and immunities of citizens of the United States in, not of, the several
133 Id.
134 See supra notes 114–26 and accompanying text.
135 See KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 38–39. The Senate authorized the creation of the
Joint Committee on December 12, 1865, and the House followed suit the next day. See
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1865) (Senate); id. at 47–48 (House).
136 For representative documents of the Joint Committee and their proposed constitu-
tional amendments, see 2 KURT T. LASH, THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS (forthcoming
2020).
137 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
138 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 27  2-JAN-20 13:28
2019] response  to  barnett  and  bernick 617
States.  This guarantee of your Constitution applies to every citizen of every
State of the Union; there is not a guarantee more sacred, and none more
vital in that great instrument.139
As he had argued before the Civil War, Bingham maintained that the
citizens of each State are, by definition, “citizens of the United States.”  This
being the case, one could read Article IV as if it referred to the privileges and
immunities “of citizens of the United States.”  So understood, Article IV obli-
gated the states to respect all of the rights of national citizenship.
Bingham then pointed out that the states “have flagrantly violated the
absolute guarantees of the Constitution of the United States to all its citizens,”140
including the natural rights protected by the Fifth Amendment.  Bingham
therefore intended to propose an amendment “giving to Congress the power
to pass all laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons—which includes
every citizen of every State—their equal personal rights.”141  Such an amend-
ment, Bingham insisted, will not “mar” the Constitution, but “will perfect
it.”142
Following up on his promise, on January 12, 1865, Bingham introduced
to the Joint Committee an amendment granting Congress “power to make all
laws necessary and proper to secure to all persons in every state within this
Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty and property.”143  His
proposal was sent to a subcommittee made up of William Pitt Fessenden,
Thaddeus Stevens, Jacob Howard, Roscoe Conkling, and John Bingham him-
self.144  On January 20, that subcommittee reported three proposed amend-
ments to the full Joint Committee.  Two were apportionment amendments
(the eventual subject of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment).  The third
was an expanded version of Bingham’s January 12 proposal: “Congress shall
have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all citizens of
the United States, in every State, the same political rights and privileges; and
to all persons in every State equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty
and property.”145
The Joint Committee postponed discussion of the above equal protec-
tion amendment and instead focused on the apportionment amendments.146
The committee ultimately adopted one version of the apportionment amend-
ment and submitted the same to the House, where it was debated during the
final days of January 1866.147  During those debates, Bingham signaled that
this was just the first of a number of proposed amendments the Joint Com-
139 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
140 Id. (emphasis added).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 46.
144 Id. at 46–47.
145 Id. at 51.
146 Id.
147 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 351, 353–59, 376–89, 403–07, 422–35,
508 (1866).  For a selection of those debates, see 2 LASH, supra note 136.
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mittee was likely to send to the House.  The Joint Committee, he explained,
was currently working on an amendment empowering Congress “to enforce
in behalf of every citizen of every State and of every Territory in the Union
the rights which were guarantied to him from the beginning.”148  Acknowledging
that some of his colleagues believed that Congress already “has the power,
implied necessarily, to enforce all the guarantees of the Constitution,” Bing-
ham insisted this was not the case.149  Congressional enforcement of the
rights of national citizenship required a constitutional amendment. Bingham
explained:
[Y]our Constitution declares that no person shall be deprived of life without
due process of law; yet, in support of what I have just said on the necessity of
an additional grant of power, allow me to remind the House of the fact that
this highest right which pertains to man or citizen, life, has never yet been
protected, and is not now protected, in any State of this Union by the statute
law of the United States. . . . And this results from the accepted construction
that this Government has not the power by law to enforce in the States this
guarantee of life.150
In fact, as Bingham spoke, the Joint Committee was working on an
amendment empowering congressional enforcement of equal rights.  The
committee struggled, however, to find agreement on the right language.  On
January 27, Bingham reported the subcommittee’s slightly modified draft:
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to secure all persons in every state full protection in the enjoyment of
life, liberty and property; and to all citizens of the United States in any State
the same immunities and also equal political rights and privileges.151
On February 3, Bingham proposed replacing the subcommittee’s propo-
sal with an entirely new draft:
The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper to secure to the citizens of each state all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states; and to all persons in the several States
equal protection in the rights of life, liberty and property.152
This proposal deleted the phrase “equal political rights and privileges”
from the subcommittee’s draft, and instead adopted the language of Article
IV, Section 2, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.  Having stud-
ied John Bingham’s antebellum speeches, we can see how this proposal
reflects Bingham’s particular theory of the rights of citizenship and the equal
natural rights of all persons.  The language of Article IV (according to Bing-
ham’s ellipsis theory) obligates the states to respect all of the enumerated
rights of national citizenship, while the language of the Due Process Clause




151 KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 56.
152 Id. at 61.
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declares all persons’ equal natural right not to be unjustly deprived of life,
liberty, or property.  Both represented rights that Bingham insisted had been
“guarantied to [citizens] from the beginning,” but that Congress had previ-
ously lacked the enumerated power to enforce.
The Joint Committee adopted Bingham’s substitute153 and, on February
10, 1866, voted to submit the amendment to the House for deliberation.154
Bingham introduced the proposal to the House on February 26,155 and, for
the next three days, the House debated the Joint Committee’s first submitted
draft of what would become Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
C. “[T]o enforce obedience to these requirements of the Constitution . . .”156:
The First Draft of Section 1
On February 26, 1866, John Bingham introduced his amendment and
delivered a short speech explaining its purpose and meaning.  Bingham
began by stressing the limited nature of the proposal.  He called
the attention of the House to the fact that the amendment proposed stands
in the very words of the Constitution of the United States as it came to us
from the hands of its illustrious framers.  Every word of the proposed
amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our country, save the words con-
ferring the express grant of power upon the Congress of the United
States.157
The amendment, Bingham explained, used “the language of the second sec-
tion of the fourth article, and of a portion of the fifth amendment adopted
by the First Congress in 1789, and made part of the Constitution of the coun-
try.”158  Although such rights were already enumerated in the Constitution, it
had been “the want of the Republic that there was not an express grant of
power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State, by con-
gressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of the
Constitution.”159  The limited scope of the proposal ensured that the amend-
ment did not violate any constitutional rights of the people in the states,
since “the proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of the
Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union, any obligation which is not
now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the Constitution.”160
Over and over again, Bingham stressed the fact that the amendment
involved only preexisting enumerated rights: “[T]he amendment proposed
stands in the very words of the Constitution . . . .  Every word of the proposed
amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our country . . . . [It] does not
impose upon any State . . . any obligation which is not now enjoined upon
153 Id.
154 Id. at 62.
155 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1033 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).




160 Id. (emphasis added).
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them by the very letter of the Constitution.”161  Bingham’s amendment pro-
tected enumerated constitutional rights and only enumerated constitutional
rights.
The next day, a number of members spoke on the amendment, includ-
ing California Republican William Higby who spoke in support and New York
Republican Robert S. Hale who spoke in opposition.  Higby focused on the
proposal’s use of the language of the Comity Clause.  Noting that sojourning
citizens had not been protected as they traveled from states to state, Higby
praised the amendment for “giv[ing] force and effect and vitality to that pro-
vision of the Constitution which has been regarded heretofore as nugatory
and powerless.”162
Speaking against the amendment, Robert Hale focused on the propo-
sal’s use of the language of the Fifth Amendment.  Hale insisted that the Due
Process Clause, along with the rest of the Bill of Rights, was meant to be a
restriction on, not a grant of power to, Congress.  Bingham’s proposal, Hale
claimed, intruded upon the reserved rights of the states by empowering Con-
gress to regulate matters relating to life, liberty and property.  Explained
Hale:
[T]he gentleman from Ohio [Mr. BINGHAM] refers us to the fifth article of
the amendments to the Constitution as the basis of the present resolution,
and as the source from which he has taken substantially the language of that
clause of the proposed amendment I am considering.  Now, what are these
amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten, one of which
is the fifth article in question?  What is the nature and object of these arti-
cles?  They do not contain, from beginning to end, a grant of power any-
where.  On the contrary, they are all restrictions of power.  They constitute
the bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defin-
ing and limiting the power of Federal and State legislation.  They are not
matters upon which legislation can be based.163
Hale believed that the Fifth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of
Rights (“amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten”)
bound both the states and the federal government, but was enforceable only
by courts of law.  In response, John Bingham challenged Hale to name a
“single decision” in which courts had enforced the Fifth Amendment’s right
to due process against a state.164  Hale conceded he could not name such a
case, but he had nevertheless, “somehow or other, gone along with the
impression that there is that sort of protection thrown over us in some way,
whether with or without the sanction of a judicial decision that we are so
protected.”165  Wisconsin Democrat Charles Eldredge then challenged Bing-
ham to name a case denying that the Fifth Amendment bound the states.166
161 Id.
162 Id. at 1054.
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Bingham would answer this challenge the next day.  For the moment, how-
ever, Hale continued his speech and insisted that the Bill of Rights already
bound the states.  Bingham’s proposal therefore was an unnecessary and dan-
gerous intrusion on state rights:
If [Bingham] claims that those provisions of the constitution or the laws
of Oregon are inconsistent with the bill of rights contained in the Constitu-
tion of the United States, then I answer that his remedy is perfect and ample,
and the courts may be appealed to to vindicate the rights of the citizens,
both under civil and criminal procedure.  Their powers are ample; it never
was questioned, it never could be questioned, that the decrees of the courts,
in all the States at least where slavery did not exist, have been thoroughly
and sufficiently enforced.167
The next day, Bingham made a final appeal in support of this first sub-
mitted version of Section 1.  In doing so, Bingham discussed the meaning
and importance of Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Barron v. Balti-
more—a discussion as important to Bingham’s own thinking about his initial
draft as it is to our understanding of why he changed the ultimate language
of Section 1.  Before getting to that speech, however, it is necessary to address
Barnett and Bernick’s claims about the common understanding of the term
“Bill of Rights” during these debates.
D. The Consensus Understanding of the Federal “Bill of Rights”
The above-quoted exchange between Bingham and Hale contains a
number of references to the “Bill of Rights.”  The Fifth Amendment is
described as one of the “amendments to the Constitution, numbered from
one to ten,” and these amendments “constitute the bill of rights.”168  Hale
insists that these amendments known as the “bill of rights” are already appli-
cable against the states.  Bingham insists Hale is incorrect and the next day,
Bingham proves his point by citing Barron v. Baltimore, a case that all first-year
law students know held that the Bill of Rights does not bind the states.169
The entire exchange is perfectly understandable as a discussion of the 1791
amendments to the Constitution that we know as the “Bill of Rights.”  It also
stands as a clear example of Bingham’s theory that the “ellipsis” privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States are those enumerated in the
federal Constitution.
The matter would not be worth commenting on were it not for Barnett
and Bernick’s quixotic claim that the term “Bill of Rights” during the Recon-
struction debates did not necessarily refer to enumerated constitutional
rights.  Citing the work of Gerard Magliocca,170 Barnett and Bernick argue
“that the first ten (or eight) amendments were not commonly called ‘the Bill
167 Id. at 1065.
168 Id. at 1064.
169 See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 243 (1833).
170 GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS
BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS 6 (2018).
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of Rights’ until the twentieth century.”171  Thus, they insist, when John Bing-
ham and others used the phrase “bill of rights,” there is no reason to think
they meant it “solely to refer to . . . enumerated rights.”172  In support of
their argument, Barnett and Bernick point to Bingham’s 1859 Oregon
speech where Bingham seems to have associated Article IV with the right to
“work and enjoy the product of . . . toil.”173  Since Bingham included Article
IV in his description of the “bill of rights” in his speeches of February 1866,
and since (they believe) Bingham had earlier included unenumerated rights
in his discussion of Article IV, this means that Bingham must have included
unenumerated Article IV rights as part of his understanding of the term “bill
of rights” during the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  To Barnett and Bernick, Bing-
ham’s unenumerated-rights understanding of “the bill of rights” was just
another example of how speakers in 1866 had no fixed understanding of the
term.
Barnett and Bernick’s efforts to make references to the federal Bill of
Rights mean something other than a reference to enumerated constitutional
rights fails, and for several reasons.  First, Barnett and Bernick have misinter-
preted Bingham’s references to the right to “work and enjoy the product
of . . . toil.”  These are not references to unenumerated rights.  These are
descriptions of rights enumerated in the First and Fifth Amendments.  We
know this from our study of Bingham’s antebellum speeches.174
Secondly, Barnett and Bernick fail to distinguish historical references to
“a bill of rights” from references to “the federal Bill of Rights.”  In the period
between the Founding and the Civil War, one can find the general term “bill
of rights,” used in reference to a variety of things, from the English Bill of
Rights,175 to the Virginia Bill of Rights,176 to a statutory bill of rights,177 to
the Declaration of Independence.178  There is no confusion here.  There are
many things one can describe as being in the “in the nature of a bill of
rights,” the federal Bill of Rights being only one among many.179  Recon-
struction-era speakers had no difficulty explaining which “bill of rights” they
were referring to.
For example, here are two speeches in which John Bingham used the
term “bill of rights.”  One involves a reference to the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, the other refers to the federal Bill of Rights.  The first is from 1861:
171 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 515 (citing MAGLIOCCA, supra note 179, at 6).
172 Id. at 544.
173 Id. (omission in original) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 985 (1859)).
174 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
175 See From the American Organ, RICHMOND WHIG, Jan. 16, 1855, at 4.
176 See H.R., To Senator Sumner, RICHMOND WHIG, Apr. 24, 1866, at 2.
177 See The Civil Rights Bill, DAILY CHRON. & SENTINEL (Augusta, Ga.), Mar. 27, 1866, at 2
(referring to the Civil Rights Bill as a “bill of rights”).
178 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 83 (1861) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
179 See “Strange Doctrine.,” COLUMBIAN WKLY. REG. (New Haven, Conn.), Apr. 28, 1866, at
2 (using the term in reference to the federal Bill of Rights).
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Is there no reference to a higher law in your sublime Declaration of Indepen-
dence, that immortal bill of rights, which will live as long as our language lives, in
the words “these States are, and of right ought to be, free and independent
States, and may do what independent States may of right do?”180
In the above, Bingham clearly references the Declaration of Indepen-
dence and nothing else.  Now, compare the above passage with a speech that
Bingham delivered the next year:
Sir, our Constitution, the new Magna Charta, which the gentleman aptly says is
the greatest provision for the rights of mankind and for the amelioration of
their condition, rejects in its bill of rights the restrictive word “freeman,” and
adopts in its stead the more comprehensive words “no person;” thus giving
its protection to all, whether born free or bond.  The provision of our Con-
stitution is, “no person shall be deprived of life, or liberty, or property with-
out due process of law.”  This clear recognition of the rights of all was a new
gospel to mankind . . . .181
In this second example, Bingham describes the Fifth Amendment as a
provision located in “our Constitution[’s]” bill of rights (“its bill of rights”).  In
both examples, Bingham tells his audience which “bill of rights” he is refer-
ring to.  In the first speech, he refers to the Declaration of Independence
(and nothing else).  In the second, he refers to the federal Constitution (“its
bill of rights”), and nothing else.
Prior to 1860 it was fairly common for speakers to describe the Declara-
tion of Independence as a bill of rights.182  In doing so, however, no one
confused the Declaration with the federal Bill of Rights.  There are many
examples.  At the New York Peace Convention of 1863, Judge Flanders com-
plained that the administration’s conduct during the Civil War had acted “as
though the American revolution had not entered into history, the Declara-
tion of Independence had never been proclaimed, and a free, constitutional
government, with its bill of rights . . . were but the ‘baseless fabric of a
vision.’”183  We find the same clear distinction between the Declaration of
Independence and the Bill of Rights in the speeches by no less a fan of the
Declaration than the Radical Republican Charles Sumner.  In his 1864 Sen-
ate speech, “No Property in Man,” Sumner distinguished the Declaration
from the federal Bill of Rights and used the term “bill of rights” as a rhetori-
cal reference to one of the Bill’s enumerated rights, the Fifth Amendment:
[N]o American need be at a loss to designate some of the distinctive ele-
ments of a republic according to the idea of American institutions.  These
will be found, first, in the Declaration of Independence, by which it is sol-
emnly announced “that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain
180 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 83 (1861) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
181 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
182 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 170, at 58.
183 Joseph A. Flanders, Speech of Judge Flanders (June 3, 1863), in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE GREAT PEACE CONVENTION 19, 19 (1863) (emphasis added).
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unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of hap-
piness.”  And they will be found, secondly, in that other guarantee and prohi-
bition of the Constitution, in harmony with the Declaration of
Independence; “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.”
But, independent of the clause of guarantee, there is the clause just
quoted, which in itself is a source of power: “No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”  This was a part of the
amendments to the Constitution proposed by the First Congress, under the
popular demand for a Bill of Rights.  Though brief, it is in itself alone a
whole Bill of Rights.184
As early as 1840, former Governor of Vermont C.P. Van Ness, in his argu-
ment before the Supreme Court, referred to Barron v. Baltimore and its hold-
ing “that the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, commonly
called the bill of rights, were simply limitations of the powers of the general
government.”185  Similarly, in his 1860 message to Congress, President
Buchanan described the Bill of Rights as an example of amendments added by
way of Article V.186  In 1862, John Bingham spoke of the federal Constitution
and “its Bill of Rights” as containing the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.187  That same session, Representative Benjamin Thomas of Massa-
chusetts declared:
Nor are we to forget that the Constitution is a bill of rights as well as a
frame of government; that among the most precious portions of the instru-
ment are the first ten amendments; that it is doubtful whether the people of the
United States could have been induced to adopt the Constitution except
upon the assurance of the adoption of these amendments . . . .188
In 1864, during the debates on the proposed Thirteenth Amendment, Repre-
sentative John Pruyn of New York explained that “[t]welve amendments to
184 NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SPEECH OF HON. CHARLES SUMNER ON THE PROPOSED AMEND-
MENT OF THE CONSTITUTION ABOLISHING SLAVERY THROUGH THE UNITED STATES 8–9 (New
York, Loyal Publ’n Soc’y 1864) (first and second emphases added).
185 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 555 (1840) (emphasis added) (citing
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
186 Explained Buchanan:
Under this article [V,] amendments have been proposed by two-thirds of both
houses of Congress, and have been “ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States,” and have consequently become part of the Constitution.  To
this process the country is indebted for the clause prohibiting Congress from
passing any law respecting the establishment of religion, or abridging the free-
dom of speech or of the press, or of the right of petition.  To this we are, also,
indebted for the Bill of Rights, which secures the people against any abuse of
power by the Federal Government.  Such were the apprehensions justly enter-
tained by the friends of State rights at that period as to have rendered it
extremely doubtful whether the Constitution could have long survived without
these amendments.
President’s Message, EXAMINER (London), Dec. 12, 1860, at 1.
187 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
188 Id. at 1614 (statement of Rep. Thomas) (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\95-2\NDL202.txt unknown Seq: 35  2-JAN-20 13:28
2019] response  to  barnett  and  bernick 625
the Constitution have been made, the first ten almost simultaneously with its
adoption.  They are declaratory and restrictive, containing the great principles of the
Bill of Rights.  The eleventh and twelfth amendments were adopted a few
years subsequently.”189
Additional examples abound: an 1865 editorial in the Albany Argus
described “[t]he bill of rights embodied in the Federal Constitution, with its
amendments” as “a fair delineation of what civil liberty is.”190  In 1866, an
editorial in the Chicago Republican quoted the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
and complained that President Johnson’s veto of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill
meant that “if any State by its local laws violates these and the various other privi-
leges enumerated in the bill of rights, the United States must be powerless to rem-
edy the wrong.”191  During the debates in the Thirty-Ninth Congress,
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio reminded his colleagues that “[t]he
bill of rights to the national Constitution declares that: ‘No person’ . . . ‘shall be
deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.’”192  As
we have already seen, when John Bingham referred to “our Constitution[’s]”
bill of rights he did so in reference to constitutionally enumerated rights.193
As Professor Magliocca points out in his book, “[b]y the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was being debated, Bingham was using the term [Bill of Rights]
for the first set of amendments repeatedly.”194  Nor was anyone listening to
Bingham “confused about what Bingham and his colleagues meant by that
phrase.”195
Enumerated rights references to the federal Bill of Rights are so abun-
dant—more than I can list in this limited Article—that they clearly represent
the consensus understanding of the term.  Every reference in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress linking the proposed amendment to the Bill of Rights would
have been understood by members (and by the public following the pub-
lished debates) as linking the amendment to constitutionally enumerated
rights.  Nor have Barnett and Bernick produced a single example of anyone
during Reconstruction referring to the federal Bill of Rights as including
absolute unenumerated rights.  Differences of opinion, to the extent there
were any, involved whether the federal Bill of Rights included all ten of the
1791 amendments or only the first eight—an issue I briefly address in the
next section.
189 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2940 (1864) (statement of Rep. Pruyn) (empha-
sis added).
190 A.B.J., The Effect of the War Upon Civil Liberty, ARGUS (Albany, N.Y.), Aug. 16, 1865, at
2.
191 The President’s Veto, CHI. REPUBLICAN, Feb. 21, 1866, at 4 (emphasis added).
192 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence)
(alteration in original) (emphasis added).
193 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1638 (1862) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
194 MAGLIOCCA, supra note 170, at 62–63 (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 188 n.16.
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D. Omitting the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
Reconstruction-era Republicans occasionally mentioned only the first
eight amendments when they described the federal Bill of Rights.196  Their
omission of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments probably reflects the fact
that, at the time of Reconstruction, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were
most commonly associated with the doctrines of federalism and state rights.
As I have demonstrated elsewhere,197 in the period between the Founding
and Reconstruction, courts and legal commentators routinely described the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments as twin guardians of American federalism.198
As provisions protective of state rights, these two amendments were often
cited in support of policies directly antithetical to those of abolitionist
Republicans.
For example, in the original Missouri debates, proponents of slavery
insisted that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments prevented Congress from
banning slavery in the territories.199  In his concurring opinion in Dred Scott
v. Sandford,200 Justice John A. Campbell declared that “the ninth and tenth
amendments to the Constitution were designed to include the reserved rights
of the States, and the people.”201  In his speech supporting South Carolina’s
secession from the Union, Democrat Judah P. Benjamin quoted the Ninth
and Tenth Amendments as
an important addition made to the Constitution by which it was expressly
provided that it should not be construed to be a General Government over
all the people, but that it was a Government of States . . . .  The language of
the ninth and tenth amendments to the Constitution is susceptible of no
other construction . . . .202
The same federalist usage of the Ninth and Tenth Amendment continued
throughout the Civil War and into Reconstruction.  In his speech opposing
the Thirteenth Amendment, New York’s Fernando Wood declared:
The control over slavery, and the domestic and social relations of the
people of the respective States, was not and never was intended to be dele-
gated to the United States, and cannot now be delegated except by the con-
sent of all the States.  Articles nine and ten of the Amendments to the
Constitution are conclusive on this point.203
196 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(“[The first eight amendments] stand simply as a bill of rights in the Constitution . . . .”);
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham) (“Jeffer-
son well said of the first eight articles of amendments to the Constitution of the United
States, they constitute the American Bill of Rights.”).
197 See KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009).
198 See generally id.
199 See, e.g., 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1197 (1819) (statement of Rep. Scott).
200 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 493 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring).
201 Id. at 511.
202 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess. 214 (1860) (statement of Sen. Benjamin).
203 CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2941 (1864) (statement of Rep. Fernando
Wood).
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In the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Pennsylvania Democrat Benjamin M. Boyer
opposed Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment and quoted the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments as evidence that Congress had no right to “disfranchise
the majority of the citizens of any State on account of their past participation
in the rebellion.”204  Just days before Jacob Howard delivered his speech
describing the Privileges or Immunities Clause as protecting rights listed in
the first eight amendments, northern and southern newspapers published
the opinion of a Louisiana judge striking down the Civil Rights Act, in part
because its passage violated the restrictions on federal power enumerated in
the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.205
In light of this longstanding association of the Ninth and Tenth Amend-
ments with slavery, secession, and state rights, it is not surprising that some
Republicans in the Thirty-Ninth Congress distinguished the personal rights
enumerated in the first eight amendments from the federalist rights enumer-
ated in the last two.  Those who included the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
as part of the Bill of Rights, on the other hand, simply acknowledged that the
Bill of Rights contained both personal and structural rights.206  Nothing
about this difference of opinion is helpful to Barnett and Bernick.  Whether
one limited the federal Bill of Rights to the first eight amendments or
included all ten, all references to the federal Bill of Rights were understood
as references to enumerated constitutional rights.
E. John Bingham and Article IV
One last “Bill of Rights” issue involves John Bingham’s apparent inclu-
sion of Article IV, Section 2 as part of the federal Bill of Rights.207  Bingham
appeared to make this suggestion in his speeches of February 26 and Febru-
ary 28, a time when he was promoting a version of Section 1 that was itself
partially based on the language of Article IV.  Here is that version—the first
draft of Section 1 submitted by the Joint Committee and authored by John
Bingham:
ARTICLE—. The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges
204 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2467 (1866) (statement of Rep. Boyer).
205 See Dixon, Judge Abell’s Opinion and Other Matters, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, May 18,
1866, at 1; The Civil Rights Bill Unconstitutional, DAILY PHOENIX (Columbia, S.C.), May 19,
1866, at 2.
206 See, e.g., ALBANY EVENING J., Mar. 10, 1855, at 2 (describing the ten amendments of
the Bill of Rights as enumerated “State and Personal Rights”); WKLY. RACINE ADVOC., Apr.
2, 1855, at 1 (same).
207 An aside: compare the speech with the accounts of the speech in newspapers. E.g.,
A Model Speech, VT. WATCHMAN & ST. J., Mar. 9, 1866, at 1; House of Representatives, N.Y.
HERALD, Feb. 27, 1866, at 1.  These accounts do not appear to show Bingham including
Article IV in the Bill of Rights.  The intriguing possibility of mistranscription by the
reporter of the Congressional Globe is beyond the scope of this response and, ultimately,
has no effect on the enumerated-rights reading.
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and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.208
On February 26, 1866, John Bingham explained the amendment’s pur-
pose and, in doing so, stressed the fact that the proposal protected only those
rights already enumerated in the Constitution:
Every word of the proposed amendment is to-day in the Constitution of our
country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon the Con-
gress of the United States.  The residue of the resolution, as the House will
see by a reference to the Constitution, is the language of the second section
of the fourth article, and of a portion of the fifth amendment adopted by the
First Congress in 1789, and made part of the Constitution of the country.
The language of the second section of the fourth article is—
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.”
The fifth article of the amendment provides that—
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”
. . . .
And, sir, it is equally clear by every construction of the Constitution, its
contemporaneous construction, its continued construction, legislative, exec-
utive, and judicial, that these great provisions of the Constitution, this
immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution, rested for its execution
and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States.209
Bingham’s above reference to “these great provisions of the Constitu-
tion, this immortal bill of rights” makes it sound as if he is including the
language of Article IV as part of the Bill of Rights.  Bingham appeared to
repeat this suggestion two days later, on February 28:
What do gentlemen say to these provisions?  “Oh, we favor that; we
agree with the President that the basis of the American system is the right of
every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; we agree that the
Constitution declares the right of every citizen of the United States to the
enjoyment of all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,
and of all persons to be protected in life, liberty, and property.”
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that
the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; but they say, “We are opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress
under an amended Constitution, as proposed.”210
If Bingham really believed Article IV was part of the federal Bill of
Rights, this would be unusual.  It would not, however, contradict the enumer-
ated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  As we shall see,
208 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1034 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
209 Id.
210 Id. at 1089.
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Jacob Howard also included both Article IV and the first eight amendments
as among the enumerated privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States protected by Section 1.  Still, Bingham’s inclusion of Article IV as part
of the Bill of Rights is odd enough to require some kind of explanation.
Either Bingham literally believed the federal Bill of Rights included Arti-
cle IV, or he was speaking rhetorically.  The latter would not be surprising,
given Bingham’s longstanding view that the language of Article IV, properly
read, had the effect of obligating the states to respect the federal Bill of
Rights.  We saw this in his 1859 Oregon speech.211  It may be that Bingham
had the same common understanding of the federal Bill of Rights as did his
colleagues, but he rhetorically linked Article IV to the Bill of Rights since
Bingham believed that Article IV was the textual vehicle by which states were
obligated to the enforce the Bill of Rights.  Interestingly, Bingham’s col-
leagues seemed to assume that Bingham shared the same common under-
standing of the federal Bill of Rights as did everyone else in the Thirty-Ninth
Congress.  Consider, for example, Representative Hale’s response to Bing-
ham’s speech of February 26:
[T]he gentleman from Ohio [MR. BINGHAM] refers us to the fifth article of
the amendments to the Constitution as the basis of the present resolution,
and as the source from which he has taken substantially the language of that
clause of the proposed amendment I am considering.  Now, what are these
amendments to the Constitution, numbered from one to ten, one of which
is the fifth article in question?  What is the nature and object of these arti-
cles?  They do not contain, from beginning to end, a grant of power any-
where.  On the contrary, they are all restrictions of power.  They constitute
the bill of rights, a bill of rights for the protection of the citizen, and defin-
ing and limiting the power of Federal and State legislation.212
Hale does not respond to Bingham’s argument of the day before as if he
thought Bingham had presented an unusual (and expanded) definition of
the Bill of Rights.  Instead, Hale assumes the common understanding that
the Bill of Rights involves the rights enumerated in the 1791 amendments
(“numbered from one to ten”).  Bingham, in turn, does not correct Hale’s
definition of the Bill of Rights as amendments “numbered from one to ten.”
Instead, Bingham simply challenges Hale to produce a case in which courts
enforced the Bill of Rights against the states.213
Bingham’s Article IV–based draft of Section 1 failed to gain sufficient
support in the House and Bingham agreed to have it withdrawn and
redrafted.214  In his final draft of Section 1, Bingham abandoned the lan-
guage of Article IV, and Bingham himself never again suggested that Article
IV was part of the Bill of Rights.  Instead, Bingham expressly embraced the
same view as Hale, Jacob Howard, and everyone else: the federal Bill of
211 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
212 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1064 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hale) (second
alteration in original).
213 Id.
214 Id. at 1095.
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Rights involve those rights enumerated in the 1791 amendments.  As Bing-
ham later declared, “Jefferson well said of the first eight articles of amend-
ments to the Constitution of the United States, they constitute the American
Bill of Rights.”215
Whether Bingham originally held an idiosyncratic view of the federal Bill
of Rights and later changed his mind, or whether he originally spoke only
rhetorically in an effort to emphasize the role Article IV played in obligating
the states to respect the federal Bill of Rights, makes no difference to the
enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  In all of
his speeches, Bingham always associated the Bill of Rights with rights enu-
merated in the federal Constitution.  All of Bingham’s speeches, in fact, are
consistent with the enumerated-rights reading of the privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States.
F. Bingham’s Focus on Enumerated Rights: The Debates of February 28
On the last day of the three-day House debate on Bingham’s initial Arti-
cle IV–based draft, critics continued to attack the proposed amendment as
an unwise expansion of federal power.  New York Republican Thomas Davis,
for example, insisted that the amendment was a “radical and fatal” blow to
federalism and state rights: it gave “Congress the power to make all laws to
secure to every citizen in the several States equal protection to life, liberty,
and property . . . .  If Congress may give equal protection to all as to property,
it is itself the judge of the measure of that protection.”216
Just before agreeing to withdraw his proposal for redrafting, John Bing-
ham rose one last time and defended the proposal from claims that it vio-
lated the principles of federalism.  Bingham “repel[led] the suggestion made
here in the heat of debate, that the committee or any of its members who
favor this proposition seek in any form to mar the Constitution of the coun-
try, or take away from any State any right that belongs to it.”217  “The proposi-
tion pending before the House,” Bingham declared, “is simply a proposition
to arm the Congress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the
United States, with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the
Constitution to-day.  It ‘hath that extent—no more.’”218
Bingham’s assurance to his colleagues cannot be reasonably understood
as anything other than a declaration that the amendment protected only pre-
existing enumerated constitutional rights.  Those are the only rights that
“stand[ ] in the Constitution to-day.”  As explained above, Bingham’s refer-
ence to the federal Bill of Rights would have been understood as a reference
to rights enumerated in the 1791 amendments and Bingham himself never
used the term in reference to anything except enumerated constitutional
rights.
215 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1871) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
216 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1087 (1866) (statement of Rep. Davis).
217 Id. at 1088 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
218 Id.
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Continuing to stress the proposal’s limit to rights already enumerated in
the Constitution, Bingham pointed out that the words of the proposal came
from the hand of the people themselves:
It rests upon the authority of the whole people of the United States, speak-
ing through their Constitution as it has come to us from the hands of the
men who framed it.  The words of that great instrument are:
“The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several States.”
“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.”219
Repeating his “ellipsis” understanding of Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause, Bingham chided his colleagues for resisting an amend-
ment that would allow Congress to enforce the Bill of Rights:
Gentlemen admit the force of the provisions in the bill of rights, that
the citizens of the United States shall be entitled to all the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States in the several States, and that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law; but they say, “We are opposed to its enforcement by act of Congress
under an amended Constitution, as proposed.” . . .
. . . Ah! say gentlemen who oppose this amendment, we are not opposed
to equal rights; we are not opposed to the bill of rights that all shall be
protected alike in life, liberty, and property; we are only opposed to enforc-
ing it by national authority, even by the consent of the loyal people of all the
States.220
The problem, Bingham explained, was the current lack of congressional
authority to enforce these pre-existing rights.  Responding to Robert Hale’s
comment the previous day that individuals could “enforce in the United
States courts the bill of rights under the articles of amendment to the Consti-
tution,” Bingham cited Chief Justice John Marshall’s opinion in Barron v.
Baltimore.  There, the Supreme Court had denied that “the provisions of the
fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution are binding upon the
State of Maryland and to be enforced in the Federal courts.”221  Bingham
further quoted from Livingston v. Moore where the Supreme Court stated that
“[a]s to the amendments of the Constitution of the United States, they must
be put out of the case, since it is now settled that those amendments do not
extend to the States.”222  Bingham then demanded, “What have gentlemen
to say to that?  Sir, I stand relieved to-day from entering into any extended
argument in answer to these decisions of your courts . . . .”223
219 Id. at 1089.
220 Id.
221 Id. (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).
222 Id. at 1090 (quoting Lessee of Livingston v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551
(1833)).
223 Id.
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As far back as 1859, in his speech opposing the admission of Oregon,224
John Bingham had insisted that states had a preexisting obligation to respect
the federal Bill of Rights.  This obligation arose from state officials taking an
oath to support the Constitution, including Article IV, which under the ellip-
sis reading impliedly referred to all of the enumerated rights of citizens of
the United States.  Now, in his final effort to convince his colleagues to pass
his Article IV–based amendment, Bingham repeated the same argument.
Stressing the obligations of state officials to uphold their oaths, Bingham
quoted Daniel Webster’s declaration that the Constitution “incapacitates any
man to sit in the Legislature of a State who shall not first have taken his
solemn oath to support the Constitution of the United States.  From the obli-
gation of this no State power can discharge him.”225  “Those oaths have been
disregarded,” Bingham insisted, and “those requirements of our Constitution
have been broken; they are disregarded to-day in Oregon; they are disre-
garded to-day, and have been disregarded for the last five, ten, or twenty
years in every one of the eleven States recently in insurrection.”226
Focusing on the enumerated right to due process, Bingham noted that
states “elect their Legislatures; they enact their laws for the punishment of
crimes against life, liberty, or property.”227  If Congress passed the proposed
amendment, then “if [state officials] conspire together to enact laws refusing
equal protection to life, liberty, or property, the Congress is thereby vested with
power to hold them to answer before the bar of the national courts for the
violation of their oaths and of the rights of their fellow-men.”228  “Why
should it not be so?”229  Bingham demanded, “Is the bill of rights to stand in
our Constitution hereafter, as in the past five years within eleven States, a
mere dead letter?”230
The problem, insisted Bingham, was the lack of congressional power to
enforce the Bill of Rights.  Reading from Federalist No. 45, “a paper written by
James Madison,” Bingham quoted Madison’s assurance that “[t]he powers
reserved to the Federal States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordi-
nary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the peo-
ple, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.”231
224 See CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 981–85 (1859) (statement of Rep. Bingham);
see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
225 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (quoting, with minor variations,
Daniel Webster, The Constitution Not a Compact Between Sovereign States (Feb. 16,




228 Id. (emphasis added).  As we have seen, Bingham had long insisted that the Due
Process Clause necessarily contained an implied principle of equal protection. See supra
text accompanying note 113.
229 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
230 Id.
231 Id. at 1093 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45 (James Madison)).  The Congressional
Globe here either misquotes Bingham or Bingham misquotes Federalist No. 45.  Although
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This federalist principle of limited federal power “stands as the very text of
the Constitution itself, which declares that—‘The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States are
reserved to the States respectively or to the people.’”232  Bingham then read
portions of McCulloch v. Maryland, Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, Gibbons v. Ogden,
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, and Kent’s Commentaries—all for the
proposition that Congress had no constitutional authority to enforce the bill
of rights.233  Rejecting the implied powers doctrine of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
as well as expansive interpretations of Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, Bingham demanded:
And from what expressly delegated power in the Constitution can any such
power be implied?  Passing the anti-slavery amendment, is there any one pre-
pared to say that the bill of rights confers express legislative power on Con-
gress to punish State officers for a willful and corrupt disregard of their
oaths and oppressive and flagrantly unjust violations of the declared rights of
every citizen and every free man in every free State?  The words of Madison
cited are very significant: “The powers reserved to the several States will
extend to all the objects which concern the lives, liberties, and properties of
the people.”234
Bingham concluded by repeating his long-held view that the Fifth
Amendment’s enumerated right to due process secured the natural right of
all persons to be equally protected against deprivations of their life, liberty or
property without due process of law:
Your Constitution provides that no man, no matter what his color, no matter
beneath what sky he may have been born, no matter in what disastrous con-
flict or by what tyrannical hand his liberty may have been cloven down, no
matter how poor, no matter how friendless, no matter how ignorant, shall be
deprived of life or liberty or property without due process of law—law in its
highest sense, that law which is the perfection of human reason, and which is
impartial, equal, exact justice; that justice which requires that every man
shall have his right; that justice which is the highest duty of nations as it is
the imperishable attribute of the God of nations.235
Bingham’s singular focus on empowering Congress to enforce constitu-
tionally enumerated rights is unmistakable.  Over and over again, Bingham
insisted that his proposal did nothing other than protect rights already enu-
merated in the Constitution, in particular the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of
Rights.  Being so limited, the proposal took nothing from the states that they
had not already been bound by oath to respect.  Bingham’s textualism is also
reflected in his insistence that no text in the Constitution granted Congress
the text in the Globe reads “Federal,” Madison actually wrote “The powers reserved to the
several States.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis added).
232 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1090 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 1094 (emphasis added).
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power to enforce the enumerated rights of due process.  Before Congress
could act, it would have to pass a constitutional amendment.
Portions of Bingham’s speech were published by the New York Times and
other major newspapers.236  No paper appears to have repeated Bingham’s
apparent inclusion of Article IV in the Bill of Rights.  Instead, multiple news-
papers simply reported Bingham’s insistence that the proposition was meant
only to enforce the Bill of Rights.  Here, for example, is the summary of the
Boston Daily Advertiser: “Mr. Bingham closed the debate.  He concisely
answered the objections which had been urged against the amendment, and
then most eloquently advocated its passage, saying it was nothing more nor
less than a proposition to give Congress power to enforce the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights.”237
Members of the public following the debate in the newspapers could
have no doubt that Bingham was proposing an amendment that did nothing
more or less than empower Congress to enforce enumerated constitutional
rights.
G. Objections and Postponement
Following Bingham’s final statement, his colleague on the Joint Commit-
tee, Roscoe Conkling (who in committee had voted against Bingham’s pro-
posal) conceded some of his time to New York Republican Giles Hotchkiss.
Described by Earl Maltz as a “mainstream Republican[ ],” Hotchkiss
remained committed the principle of constitutional federalism—a principle
he believed was threatened by Bingham’s amendment.238  According to
Hotchkiss, “[Bingham’s] object in offering this resolution and proposing this
amendment is to provide that no State shall discriminate between its citizens
and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon another.”239
If that was all the amendment secured, Hotchkiss would have voted in sup-
port.240  As written, however, the amendment “authorize[d] Congress to
establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon the subject
named, the protection of life, liberty, and property.”241  Hotchkiss was
“unwilling that Congress shall have any such power.”242  Should Congress
one day fall into the “hands of rebels,” “we may have a Congress here who
would establish such rules in my State as I should be unwilling to be governed
by.”243
236 House of Representatives: The Constitutional Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1866, at 4.
An almost verbatim account was published in The President’s Veto, supra note 191.
237 The Debate in Congress, Bos. Daily Advertiser, Mar. 1, 1866, at 1.
238 EARL M. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863–1869, at 39
(1990).
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Hotchkiss did not oppose enforcing the rights of Article IV, rights that
Hotchkiss described as “provid[ing] that no State shall discriminate between
its citizens and give one class of citizens greater rights than it confers upon
another.”244  His concerns were focused on giving Congress power to estab-
lish “uniform laws throughout the United States” relating to the protection of
life, liberty and property.245  Such power left the substance of such uniform
laws “to the caprice of Congress; and your legislation upon the subject would
depend upon the political majority of Congress, and not upon two thirds of
Congress and three fourths of the States.”246  Hotchkiss therefore suggested
the committee redraft the amendment in a manner that “these guarantees in
the Constitution . . . cannot be stripped from us by any accident, and I will go
with the gentleman.”247  Specifically, “[w]hy not provide by an amendment
to the Constitution that no State shall discriminate against any class of its
citizens; and let that amendment stand as a part of the organic law of the
land, subject only to be defeated by another constitutional amendment.”248
Hotchkiss’s objections posed a problem for Bingham in three different
ways.  First, they signaled that Bingham was losing the support of moderate
Republicans—support he could not afford to lose.  Secondly, Hotchkiss inter-
preted Bingham’s effort as seeking to enforce nothing more than the rights
of equal treatment, either by way of the Comity Clause (which Hotchkiss did
not oppose) or by way of the equal due process rights provision.  This fell far
short of Bingham’s announced goal of enforcing the absolute rights enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights.  Finally, Hotchkiss was right about the framing of
the amendment: as drafted, the proposal might be read as granting Congress
power to establish uniform laws on the subjects of life, liberty, and prop-
erty.249  Bingham desired no such thing and he had insisted that the protec-
tions of the amendment would come into play only in cases where states
failed to enforce the “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States.”
Having failed to gain the support of even moderate Republicans, Bing-
ham bowed to the inevitable.  Upon Representative Roscoe Conkling’s
motion, the discussion of the amendment was postponed until April.250  By
the time the proposal was reintroduced, Bingham had removed the language
of Article IV and replaced it with language expressly declaring the privileges






249 I do not so much disagree with Barnett and Bernick’s account of Bingham’s
exchange with Hotchkiss as I find it incomplete.  They are right that Hotchkiss was con-
cerned about unconstrained federal power and a failure to permanently secure equal
rights.  Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 543.  What they leave out is Hotchkiss’s failure
to understand that the draft was meant to enforce the Bill of Rights—a failure that obvi-
ously would have deeply concerned Bingham.
250 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1095 (1866) (voting on the postponement).
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final draft of the Joint Committee, it is important to first address the debates
and passage of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
H. The Civil Rights Act
Barnett and Bernick insist that “the credibility of any proposed interpre-
tation of the Fourteenth Amendment must be measured, in part, by consider-
ing how well it accounts for the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”251  Because the
enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause does not
appear to authorize the Civil Rights Act, Barnett and Bernick claim that this
cannot be the correct reading of the Clause.252  The obvious problem with
this argument is that there are other provisions in Section 1 besides the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause that members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress
would have understood as authorizing legislation like the Civil Rights Act.
John Bingham himself insisted that the Civil Rights Act represented an effort
to enforce the rights of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.253
Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act because passing such legislation first
required passing an amendment giving Congress power to enforce the Due
Process Clause.  That, of course, is exactly what Bingham and his colleagues
accomplished by passing an amendment with a Due Process Clause and a
provision empowering Congress to enforce “the provisions of this article.”254
I. The 1866 Civil Rights Bill and the Rights of Due Process
At the same time the House of Representatives debated proposed consti-
tutional amendments submitted by the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
the Senate debated civil rights legislation submitted by the Senate Judiciary
Committee.  With the exception of New York’s Ira Harris, these two commit-
tees were made up of different men, and their proposals reflected very differ-
ent agendas and different theories of congressional power.255  From the
earliest days of the session, John Bingham had insisted that Congress cur-
rently lacked the power to protect individual rights against state abridgment,
and that any such effort required first passing a constitutional amend-
251 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 504.
252 See id.
253 See discussion infra text accompanying notes 265–72.
254 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see id. § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”); id. § 5 (“The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
255 Chaired by Lyman Trumbull, the members of the Senate Judiciary Committee
included Harris (N.Y.), Poland (Vt.) (replacing the deceased Collamer), Johnson (Md.),
Clark (N.H.), Stewart (Nev.), and Hendricks (Ind.). See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 25 (1865) (statement of Sen. Doolittle) (naming the members of the committee).
Harris was the only member who was also on the Joint Committee. Compare id. (naming
members of the Senate Judiciary Committee), with KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 38 (naming
members of the Senate who served on the Joint Committee).
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ment.256  The Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Lyman
Trumbull of Illinois, on the other hand, believed no such amendment was
necessary.  Instead he and his committee quickly drafted and submitted for
debate the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Bill.
Both bills were meant to prohibit the racially discriminatory “Black
Codes,” and contained the same set of nondiscrimination provisions.  As orig-
inally submitted to the Senate, the Civil Rights Bill declared:
[T]hat there shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among
the inhabitants of any State or Territory of the United States on account of
race, color, or previous condition of slavery; but the inhabitants of every race
and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of
all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, and shall
be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any
law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.257
Introducing both bills at the same time, Senator Trumbull explained
that the Freedmen’s Bill should be viewed as a continuation of all the power
Congress had exercised during the war.258  The authority to pass the Civil
Rights Bill, Trumbull claimed, was found in Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment:
With the destruction of slavery necessarily follows the destruction of the inci-
dents to slavery.  When slavery was abolished, slave codes in its support were
abolished also.
Those laws that prevented the colored man going from home, that did
not allow him to buy or to sell, or to make contracts; that did not allow him
to own property; that did not allow him to enforce rights; that did not allow
him to be educated, were all badges of servitude made in the interest of
slavery and as a part of slavery.259
256 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 422–35 (1865) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(“I understand very well, Mr. Speaker, that there are gentlemen for whom I have the
profoundest respect, not only for their great attainments, but for their generous and patri-
otic motives, who contend, against all past constructions and all past experience, that the
Congress of the United States has the power, implied necessarily, to enforce all the guaran-
tees of the Constitution.  In my judgment, unless some such general provision as that to
which I have referred be adopted, it is in vain that you hope for future safety or future
peace in the country . . . .”).
257 Id. at 211 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
258 Id. at 320.
259 Id. at 322.  In discussing Congress’s legislative efforts during the war, Trumbull
claimed Congress had relied on a number of texts in the Constitution, including the War
Powers, the Comity Clause, and the Republican Guarantee Clause.  See id. at 319.  Trum-
bull’s references were not tied specifically to either the Freedmen’s Bill or the Civil Rights
Bill.  At this point in the debates (prior to the alteration of the Civil Rights Bill), Trumbull
cited only the Thirteenth Amendment as empowering Congress to pass the two bills.
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According to Trumbull, both the Freedmen’s Bill and the Civil Rights
Bill simply advanced policies advocated by President Johnson, who had
recently declared that “[t]he American system rests on the assertion of the
equal right of every man to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”260
Republican Senator Edgar Cowan of Pennsylvania viewed Trumbull’s
bills as an effort to enforce the due process rights of life, liberty, and prop-
erty, but Cowan insisted that such legislation was unnecessary because the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment already guaranteed the rights of
life, liberty, and property against state abridgement:
I have only to say that the Constitution of the United States makes provision
by which the rights of no free man, no man not a slave, can be infringed in
so far as regards any of the great principles of English and American liberty;
and if these things are done by authority of any of the southern States, there
is ample remedy now.  Under the fifth amendment of the Constitution, no
man can be deprived of his rights without the ordinary process of law; and if
he is, he has his remedy.261
Cowan was just one of a number of members of the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress who viewed the rights protected in the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil
Rights Bills as efforts to enforce rights enumerated in the Due Process
Clause.  Representative M. Russell Thayer of Pennsylvania, for example,
insisted that the Due Process Clause all by itself authorized legislation like the
Civil Rights Act:
[I]n my judgment sufficient power is found, by implication at least, in that
clause of the Constitution which guaranties to all the citizens of the United
States their right to life, liberty, and property.
. . . In my judgment no man can find any difficulty in seeking constitu-
tional grounds upon which to place his justification for supporting this
bill. . . .
. . . .
. . . If, then, the freedmen are now citizens, or if we have the constitu-
tional power to make them such, they are clearly entitled to those guaran-
tees of the Constitution of the United States which are intended for the
protection of all citizens.
They are entitled to the benefit of that guarantee of the Constitution which
secures to every citizen the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property, and no just reason
exists why they should not enjoy the protection of that guarantee of the
Constitution.262
In the House, Representative John Bingham had recently proposed an
amendment that empowered Congress to enforce the rights of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.  Nodding to Bingham’s effort, Thayer “approve[d] of the pro-
position of the gentleman from Ohio, [Mr. BINGHAM,] in which he offers to
put this protection substantially into the Constitution of the United States,
260 Id. at 322 (quoting President Andrew Johnson’s annual message to Congress).
261 Id. at 340 (statement of Sen. Cowan).
262 Id. at 1152–53 (statement of Rep. Thayer) (emphasis added).
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though, according to my best judgment, it is not necessary to do so.”263
Freedmen, according to Thayer, had “a right to demand the protection of
your flag and the immunities guarantied to every freeman by your
Constitution.”264
John Bingham disagreed.  When the House debated the proposed Civil
Rights Act, Bingham opposed the bill.  His opposition sheds important light
both on the constitutional theory informing the final version of Section 1
and the relationship between the Due Process Clause and the Civil Rights
Act.
J. John Bingham’s Due Process Understanding of the Civil Rights Bill
On March 9, 1866, John Bingham delivered a speech detailing his objec-
tions to the proposed Civil Rights Bill recently introduced by Representative
James Wilson.265  Bingham began by assuring his colleagues that he sup-
ported the general policy of protecting rights enumerated in the federal Bill
of Rights:
I do not oppose any legislation which is authorized by the Constitution of my
country to enforce in its letter and its spirit the bill of rights as embodied in
that Constitution.  I know that the enforcement of the bill of rights is the
want of the Republic.  I know if it had been enforced in good faith in every
State of the Union the calamities and conflicts and crimes and sacrifices of
the past five years would have been impossible.266
Like Cowan and Thayer, Bingham understood the proposed Civil Rights
Bill as an attempt to enforce the natural due process rights of life, liberty,
and property.  However, in Bingham’s view, this attempt was beyond congres-
sional authority.  According to Bingham,
The Constitution does not delegate to the United States the power to punish
offenses against the life, liberty, or property of the citizen in the States, nor
does it prohibit that power to the States, but leaves it as the reserved power
of the States, to be by them exercised. . . .
. . . I am with [MR. WILSON] in an earnest desire to have the bill of rights
in your Constitution enforced everywhere.  But I ask that it be enforced in
accordance with the Constitution of my country.267
In addition to insisting Congress lacked the power to enforce the due
process legislation like the Civil Rights Bill, Bingham also objected to the fact
that the bill protected only citizens.  As we know from studying Bingham’s
antebellum speeches, he believed that the rights of due process were natural
rights held by every person, not just citizens.268  Bingham therefore insisted
263 Id. at 1153 (second alteration in original).
264 Id. at 1154 (emphasis added).
265 Id. at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham); see also id. at 1367 (statement of Rep.
Wilson).
266 Id. at 1291 (statement of Rep. Bingham).
267 Id. (alteration in original).
268 See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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that the Civil Rights Bill was wrongfully underinclusive.  “If this is to be the
language of the bill,” Bingham objected, “by enacting it are we not commit-
ting the terrible enormity of distinguishing here in the laws in respect to life,
liberty, and property between the citizen and stranger within your gates?”269
According to Bingham, protecting the due process rights of citizens and not
all persons “is forbidden by the Constitution of your country,” which “says ‘no
person,’ not ‘no citizen,’ ‘shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,’ with-
out due process of law.”270
Bingham’s due process understanding of the Civil Rights Bill thus raised
two serious problems.  First, Bingham recognized the bill as an effort to pro-
tect the equal right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law—rights declared in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.  For Congress to pass such a law, an amendment would have to
first be added to the Constitution giving Congress power to enforce the
rights of due process.  Secondly, Bingham pointed out that the rights of due
process were natural rights held by all persons, not just citizens.  It was wrong,
therefore, to pass a bill protecting only citizens’ natural right not to be
deprived of life, liberty, and property without due process of law.
Finally, Bingham objected to the bill’s declaration that it sought to
enforce the general subject of civil rights.271  Although Bingham advocated
an amendment granting Congress power to enforce enumerated constitu-
tional rights, that was all he sought to accomplish.  The substantive content
of all other civil rights ought to be left to the people in the several states
according to the principles of constitutional federalism.  According to
Bingham:
[W]hen peace is restored; when the courts of justice are opened; when her
white-robed ministers take the golden scales into their hands, justice is to be
administered under the Constitution, according to the Constitution, and
within the limitation of the Constitution.
. . . “[C]entralized government, decentralized administration.”  That,
sir, coupled with your declared purpose of equal justice, is the secret of your
strength and power.
. . . .
Sir, I have always so learned our dual system of Government by which
our own American nationality and liberty have been established and main-
tained.  I have always believed that the protection in time of peace within the
States of all the rights of person and citizen was of the powers reserved to the
States.  And so I still believe.
Now, what does this bill propose?  To reform the whole civil and crimi-
nal code of every State government by declaring that there shall be no dis-
269 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1292 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
270 Id.
271 Id. at 1291 (Bingham moving “to strike out of the first section the words ‘and there
shall be no discrimination in civil rights or immunities among citizens of the United States
in any State or Territory of the United States on account of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of slavery’”).
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crimination between citizens on account of race or color in civil rights or in
the penalties prescribed by their laws.  I humbly bow before the majesty of
justice, as I bow before the majesty of that God whose attribute it is, and
therefore declare there should be no such inequality or discrimination even
in the penalties for crime; but what power have you to correct it?  That is the
question.272
To the consternation of supporters of the Civil Rights Act, Bingham’s
speech was “extensively published.”273  If moderates like Bingham were will-
ing to challenge Congress’s authority to protect due process rights, this could
dangerously undermine House support for the bill.  Bingham’s arguments,
therefore, would have to be answered.  Later that same day, the House spon-
sor of the Civil Rights Bill and chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
James Wilson, delivered his reply.
Wilson could have denied Bingham’s due process reading of the Civil
Rights Bill.  Instead, Wilson agreed that the bill enforced the rights of due
process.  Unlike Bingham, however, Wilson insisted Congress had the
implied power to enforce the Fifth Amendment of the federal Bill of Rights:
[Rep. Bingham] says that we cannot interpose in this way for the protection
of rights.  Can we not?  What are the great civil rights to which the first sec-
tion of the bill refers?  I find in the bill of rights which the gentleman desires
to have enforced by an amendment to the Constitution that “no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”
. . . .
Now, sir, in relation to the great fundamental rights embraced in the
bill of rights, the citizen being possessed of them is entitled to a remedy.
That is the doctrine of the law as laid down by the courts.  There can be no
dispute about this.  The possession of the rights by the citizen raises by impli-
cation the power in Congress to provide appropriate means for their protec-
tion; in other words, to supply the needed remedy.
. . . .
Now, I want to know whether these rights [enumerated in the bill] are
any greater than the rights which are included in the general term “life,
liberty, and property.”274
272 Id. at 1292–93 (emphasis added).
273 See id. at 1837 (statement of Rep. Lawrence).
274 Id. at 1294–95 (statement of Rep. Wilson).  Barnett and Bernick make much of the
fact that supporters of the Civil Rights Act sometimes described it as protecting “absolute”
natural rights. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 562.  This is true, but the term
referenced an understanding stretching all the way back to Blackstone’s Commentaries that
explained that all men had the natural “absolute” right not to be deprived of life, liberty,
or property except according to the law of the land. See, e.g., 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 23,
at *134 (“The third absolute right, inherent in every Englishman, is that of property: which
consists in the free use, enjoyment, and disposal of all his acquisitions, without any control
or diminution, save only by the laws of the land.”).  Thus, when Lawrence and others spoke
of the natural absolute rights of life, liberty, and property, this was just another way of
referring to the rights of the Due Process Clause.  Indeed, Lawrence cites to Kent’s Com-
mentaries, when Chancellor Kent explains these absolute rights cannot be deprived except
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Wilson expressly agreed with Bingham that the Civil Rights Bill consti-
tuted an effort to enforce the rights of life, liberty, and property as declared
by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause in the Bill of Rights.  Wilson
also accepted Bingham’s argument that the unenumerated rights of state citi-
zenship were reserved to the control of the people in the states.  Wilson
insisted, however, that every right announced in the Bill of Rights fell within
either the scope of the federal Due Process Clause or was a necessary means
of protecting the rights of due process.  Indeed, Wilson believed that refer-
encing the “civil rights” of federal citizenship was no different than referenc-
ing the Fifth Amendment rights of due process.  The Civil Rights Bill, he
explained, constituted an effort to enforce the enumerated due process
rights of national citizenship, not the unenumerated civil rights of state citi-
zenship.  Like most radical Republicans, Wilson insisted that Congress had
implied power to enforce the federal Due Process Clause against the states.
In Prigg v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court found implied congressional
power to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause.275  If Congress had implied
power to enforce the enumerated rights of slave owners, then it had no less
power to enforce the enumerated rights of former slaves. It was this claim of
implied unenumerated power that Bingham could not accept.
The congressional debates on the Civil Rights Act were published in
national newspapers on an almost daily basis.276  Those following the debates
knew that the bill was being promoted as an effort to enforce the Fifth
Amendment in the Bill of Rights—a fact that triggered the same objections
raised by John Bingham.  For example, in his April 12, 1866, essay “The Civil
Rights Bill,” S.S. Nicholas complained:
Has Congress power to do this?  That is the great question.
. . . .
. . . The bill of rights, or what are termed the guaranties of liberty, con-
tained in the Federal Constitution, have none of them any sort of applica-
tion to or bearing upon the State governments, but are solely prohibitions or
restrictions upon the Federal Government.  The recent attempt in Congress
to treat them as guaranties against the State governments, with an accompa-
nying incidental power to enforce the guaranties, is a surprising evidence of
stolid ignorance of Constitution law, or of a shameless effort to impose upon
the ignorant.277
by the law of the land, meaning “due process of law.” See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1833 (1866) (statement of Rep. Lawrence); 1 KENT, supra note 29, at 599–648.
275 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 569 (1842).
276 For example, on March 10, 1866, the New York Times reported Bingham’s March 9
speech, including his declaration that “enforcement of the bill of rights in the Constitution
was the want of the Republic.” Thirty-Ninth Congress, First Session: The Civil Rights Bill, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 1866, at 1.
277 S.S. Nicholas, The Civil Rights Act: A Brief Comment, DAILY NAT’L INTELLIGENCER
(D.C.), May 8, 1866, at 1 (noting date of writing, April 12, 1866).  Although I originally
believed Nicholas was referring to Congress’s efforts to pass an amendment, after studying
the debates of the Civil Rights Act and the accompanying public commentary, I now realize
Nicholas was writing about the Civil Rights Act and that he agreed with Wilson and Bing-
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Like Bingham, Nicholas insisted that Congress—at that point—had no
power to enforce the Fifth Amendment of the Bill of Rights.  Nicholas’s essay
is important in that it shows that members of the public were as aware as
members of Congress that the Civil Rights Act was an attempt to enforce due
process rights.  There is no doubt that Bingham himself held that view.  It is
not surprising, therefore, that Bingham joined his colleagues in voting to
repass the Civil Rights Act in 1871, after the ratification of an amendment
empowering Congress to the enforce the rights of due process and equal
protection.278  Not only did Congress repass the Civil Rights Act in 1871, they
extended most of its provisions to protect “all persons,” not just “citizens.”
This extension would have been constitutional if the Privileges or Immunities
Clause is the only provision in Section 1 that authorizes nondiscrimination
legislation like the Civil Rights Act.
Despite the inescapable link between the repassed Civil Rights Act and
the due process reading of the 1866 Act, Barnett and Bernick nevertheless
insist that the 1871 extension of the Civil Rights Act poses a problem for my
reading of the Act.  This is because the extension grants to noncitizens all of
the rights of the original 1866 Act except the right to purchase and convey
real estate.279  Barnett and Bernick’s reasoning here is somewhat compli-
cated.  First, Barnett and Bernick assume that in 1870, Congress would have
wanted to give aliens the right to buy and sell real estate if they had the
constitutional power to do so.  The fact that Congress did not do so must
mean that they believed that neither the Due Process nor the Equal Protec-
tion Clauses authorized such legislation.  Because we must read Section 1 as
authorizing all of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and not just most of the Act, then
this means we must read the Privileges or Immunities Clause as authorizing
the Act’s protection of the equal right of citizens to purchase and convey real
estate.  Since there is no such right enumerated in the Constitution, this
must mean that the enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause is incorrect.  So, believe Barnett and Bernick.280
There are multiple problems with this extended chain of reasoning.  To
begin with, we are talking about the unstated beliefs of members of a differ-
ent Congress acting five years after the Thirty-Ninth Congress passed the
original Civil Rights Act and the Fourteenth Amendment.  All postratification
“evidence” is problematic as a source of original ratifier understanding, and
its especially problematic here where Barnett and Bernick attempt to discern
the unstated mental operations of a later Congress.  And whatever weight
such evidence might have, it must be balanced against the far weightier
ham that the bill was an attempt to enforce the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment.  Nicholas’s essay is much stronger evidence in support of the due process
understanding of the Civil Rights Act than I had previously recognized.
278 Congress repassed the 1866 Civil Rights Act as part of the 1871 Enforcement Bill.
See Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution).
279 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 562–63.
280 Id. at 562–64.
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express comments of the Congress and people who participated in the ratifi-
cation of the Fourteenth Amendment between 1866 and 1968.
But most problematically for Barnett and Bernick, this particular postra-
tification evidence has no discernable weight whatsoever.  There are many
reasons why politicians in 1870 might have chosen to extend some, but not
all, of the rights of the 1866 Civil Rights Act to aliens.  It is possible, for exam-
ple, that members believed that the Due Process Clause authorized the 1866
Act’s protections of citizens’ property rights, but also believed that noncitizens
did not have the same due process rights when it came to the purchase and con-
veyance of real property.  In fact, there is good reason to think this was
exactly the case.281  If so, then this would explain how John Bingham could
support a bill that gave noncitizens most, but not all, of the rights granted to
citizens in the Act.  Such an explanation would be perfectly consistent with
Bingham’s due process understanding of the Act.
Conceding that the above is a possible explanation, Barnett and Bernick
nevertheless insist my reading remains problematic since I have failed to
prove that Congress believed noncitizens had different due process property
rights than citizens.282  I bear no such burden.  They are the ones insisting
that the nonextension of real property rights can only be explained by an
enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The mere
possibility that there exist plausible alternative explanations consistent with
the enumerated-rights reading is sufficient to negate their argument.
In fact, there are additional alternative explanations for not extending
real property rights to noncitizens that are also consistent with the due pro-
cess reading of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Members, for example, may have
believed they had power to enforce the equal due process real property
rights of noncitizens, but they simply chose not to do so.  At the time of the
Forty-First Congress, the most commonly discussed group of noncitizens who
would benefit from an extension of the Civil Rights Act were Chinese immi-
grants in the West.  Not every member of Congress (and not every member’s
constituents) particularly wanted this group to purchase real property and
become permanent residents of the United States.283  In fact, that same ses-
sion, Congress rejected efforts to allow Chinese immigrants to become Amer-
ican citizens.284  It is altogether possible (indeed, likely), that some members
281 I have explored this possibility elsewhere. See Lash, supra note 131, at 1464.
282 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 564 (“Lash’s claim,” even if possible, “remain[s]
unproven.”).
283 See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 475 (1870) (statement of Sen.
Casserly) (“I shall not say a word in reply to the speech of the Senator from Nevada [MR.
STEWART] on the Chinese question in California, made by him after I arose, when I yielded
to him to say a word in reply to the Senator from Oregon, [MR. WILLIAMS.]  That is a
question of considerable dimensions, which, as even he seems to be conscious, is by no
means an easy one to deal with.  I trust that the Senate will at this time confine itself to the
subject which it has before it—the consideration of the bills to enforce the fifteenth
amendment.” (alterations in original)).
284 In 1870, Congress rejected efforts to amend the naturalization laws and allow Chi-
nese to become American citizens. See CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 5177 (1870)
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would have opposed extending equal real estate purchasing rights to nonci-
tizens groups like the Chinese even if those members believed Section 5
enforcement of the Due Process Clause granted them such power.  Even if
John Bingham himself had no animosity toward immigrant groups, he might
have had his own constitutional doubts (as discussed above) or simply under-
stood that nothing beyond a limited extension of the Civil Rights Act was
politically possible at that time.
Barnett and Bernick do not explore any of these possibilities.  In the
end, they have nothing more than an argument based on an omission, and a
weak one at that.  Whatever reasons Congress may have had in extending
only some equal due process property rights to noncitizens, there is nothing
about this postratification omission that poses a problem for the due process
reading of the Civil Rights Act—or for the enumerated-rights reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.
K. The Final Draft of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
Back to the Thirty-Ninth Congress.  Despite months of work, by April of
1866, the Joint Committee had not managed to produce a single successful
amendment.  The House managed to pass an apportionment amendment
but the proposal failed in the Senate, blocked by a coalition of conservative
and radical Republicans.285  Bingham’s civil rights amendment faced heavy
resistance and was withdrawn and further debate postponed until April.  At
this point it appeared that the Joint Committee would not succeed in getting
any of its amendments passed.
The log jam broke on April 21, 1866, when Thaddeus Stevens submitted
to the Joint Committee a draft multisectioned amendment he had received
from Robert Dale Owen.286  This omnibus amendment combined a number
of popular amendments (for instance, a prohibition on paying rebel debt)
with more difficult issues (limiting the political power of the returning south-
ern states).  Section 1 of Owen’s proposal declared that “[n]o discrimination
shall be made by any state, nor by the United States, as to the civil rights of
persons because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”287
Owen’s Section 5 granted Congress power to enforce “the provisions of this
article.”288
(voting to reject Trumbull’s amendment, which would have permitted Chinese
citizenship).
285 See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1275, 1281–89 (1866).
286 See A New Proposition, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 16, 1866, at 2 (reporting the Joint Commit-
tee’s receipt of a multisectioned amendment submitted by Robert Dale Owen).
287 KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 83.
288 Id. at 84. Here is the proposal that Stevens submitted to the Joint Committee on
April 21, 1866:
Article—
Section 1.  No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the United
States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previous condi-
tion of servitude.
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As written, a combination of the proposed first and fifth sections would
authorize legislation like the Civil Rights Act.  It also met the objections of
members like Giles Hotchkiss who supported a nondiscrimination provision
but who insisted that Congress not be given authority to establish uniform
laws on the subjects of life, liberty and property.289  It did not, however,
include language that could be read as enforcing the Bill of Rights against
the states—Bingham’s particular objective.  Bingham remedied that problem
by convincing a majority of the committee to delete Owen’s proposed Sec-
tion 1 and replace it with an altogether different provision—one protecting
the rights “of citizens of the United States” and the rights of all persons to
due process and equal protection.
The various versions of Section 1 discussed by the Joint Committee, and
their various votes, are interesting in themselves, but are well discussed else-
where.290  For our purposes, it is important to focus on the difference
between Bingham’s withdrawn February draft and the final draft of the Joint
Committee (which Bingham also drafted).  Here are the two proposals: Feb-
ruary Draft:
ARTICLE—. The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the
several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.291
Final Joint Committee Draft:
Sec. 1.  No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law,
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.292
Some aspects of the two drafts are the same.  In both, Bingham sepa-
rated the rights of “citizens” from the rights of “all persons.”  This, as we
Sec. 2.  From and after the fourth day of July, in the year one thousand eight
hundred and seventy-six, no discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the enjoyment by classes of persons of the right of suffrage,
because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 3.  Until the fourth day of July, one thousand eight hundred and sev-
enty-six, no class of persons, as to the right of any of whom to suffrage discrimina-
tion shall be made by any state, because of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude, shall be included in the basis of representation.
Sec. 4.  Debts incurred in aid of insurrection or of war against the Union,
and claims of compensation for loss of involuntary service or labor, shall not be
paid by any state nor by the United States.
Sec. 5. Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Id. at 83–84.
289 See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
290 See MALTZ, supra note 238, at 82–89.
291 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1083 (1866).
292 KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 106.
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know, reflects Bingham’s longstanding view that some rights are natural
rights belonging to all persons, while others are privileges or rights belonging
only to citizens.  Although the statement of congressional power has been
moved out of Section 1, it reappears as Section 5.  This was Hotchkiss’s rec-
ommendation—the amendment should first specify the rights being pro-
tected and then empower Congress to enforce those rights.
The biggest difference between the drafts is Bingham’s decision to
replace “of citizens in the several States” with the phrase “of citizens of the
United States.”  Bingham had abandoned the express language of Article IV
and replaced it with language that Bingham had previously claimed was
implied in Article IV.  In his speeches before the Civil War, and during his
defense of his original draft, Bingham had argued that the language of Arti-
cle IV should be read as if it contained an “ellipses” referring to the rights of
“citizens of the United States”—rights Bingham insisted included those enu-
merated in the Bill of Rights.  By expressly defining the protected privileges
and immunities to be those held by “citizens of the United States,” Bingham
now made explicit what he had previously claimed was implicit.  This new
language relieved Bingham of the burden of having to convince his col-
leagues to see words that were not actually in the text of Article IV.
L. Bingham’s Speech Introducing the Second and Final Draft
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause
On May 10, 1866, John Bingham explained his new draft to the House of
Representatives.  In his speech, Bingham recapitulated the same ideas and
themes that he had stressed from the opening days of the session: although
state officials were obligated to enforce enumerated constitutional rights
from the moment they took the oath to uphold the Constitution, they had
failed to do so.  The need for congressional power to enforce that preexisting
obligation was the “want” of the country.  His efforts were directed at produc-
ing an amendment enabling the enforcement of constitutionally enumerated
privileges and immunities—and “no more.”  Although the language of Sec-
tion 1 had been somewhat reworked in response to his colleagues’ sugges-
tions, as far as Bingham was concerned the new draft was simply a polished
version of his original proposal.  As Bingham explained to his colleagues:
There was a want hitherto, and there remains a want now, in the Constitu-
tion of our country, which the proposed amendment will supply.  What is
that?  It is the power in the people, the whole people of the United States, by
express authority of the Constitution to do that by congressional enactment
which hitherto they have not had the power to do, and have never even
attempted to do; that is, to protect by national law the privileges and immu-
nities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every person
within its jurisdiction whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the
unconstitutional acts of any State.293
293 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
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These words echo Bingham’s speech of February 26, where he explained
that “it has been the want of the Republic that there was not an express grant
of power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of every State, by
congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these requirements of the
Constitution,”294 and Bingham’s declaration on March 9: “I know that the
enforcement of the bill of rights is the want of the Republic.”295
Prior to the Civil War, Bingham had argued that a combination of the
language of Article IV and the Supremacy Clause obligated the states to fol-
low the Bill of Rights—therefore, binding the states to that obligation did not
interfere with any of their reserved rights.  In his speech on February 26,
1866, Bingham had made the same claim.  Now, in May, Bingham again
stressed the same point:
Allow me, Mr. Speaker, in passing, to say that this amendment takes
from no State any right that ever pertained to it.  No State ever had the right,
under the forms of law or otherwise, to deny to any freeman the equal pro-
tection of the laws or to abridge the privileges or immunities of any citizen of
the Republic, although many of them have assumed and exercised the
power, and that without remedy.296
This is the same point Bingham made on February 26, 1866, when he
declared that requiring the states to respect enumerated rights “does not
impose upon any State of the Union, or any citizen of any State of the Union,
any obligation which is not now enjoined upon them by the very letter of the
Constitution.”297  In May, Bingham again reminded his colleagues that state
officials had engaged in
flagrant violations of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United
States, for which the national Government furnished and could furnish by
law no remedy whatever.  Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution,
“cruel and unusual punishments” have been inflicted under State laws
within this Union upon citizens, not only for crimes committed, but for
sacred duty done, for which and against which the Government of the
United States had provided no remedy and could provide none.298
This lack of power to enforce constitutional rights against state abridgement
had to be remedied:
It was an opprobrium to the Republic that for fidelity to the United States
they could not by national law be protected against the degrading punish-
ment inflicted on slaves and felons by State law.  That great want of the citi-
zen and stranger, protection by national law from unconstitutional State
enactments, is supplied by the first section of this amendment.  That is the
extent that it hath, no more . . . .299
294 Id. at 1034.
295 Id. at 1291.
296 Id. at 2542.
297 Id. at 1034.
298 Id. at 2542.  Compare id., with id. at 1034 (Bingham’s speech of February 26, 1866).
299 Id. at 2543.
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As he had done in February regarding his initial draft, Bingham again
assured his colleagues that the proposal enforced only those rights already
announced in the Constitution: “That is the extent that it hath, no more.”
Likewise, on February 28, Bingham explained his purpose was “to arm the
Congress of the United States, by the consent of the people of the United
States, with the power to enforce the bill of rights as it stands in the Constitu-
tion to-day.  It ‘hath that extent—no more.’”300  Bingham’s declared goal of
enforcing enumerated rights, and only enumerated rights, had not changed,
but was more perfectly accomplished by the new draft of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
Barnett and Bernick insist that there was a “dog” in Bingham’s speech
“that did not bark.”301  At one point in his speech, Bingham explained why
the proposed amendment could not reasonably be read as giving freedmen
the right to vote.302  If Bingham held the enumerated-rights reading of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause, why didn’t he simply state that the right of
suffrage was not a constitutionally enumerated right and therefore could not
be considered a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States?
Arguments from silence are necessarily weak, since one cannot read the
minds of speakers to determine why they used one argument and not
another.  In this case, the argument is so weak it collapses.  Not only do Bar-
nett and Bernick wrongly assume that the rights of suffrage cannot be drawn
from the constitutionally enumerated rights in the Constitution, they are also
wrong about Bingham’s argument.  Bingham believed that there were enu-
merated rights that, in certain circumstances, authorized federal enforce-
ment of the right to vote.  Therefore the “easy” argument that voting was not
an enumerated privilege or immunity was unavailable.  Instead, Bingham
needed to explain why the exceptional circumstances in which enumerated
rights triggered federal enforcement of the right to vote were not in play.
Here is the critical passage in his speech:
The second section [of the proposed amendment] excludes the conclu-
sion that by the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law; save,
indeed, with this exception, that as the right in the people of each State to a
republican government and to choose their Representatives in Congress is
of the guarantees of the Constitution, by this amendment a remedy might be
given directly for a case supposed by Madison, where treason might change a
State government from a republican to a despotic government, and thereby
deny suffrage to the people.  Why should any American citizen object to
that?303
Section 2 of the proposed amendment allowed states to deny otherwise
qualified males the right to vote, but reduced the states’ representation in
Congress proportionately if they chose to do so.304  According to Bingham,
300 Id. at 1088.
301 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 545.
302 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
303 Id.
304 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
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this section all by itself forecloses the idea that Section 1 somehow estab-
lished a national right to vote.
The reason Bingham does not use the enumerated-rights argument to
deny the existence of an unenumerated right to vote is because Bingham
believed there were enumerated texts like the Republican Guarantee Clause
that, on certain occasions, gave rise to congressional authority to regulate
voting in the states.  Bingham noted, for example, that “where treason might
change a State government from a republican to a despotic government, and
thereby deny suffrage to the people,” this would violate the “right in the peo-
ple of each State to a republican government and to choose their Representa-
tives in Congress” and deny them these “guarantees of the Constitution.”  In
such a case, Congress might be justified in remedying a violation of this enu-
merated right by passing laws guaranteeing the rights of suffrage.
In other words, this dog barked.  Bingham’s argument about the right to
vote is an example of the enumerated-rights understanding of the rights of
national citizenship.  These rights include not only those in the 1791 amend-
ments but all enumerated rights, including those enumerated in the Republi-
can Guarantee Clause and the provisions enumerating the processes of
congressional representation.
Bingham’s greatest concern, of course, involved requiring the states to
protect the “guaranteed privileges of citizens of the United States” enumer-
ated in the Bill of Rights:
I beg leave again to say, that many instances of State injustice and oppression
have already occurred in the State legislation of this Union, of flagrant viola-
tions of the guarantied privileges of citizens of the United States, for which the
national Government furnished and could furnish by law no remedy
whatever.  Contrary to the express letter of your Constitution, “cruel and unusual
punishments” have been inflicted under State laws within this Union upon citi-
zens, not only for crimes committed, but for sacred duty done, for which and
against which the Government of the United States had provided no remedy
and could provide none.305
From the opening days of the Thirty-Ninth Congress to this final speech
supporting the amendment, John Bingham transparently and consistently
pursued the goal of securing an amendment empowering Congress to
enforce the enumerated rights of the federal Constitution and only the enu-
merated rights of the Constitution.  In placing this final draft of the Privileges
or Immunities Clause before his colleagues, Bingham once again assured
members “[t]hat is the extent that it hath, no more.”306
M. The Speech of Jacob Howard
It is a matter of historical irony that then-Senator Jacob Howard’s speech
introducing the Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate has played such a sig-
305 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866) (statement of Rep. Bingham)
(emphasis added).
306 Id. at 2543.
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nificant role in scholarly efforts to determine the original meaning of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  The original plan was to have the chair of
the Joint Committee, William Pitt Fessenden, introduce the amendment to
the Senate.  Unfortunately, Fessenden was ill and Howard was chosen as his
last-minute replacement.  The irony is that, in the Joint Committee discus-
sions, Jacob Howard had repeatedly voted against this draft of Section 1.
Howard had supported Bingham’s failed February draft, which used the
language of Article IV and the Fifth Amendment.307  When the Joint Com-
mittee considered Robert Dale Owen’s draft five-part amendment on April
21, 1866, Howard supported Owen’s antidiscrimination-only draft of Section
1, which read: “No discrimination shall be made by any state, nor by the
United States, as to the civil rights of persons because of race, color, or previ-
ous condition of servitude.”308  Howard voted against Bingham’s proposal to
add the words “nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws, nor take private property for public use
without just compensation.”309  On April 21, Howard briefly joined the com-
mittee in voting to add Bingham’s proposed language as Section 5 of the
amendment:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.310
Four days later, however, Howard joined the committee in voting to remove
Bingham’s language from the amendment.311  Howard then voted against
submitting Bingham’s language as a separate amendment.312  On April 28,
Bingham convinced a majority to replace the purely nondiscrimination lan-
guage of Section 1 with the broader language Bingham originally proposed
(and the committee briefly adopted) on April 21.  This final vote on Bing-
ham’s draft of Section 1 was ten to three, with Jacob Howard once again
voting against Bingham’s proposal.313  This was the last committee vote on
the language of Section 1.
In sum, Jacob Howard repeatedly voted in favor of an amendment that
did nothing more than prohibit racial discrimination, and he repeatedly
voted against Bingham’s broader amendment, which protected the rights of
national citizenship and the equal due process rights of all persons.
Whatever his understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Howard
did not want that provision added to the Constitution.  Nevertheless, it fell to
307 KENDRICK, supra note 7, at 61 (voting on Feb. 3, 1866, on the language); id. at 62
(voting on Feb. 10, 1866, to submit the draft to Congress).
308 Id. at 83.
309 Id. at 85.
310 Id. at 87.
311 Id. at 98.
312 Id. at 99.
313 Id. at 106.
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Howard to explain to the Senate the meaning of a text he repeatedly
opposed.
Howard began his May 23 speech by apologizing for Fessenden’s
absence and promising to present “in a very succinct way, the views and the
motives which influenced that committee, so far as [he] understand[s] those
views and motives.”314  Starting with Section 1, Howard explained that “[t]he
first clause of this section relates to the privileges and immunities of citizens
of the United States as such, and as distinguished from all other persons not
citizens of the United States.”315  Conceding that “[i]t is not, perhaps, very
easy to define with accuracy what is meant by the expression, ‘citizen of the
United States,’” Howard recounted how the Founders had approached the
issue of national citizenship.316  Because it had been possible that the origi-
nal states might treat visitors from other states as aliens, Howard explained,
the Founders had added Article IV to the Constitution “[w]ith a view to pre-
vent such confusion and disorder, and to put the citizens of the several States
on an equality with each other as to all fundamental rights.”317
Howard declined to analyze the particular content of Article IV privi-
leges and immunities, noting that doing so was not worth the time and
“would be a somewhat barren discussion.”318  Nevertheless, the Clause must
have “some good purpose” or “it would not be found [in the Constitu-
tion].”319  Howard then cited Justice Washington’s discussion of Article IV
privileges and immunities in Corfield v. Coryell320 as representing the Supreme
Court’s likely understanding of Article IV, Section 2, and he quoted the same
“fundamental rights” passage from Corfield that others in the Senate and
House had repeatedly discussed over the past several weeks.321  He con-
cluded that “[s]uch is the character of the privileges and immunities spoken
of in the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution.”322
At this point in his speech, Howard had done nothing more than associ-
ate the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States with rights
described in Corfield.  His colleagues, having participated in weeks of debates
that regularly included discussions of Corfield, would have been perfectly
familiar with that case and the fact that it established nothing more than the
“equal-rights” reading of the Comity Clause.  Howard’s colleagues in the Sen-
ate had recently heard Lyman Trumbull quote the same passage from Wash-
314 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–65 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).





320 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
321 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).  For
an analysis of the role Corfield played in the Thirty-Ninth Congress, see LASH, supra note 2,
at 162–68.  Suffice here to say the consensus understanding of Corfield in 1866 was the
same as the antebellum consensus described in the opening section of this Article—a fact
Barnett and Bernick never mention, much less dispute.
322 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
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ington’s opinion323 and explain that Corfield’s protections “relate entirely to
the rights which a citizen in one State has on going into another State, and
not to the rights of the citizens belonging to the State.”324
After quoting Corfield’s discussion of Article IV, Section 2, Howard then
explained that rights protected under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
also included those “guarantied and secured by the first eight amendments
of the Constitution.”325  Howard named a number of these rights, including
the freedom of speech and of the press; the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances, a right
appertaining to each and all the people; the right to keep and to bear arms;
the right to be exempted from the quartering of soldiers in a house without
the consent of the owner; the right to be exempt from unreasonable
searches and seizures, and from any search or seizure except by virtue of a
warrant issued upon a formal oath or affidavit; the right of an accused per-
son to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him, and his right
to be tried by an impartial jury of the vicinage; and also the right to be
secure against excessive bail and against cruel and unusual punishments.326
Summing up, Howard concluded: “[H]ere is a mass of privileges, immunities,
and rights, some of them secured by the second section of the fourth article
of the Constitution, which I have recited, some by the first eight amendments
of the Constitution.”327
Notice Howard’s textualism.  The “mass” of rights protected by the privi-
leges and immunities clause involves those “secured” by enumerated texts in
the Constitution; some by Article IV, others by the first eight amendments.
This echoes Bingham’s own view that the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States include all enumerated constitutional rights,
whether in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere.  In other words, Howard’s discus-
sion of Article IV and the Bill of Rights is perfectly consistent with the enu-
merated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Barnett and Bernick insist that Howard would not have used the phrase
“here is a mass of privileges, immunities, and rights” unless Howard believed
that both the rights of Corfield and the rights of the first eight amendments
were the same kind of rights, and that Howard understood them to be “abso-
lute” rights.328  They cite no evidence in support of this claim, nor could
they.  Rights, then as now, come in different forms; some are absolute, some
relative, some individual, some collective, etc.  A “mass” or “bunch” of rights
may contain several kinds of rights, just as Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains more than one kind of right (the rights of national
citizenship, the due process rights of all persons, and the rights of equal pro-
tection), and the Bill of Rights contains various kinds of rights (absolute
323 See, e.g., id. at 475 (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
324 Id. at 600.
325 Id. at 2765 (statement of Sen. Howard).
326 Id.
327 Id.
328 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 551–52.
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rights, procedural rights, and federalist-structural rights).  There is no lin-
guistic or historical reason to read the term “mass of rights” as referring to
only one kind of right.
Moreover, to accept Barnett and Bernick’s reading, we must believe that
Howard was making the startling claim that all of the rights discussed as
equality rights in Corfield somehow were transformed by the Privileges or
Immunities Clause into absolute unenumerated rights, with congressional
power to enforce the same.  Once again, there is neither linguistic nor histor-
ical evidence that such a transformative understanding of Corfield emerged
during the Thirty-Ninth Congress, or that anyone understood Howard as
making such an extraordinary claim.  No matter how much Barnett and
Bernick stress Howard’s quoting the fundamental-rights passage of Corfield,
the fact remains that the consensus understanding of Corfield in the Thirty-
Ninth Congress was that Corfieldian rights received no more than a degree of
equal protection.
Corfield itself of course, was even more limited in that it applied only to
out of state visitors and not in-state residents.  Barnett and Bernick make
much of this fact since, to them, such a reading of Howard’s description of
the Privileges or Immunities Clause would not authorize legislation like the
1866 Civil Rights Act, which provided equal protection to all persons, includ-
ing a state’s own residents.329  But as we have already seen, there are other
clauses in Section 1 that would authorize legislation like the Civil Rights Act.
Bingham, of course, would have looked to the Due Process Clause—a criti-
cally important fact that Barnett and Bernick never acknowledge, much less
discuss.  Howard himself appeared to view both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses as authorizing nondiscrimination legislation like the Civil
Rights Act.  Here, for example, is Howard on the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of Section 1:
The last two clauses of the first section of the amendment disable a State
from depriving not merely a citizen of the United States, but any person,
whoever he may be, of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or
from denying to him the equal protection of the laws of the State.  This
abolishes all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another.330
The “class legislation” that “subject[ed] one caste of persons to a code,”
of course, are the Black Codes—the target of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.331
According to Howard, it was “the last two clauses of the first section,” and not
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, that prohibited racially discriminatory
laws.332  This suggests that, to Howard at least, power to enact anti–Black
329 See id. at 499–503.
330 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
331 A point acknowledged by Barnett and Bernick. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3,
at 559.
332 Christopher Green argues that Howard did not mean to link power to prohibit the
Black Codes with the “last two clauses” of Section 1.  Green asserts that the word “this” in
the above Howard quote actually refers to Section 1 as a whole and not to “last two clauses”
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Code legislation like the Civil Rights Act is found somewhere in the “last two
clauses” of Section 1 in combination with the powers granted by Section 5.
Others held the same view.  For example, here is how Howard’s colleague,
Vermont’s Republican Senator Luke Poland, described the proposed Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses:
[T]he residue of the first proposed amendment [after the Privileges or
Immunities Clause333] . . . is the very spirit and inspiration of our system of
government, the absolute foundation upon which it was established.  It is
essentially declared in the Declaration of Independence and in all the provi-
sions of the Constitution.  Notwithstanding this we know that State laws exist,
and some of them of very recent enactment, in direct violation of these prin-
ciples.  Congress has already shown its desire and intention to uproot and
destroy all such partial State legislation in the passage of what is called the
civil rights bill.  The power of Congress to do this has been doubted and
denied by persons entitled to high consideration.  It certainly seems desira-
ble that no doubt should be left existing as to the power of Congress to
enforce principles lying at the very foundation of all republican government
if they be denied or violated by the States, and I cannot doubt but that every
Senator will rejoice in aiding to remove all doubt upon this power of
Congress.334
According to Poland, these last two clauses in Section One “remove all
doubt” as to Congress’s power to enact legislation like the Civil Rights Act.  In
this, he echoed John Bingham and the House sponsor of the Civil Rights Act,
James Wilson.
There is no reason, in other words, to stretch Jacob Howard’s words
beyond their facial meaning.  The Privileges or Immunities Clause protected
enumerated rights such as those enumerated in Article IV and discussed in
Corfield (equal “fundamental” rights for out of state visitors), and those enu-
merated in the first eight amendments.  As for legislation like the Civil Rights
Act, which prohibited racially discriminatory “codes,” such legislation would
be authorized by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses in combina-
tion with Section 5.
of Section 1. See CHRISTOPHER R. GREEN, EQUAL CITIZENSHIP, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE CON-
STITUTION 104–05 (2015); Christopher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection
Clause: Pre-Enactment History, 19 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1, 27–31 (2008).  Green’s attempt
to break apart an otherwise perfectly coherent and easily understandable paragraph is
neither necessary nor plausible.  The most natural reading of Howard’s speech preserves
the structure of the paragraph and coincides with the views of the Clause’s author (and
Howard’s colleague on the Joint Committee), John Bingham.
333 Poland believed the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself did nothing more than
protect the rights of Article IV. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (state-
ment of Sen. Poland).  Unless Poland held an “ellipsis” view of Article IV, this renders the
Clause as providing nothing more than a degree of equal treatment.  Such a view may have
been held by some members, but it is one that Barnett and Bernick, as well as myself, do
not believe was the consensus understanding.
334 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (statement of Sen. Poland).
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Regarding Howard’s treatment of the right to vote, Barnett and Bernick
once again try to make a “dog that did not bark” kind of argument.  Here is
how they put it:
Howard . . . contended that the right to suffrage had been “always . . .
regarded in this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as
one of those fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without
which a people cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic].”
On Lash’s account, we can only conclude that Republicans wasted a tremen-
dous amount of time and courted unnecessary risk by failing to avail them-
selves of a comparatively cheap means of making plain that enumerated
rights were categorically “in” and unenumerated rights categorically
“out.”335
Once again, however, the argument fails because the dog actually barks.
Here is the full passage from Howard’s speech:
But, sir, the first section of the proposed amendment does not give to
either of these classes [black and white] the right of voting.  The right of
suffrage is not, in law, one of the privileges or immunities thus secured by the
Constitution.  It is merely the creature of law.  It has always been regarded in
this country as the result of positive local law, not regarded as one of those
fundamental rights lying at the basis of all society and without which a peo-
ple cannot exist except as slaves, subject to a depotism [sic].336
In the sentences just prior to the portion quoted by Barnett and Bernick,
Howard explains that suffrage could not be considered a national privilege
or immunity because it was not a right “secured by the Constitution” but was
instead a matter of “positive local law.”  To be “secured by the Constitution”
is to be enumerated in the Constitution.  For Barnett and Bernick’s (already
weak) argument from silence to work, one must assume Howard did not
equate “secured” with “enumerated.”  But this is a perfectly reasonable inter-
pretation of what Howard actually said.  Howard’s insistence that denying the
right to vote did not amount to reducing someone to slavery explains why
Congress could not pass suffrage legislation claiming to enforce the Thir-
teenth Amendment—another enumerated right of citizens of the United
States.
In sum, nothing in Howard’s speech contradicts the enumerated-rights
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Every one of the rights that
Howard declared protected by the Clause is derived from an enumerated
constitutional right—some from Article IV and some from the Bill of Rights.
Most of all, there is no evidence that either Howard or his audience held a
“transformative” understanding of Corfield and Article IV.  Such a reading
seems particularly awkward to ascribe to Howard, given his repeated efforts
335 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 51 (second omission and third alteration in
original). (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen.
Howard)).
336 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)
(emphasis added).
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in the Joint Committee to vote down the Clause and replace it with a nar-
rower version.337
III. RATIFICATION
Unlike the secret debates in Philadelphia that produced the original
Constitution, the debates that produced the Fourteenth Amendment were
published in national newspapers on a daily basis.  Not only was the public
fully informed about what was happening and why, the debates of the Thirty-
Ninth Congress were a matter of intense public interest, both North and
South.  The outcome of these debates would determine the conditions under
which the southern states would be readmitted to Congress.  Moreover, the
increasing tension between the Democratic President and the Republican
Congress not only threatened the progress of Reconstruction, it threatened
to produce a new and dangerous constitutional rupture between the political
branches of the national government.  There was good reason, then, for the
people of the United States to pay close attention to what was happening in
Congress during the first half of 1866.
By the summer of 1866, when Congress sent the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the states, anyone following the debates would already know a great
deal about Section 1.  They would know it began as an amendment submitted
by Joint Committee member John Bingham who described his efforts as giv-
ing Congress power to enforce the Bill of Rights—and nothing more.338
They would know that John Bingham had always described the rights of citi-
zens of the United States as rights enumerated in the Constitution.  They also
would know Bingham opposed the Civil Rights Act because Congress did not
yet have power to enforce enumerated rights like those declared by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  Finally, they would know John Bing-
ham was a member of the Joint Committee that drafted the final version of
337 Barnett and Bernick briefly mention Howard’s handwritten notes for his speech.
See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 50.  It appears that Howard originally considered
naming only Article IV as a privilege or immunity of citizens of the United States: pages
with markings indicating they were inserted at a later point in time contain the reference
to the first eight amendments.  If, as these notes suggest, Howard originally considered
naming only the equal protection rights of Article IV as “privileges or immunities,” then
this might reflect Howard’s personal preference for such a limited clause (as reflected in
his votes in the Joint Committee).  Nothing about these handwritten notes, however, sup-
ports a fundamental-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Indeed, they
seem to indicate that Howard received some last-minute pressure, perhaps from his com-
mittee colleague John Bingham, to say something about protecting the Bill of Rights—
Bingham’s major purpose for the Clause.
338 Barnett and Bernick try to minimize the importance of published references linking
privileges and immunities to the Bill of Rights, claiming that in 1866 the term lacked a
standard meaning. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 567–68.  As demonstrated
above, there is more than enough evidence that any reference to the federal Bill of Rights
in 1866 would have been broadly understood as a reference to constitutionally enumerated
rights and only constitutionally enumerated rights. See supra note 168 and accompanying
text.
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the Fourteenth Amendment and they likely would know (or would soon
learn) that Bingham had personally drafted the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.339
Long before Jacob Howard introduced the Joint Committee’s draft
amendment, people following the debates would have heard multiple refer-
ences to the “fundamental” relative rights described in Corfield v. Coryell.
When Howard mentioned Corfield in his speech, the case would have been
familiar.  They would know Howard considered both Article IV and the first
eight amendments to be privileges and immunities of national citizenship.
As far as the Civil Rights Act was concerned, they would know that the Joint
Committee believed that the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses pro-
hibited racially discriminatory “codes” and that Section 5 of the Amendment
authorized federal legislation prohibiting such codes.  Finally, and most
problematically for Barnett and Bernick, the public would not have heard a
single word about the amendment transforming locally protected rights into
absolute unenumerated rights.
Of course, the public debates over the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment involved much more than just the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
Public discussion ranged from the legitimacy of proposing an amendment
while the southern states remained excluded from Congress,340 to arguments
about whether the amendment established black suffrage (an idea unpopu-
lar at the time both North and South),341 to the impact of the amendment
on state rights and constitutional federalism,342 to the need to protect basic
339 See, e.g., Speech of Senator Wilson, of Mass., at Anderson, Madison Cty., Ind. (Sept.
22, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN OF 1866 IN THE STATES OF OHIO, INDIANA AND
KENTUCKY 34, 34 (Cincinnati, Cincinnati Commercial 1866) [hereinafter SPEECHES OF THE
CAMPAIGN] (“And there is another glorious provision—I think the noblest of them all—
that no State shall make any law, or enforce any law impairing the rights or privileges of a
citizen of the United States, and that all citizens every-where shall be under the equal
protection of the law.  That provision was introduced into Congress by John A. Bingham,
of Ohio, one of the ablest, truest and best men in the Congress of the United States, and
an honor to the State of Ohio.”).
340 An issue raised by the President himself. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess.
3349 (1866) (message of transmission from President Andrew Johnson expressing concern
about amending the Constitution before senators and representatives from the South had
been readmitted).
341 See, e.g., E.A. Hibbard, Speech upon the Constitutional Amendment, Delivered in
the House of Representatives of New Hampshire (June 26, 1866), in UNION DEMOCRAT,
July 17, 1866, at 2 (opposing the amendment because it was an attempt “was to force the
Southern people to put the negro upon an equality with the white man in the matter of
suffrage”).
342 See Thomas A. Hendricks, U.S. Senator from Ind., Speech at Indianapolis (Aug. 8,
1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN, supra note 339, at 9, 9 (“[I]t takes away the indepen-
dence of the State judiciary and compels it to kneel in the presence of Federal authority; it
tramples under foot the policy, laws and Constitution of our State; and yet, my country-
men, Congress demands that you shall be its partisan in its support.”).
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constitutional rights like freedom of speech and assembly in the South.343
With so many subjects on the table for discussion, it is no surprise that rela-
tively little public discussion involved the precise meaning of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause.
Although the amendment was a major subject for Republicans and Dem-
ocrats on the campaign trail, the lengthy proposal was difficult to fully
explore in a stump campaign speech.  The amendment’s proponents tended
to briefly describe Section 1 in terms of equal rights and they regularly com-
pared its protections to those provided by the Civil Rights Act.344  On those
rare occasions when speakers specified the rights protected by the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, they often mentioned the constitutionally enumerated
rights of freedom of speech, press, and assembly.345
Although there is a robust body of evidence suggesting that an attentive
public would have understood that the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States included enumerated constitutional rights,346 there is no
similar body of evidence suggesting the public believed the amendment pro-
tected absolute unenumerated rights.  Speeches linking the amendment to the
Civil Rights Act described Section 1 as providing basic rights of equal treat-
ment, not substantive unenumerated rights.347  Although a few radical
Republicans believed the amendment would give blacks the otherwise
unenumerated right to vote, the vast majority of Republican supporters of
the bill expressly rejected this reading of the amendment.348
Barnett and Bernick do not dispute my claim that the historical record
suggests that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protected enumerated con-
343 John A. Bingham, Speech at Bowerston, Harrison County, O.: The Constitutional
Amendment Discussed by Its Author (Aug. 24, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN, supra
note 339, at 19, 19.
344 This evidence is discussed at length in LASH, supra note 2, at 176–229.
345 See id. at 197–210.
346 See id. at 208–21, 224–26.
347 For example, in his speech describing Section 1 of the proposed amendment,
Lyman Trumbull explained:
The first [section], and it is all one, article declares the rights of the American
citizen.  It is a reiteration of the rights as set forth in the Civil Rights Bill, an
unnecessary declaration, perhaps, because all the rights belong to the citizen, but
it was thought proper to put in the fundamental law the declaration that all good
citizens were entitled alike to equal rights in this Republic [applause]. and that all
who were born here, or who came here from foreign lands and were naturalized,
were to be deemed citizens of the United States in every State where they might
happen to dwell.
Senator Lyman Trumbull, Great Speech Reviewing the Conflict Between Congress and the
President Speech at His Reception at the Operahouse: The Constitutional Amendment—
The Civil Rights Bill—Issues of the Fall Campaign, in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN, supra
note 339, at 6, 6.
348 See, e.g., REVERDY JOHNSON, A FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE DANGEROUS CONDI-
TION OF THE COUNTRY, THE CAUSES WHICH HAVE LED TO IT, AND THE DUTY OF THE PEOPLE 14
(Baltimore, Sun Job Printing Establishment 1867) (responding to Thaddeus Stevens’
claims that the amendment would empower Congress to protect the rights of suffrage).
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stitutional rights.  They insist, however, that this same evidence either sup-
ports or is consistent with a fundamental-rights understanding of the
Privileges or Immunities Clause.  Some of their argument is based on claims
we have already shown to be incorrect.  For example, they claim the public
following the debates would have understood references to the Bill of Rights
or to Corfield as involving unenumerated absolute rights.  Neither assertion is
supported by the evidence. Corfield retained its antebellum meaning,349 and
we have already seen that a reference to the federal Bill of Rights—then, as
now—would be understood as a reference to enumerated constitutional
rights.
Barnett and Bernick correctly point out that proponents of the Four-
teenth Amendment often associated the rights of Section 1 with the rights of
the Civil Rights Act (indeed, they cite my work on this point).350  Sometimes
speakers associated the Act with the Citizenship Clause,351 sometimes with
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses,352 and sometimes with Sec-
tion 1 as a whole.353  In every case, however, these speakers emphasized how
Section 1 protected the equal rights of citizens of all persons.  In no case did
proponents of the amendment describe either the Civil Rights Act or Section
1 as protecting absolute unenumerated rights.
For example, in a speech supporting the proposed amendment, the Sen-
ate sponsor of the Civil Rights Act, Lyman Trumbull, explained that the Civil
Rights Act was intended “to make all persons equal before the law—equal in
right to acquire property, to dispose of property, to make contracts, enforce
contracts, and in every right which belongs to man as a man.”354  As for the
Fourteenth Amendment,
[t]he first, and it is all one, article [in the proposed Fourteenth Amend-
ment] declares the rights of the American citizen.  It is a reiteration of the
349 See LASH, supra note 2, at 162–68.
350 See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 569–70.
351 Senator Henry Lane, for example, explained that “[t]he first clause in that Constitu-
tional Amendment is simply a re-affirmment of the first clause of the Civil Rights Bill,
declaring the citizenship of all men born in the United States, without regard to race or
color.”  W.W. Wines, Speech at the Union Party in Indiana, Great Republican Gathering:
Senator Lane’s Great Speech, “My (Bread and Butter) Policy” (Aug. 18, 1866), in SPEECHES
OF THE CAMPAIGN, supra note 339, at 13, 14 (emphasis added).
352 Schuyler Colfax, for example, linked the Civil Rights Act to language in the amend-
ment declaring “that no State shall deny to any person the equal protection of life, liberty
and civil rights.”  This seems clearly a paraphrase of the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses. See Schuyler Colfax, Speech at Indianapolis: The Question of the Hour, Action of
Congress Defended, “My Policy” Reviewed, Necessity of the Constitutional Amendment
(Aug. 8, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAMPAIGN, supra note 339, at 14, 14.
353 Speech of John Sherman at Mozart Hall (Sept. 28, 1866), in SPEECHES OF THE CAM-
PAIGN, supra note 339, at 39, 39 (“What are the features of that amendment?  Every thing
that was radical which he objected to—I believe the President does not like that name—
was stricken out.  The first section was an embodiment of the Civil Rights Bill, namely: that
every body—man, woman and child—without regard to color, should have equal rights
before the law; that is all there is in it . . . .”).
354 Trumbull, supra note 347, at 6.
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rights as set forth in the Civil Rights Bill, an unnecessary declaration, per-
haps, because all the rights belong to the citizen, but it was thought proper
to put in the fundamental law the declaration that all good citizens were
entitled alike to equal rights in this Republic [applause]. and that all who
were born here, or who came here from foreign lands and were naturalized,
were to be deemed citizens of the United States in every State where they
might happen to dwell.355
Portions of these speeches, if viewed out of context, might appear to
describe the rights listed in the Civil Rights Act (or Corfield) as absolute
rights.  When the full context of the speech is considered, however, it
becomes clear that the speaker was discussing the rights of equal protection.
For example, consider this excerpt from a speech by Vice President Schuyler
Colfax:
We passed a bill on the ninth of April last, over the President’s veto, known
as the Civil Rights Bill, that specifically and directly declares what the rights
of a citizen of the United States are—that they may make and enforce con-
tracts, sue and be parties, give evidence, purchase, lease and sell property,
and be subject to like punishments. . . . But they say “why do you want to put
this into the Constitution?[”]  I answer, it was to embody it forever in the
Constitution, and to say to the Judges of the South, who had been deciding
the Civil Rights Law unconstitutional, that they must cease to lift their puny
arms against this great principle of civil rights.  It is put there as a guarantee
for the future.  [Applause.]  I want this great doctrine, that there shall be
equality before the law, placed where it can not be repealed, that no State
shall deny to any person the equal protection of life, liberty and civil
rights.356
Colfax initially described the Civil Rights Bill as protecting “the rights of
a citizen of the United States,” such as the right to “make and enforce con-
tracts, sue and be parties, give evidence, purchase, lease and sell property.”  A
bit later in his speech, however, Colfax clarified that these are subjects that
are granted no more than equal protection under the Civil Rights Act and
section one.  Colfax’s speech illustrates why it is important to consider
speeches or essays in their entirety, rather than focus on just one or two
sentences.  This is particularly true in regard to the “Madison” essays pub-
lished by the New York Times in the fall of 1866.  In one essay, “Madison” uses
Corfield v. Coryell to explain the “rights and privileges of a citizen of the
United States.”  According to “Madison,” Washington’s list of protected sub-
jects represented the “long-defined rights of a citizen of the United States.”
Here is the passage:
What the rights and privileges of a citizen of the United States are, are
thus summed up in another case: Protection by the Government; the enjoy-
ment of life and liberty, with the rights to possess and acquire property of
every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; the right to pass
through and to reside in any other State, for the purposes of trade, agricul-
355 Id.
356 Colfax, supra note 352.
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ture, professional pursuits or otherwise; to obtain the benefit of the writ of
habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the Courts of
the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either real or personal, &c.,
&c.  These are the long-defined rights of a citizen of the United States, with
which States cannot constitutionally interfere.357
According to Barnett and Bernick, this paragraph provides “an unambig-
uous affirmation that the Privileges or Immunities Clause will provide abso-
lute protection to Corfield rights.”358  But this is no truer of “Madison” than it
was for Schuyler Colfax who also described “the rights of a citizen of the
United States” as the right to “make and enforce contracts, sue and be par-
ties, give evidence, purchase, lease and sell property.”  Colfax and his audi-
ence understood that he was describing subjects receiving relative (equal),
not absolute, protection.  Madison, by expressly quoting the “case” Corfield
and its “long-defined” rights of equal treatment likely meant, and certainly
would have been understood as saying, the same thing.  If “Madison” had
meant anything else, he would not have referred to Corfield’s rights as “long-
defined.”  In fact, this entire portion of “Madison’s” essay involved a discus-
sion of the relationship between the opening words of Section 1 and the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act—a relationship involving
the principle of equal rights.  Here is “Madison’s” summation:
It is time that national citizenship should be defined in the Constitution and
unquestionably protected by appropriate legislation.
It is but following the example of other nations.  The amendment is in
terms the most appropriate.  It is carrying out the advanced sentiment of the
great masses in favor of equal rights and protection to all.  It is an enlarged
and comprehensive principle; and those who stop short of it but consult the
prejudices of bigotry and ignorance.
My own opinion is, that the Civil Rights Bill was, in this respect,
constitutional.359
“Madison” thus summarizes all of his remarks by invoking the language of
equal protection, not absolute rights.
A. Enumerated Rights in the Public Debate
Throughout the ratification period, although primarily focusing on the
rights of equal protection, supporters of the amendment also frequently
described the proposed amendment as protecting enumerated constitutional
rights, especially those listed in the original amendments to the Constitution.
In other works, I have presented this evidence in detail.360  For now, I pre-
sent just a couple of key examples.
357 Madison, Letter to the Editor, The National Question: The Constitutional Amendments—
National Citizenship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1866, at 2 (emphasis added).
358 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 573.
359 Madison, supra note 357, at 2 (emphasis added).
360 See generally LASH, supra note 2, at 204–29.
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In his January 27, 1867, speech before the House on the proposed
“Cruel and Unusual Punishments Bill,” John Bingham explained that the
pending amendment would give Congress power to enforce the 1791
amendments:
One word further as to the gentleman’s statement that the provision of
the eighth amendment has relation to personal rights.  Admit it, sir; but the
same is true of many others of the first ten articles of amendment.  For
example, by the fifth of the amendments it is provided that private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.  Of this, as also
of the other amendments for the protection of personal rights, it has always
been decided that they are limitations upon the powers of Congress, but not
such limitations upon the States as can be enforced by Congress and the
judgments of the United States courts.
. . . .
. . . So far as we can constitutionally do anything to prevent the inflic-
tion of cruel punishments by State laws I wish to see it done.  I trust the day
is not distant when by solemn act of the Legislatures of three fourths of the
States of the Union now represented in Congress the pending constitutional
amendment will become part of the supreme law of the land, by which no
State may deny to any person the equal protection of the laws, including all
the limitations for personal protection of every article and section of the
Constitution, and by which also the Congress will be empowered by law to
enforce every one of those limitations so essential to justice and
humanity.361
As he had done in 1866, here, Bingham links the pending amendment to the
protection of enumerated constitutional rights, and nothing else.
Similarly, constitutional-treatise writer George W. Paschal published an
essay in the New York Tribune soon after the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, explaining:
Nor is the remaining guarantee in this clause less important.  “No state shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any citizen of life,
liberty, or property without the process of law, nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  Law readers are so accus-
tomed to see similar provisions in the State Constitutions, that they under-
rate this national guaranty.  They should have lived in the South, where
there was always a class of “persons” for whom there was a summary and
barbarous code; they should know that the national bill of rights has, by a
common error, been construed not to apply to or control the States; they
should have seen and felt that for 30 years there was even half the area of the
Union where no man could speak, write, or think against the institution of
Slavery . . . .362
361 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 811 (1867) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
362 George W. Paschal, Letter to the Editor, The Fourteenth Article, N.Y. TRIB., Aug. 6,
1868, at 2.
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Readers would understand Paschal’s reference to the national bill of rights
as a reference to the 1791 amendments, particularly the First Amendment’s
enumerated rights of freedom of religion, speech, and press—rights
abridged by the southern states “where no man could speak, write, or think
against the institution of Slavery.”  These enumerated rights would now be
protected under the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment.
B. Only Enumerated Rights?
As mentioned earlier, Barnett and Bernick do not deny that the public
understood Section 1 in general, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause in
particular, as protecting enumerated constitutional rights.  Instead, they
claim that the evidence does not support a conclusion that the privileges or
immunities clause only involved enumerated rights.  The only evidence we
have, however, associates the clause with nothing other than enumerated
constitutional rights, whether the equal protection rights of Article IV or the
rights enumerated in the 1791 amendments.  This fact alone is sufficient to
make the enumerated-rights reading more plausible than the fundamental-
rights reading, even if we lack evidence of anyone expressly describing the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as only protecting enumerated rights.
In fact, there is such evidence.  Some Republicans criticized Section 1
precisely because it protected enumerated constitutional rights and only enu-
merated constitutional rights.  In the 1867 report excerpted below, a majority
of the Massachusetts Committee on Federal Relations described Section 1 as
protecting enumerated constitutional rights like those found in Article IV
and in the Bill of Rights.  The majority then criticizes Section 1 as mere sur-
plusage since states are already obligated to respect these constitutional
rights.  Here is that section of the Report:
Two questions present themselves at the outset:—
First.  Does it give any additional guarantees to human rights?
Second.  Does the proposed amendment impair or endanger any rights
now recognized by the Constitution?
The first section of the Article of Amendment is as follows:
“SECT. 1.  All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and sub-
ject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside.  No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”
It is difficult to see how these provisions differ from those now existing
in the Constitution.
. . . .
Many of our ablest jurists agree with the opinion of the late Attorney-
General Bates, that all native-born inhabitants and naturalized aliens, with-
out distinction of color or sex, are citizens of the United States.
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The Constitution (Article IV., section 2,) declares,—
“The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of citizens in the several states.”
“SECT. 4.  The United States shall guarantee to every state in this Union
a republican form of government.”
Amendments:—
“ARTICLE I.  Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom
of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.
“ARTICLE II.  A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a
free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be
infringed.
“ARTICLE V.  No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.
“ARTICLE VI.  In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assis-
tance of counsel for his defense.
“ARTICLE VII.  In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
exceeds twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”
Nearly every one of the amendments to the Constitution grew out of a
jealousy for the rights of the people, and is in the direction, more or less
direct, of a guarantee of human rights.
It seems difficult to conceive how the provisions above quoted, taken in
connection with the whole tenor of the instrument, could have been put
into clearer language; and, upon any fair rule of interpretation, these provi-
sions cover the whole ground of section first of the proposed amendment.
. . . .
We are brought to the conclusion, therefore, that this first section is, at best, mere
surplusage; and that it is mischievous, inasmuch as it is an admission, either that the
same guarantees do not exist in the present Constitution, or that if they are there, they
have been disregarded, and by long usage or acquiescence this disregard has hardened
into constitutional right; and no security can be given that similar guarantees will not
be disregarded hereafter.363
363 MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS ON THE PROPOSED FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL RELATIONS, H.R. 149, Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess.
(Mass. 1867).  Also reported (and substantially quoted) in Massachusetts: The Constitutional
Amendment—The Legislative Committee Divided Upon the Question of Adoption—The Minority and
Majority Reports—The Colored Member, Mr. Walker, Against Adoption, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1867,
at 5.
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There is no way to understand the committee report except as a com-
plaint that the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects enumerated constitu-
tional rights and only enumerated constitutional rights (“these provisions
cover the whole ground of section first of the proposed amendment”).  Massa-
chusetts newspapers supporting the amendment criticized the majority
report, not by denying its interpretation of Section 1, but by insisting that it
was a good idea to add an amendment that expressly declares that states were
obligated to protect enumerated constitutional rights.  According to the edi-
tors of the Boston Daily Advertiser,
[t]o the first section, which defines citizenship, forbids any abridgement of
the privileges of citizens and guarantees to all the equal protection of the
laws, the objection of the committee is in effect that the section would be
surplusage. . . . We hardly need to point out that the committee here fail to
distinguish between what is settled in their opinion, and what is settled as the
definite and stable rule of constitutional law. . . . And so of the other rights
secured by the first section of the amendment, in the judgment of the com-
mittee they are “inevitably inferable” from existing provisions, and yet they
have not been so inferred, nor are they now in all cases.  To put these guar-
antees then in clear and unequivocal terms in the text of the Constitution, is
simply a prudent precaution, and the section in which this is done, so far
from being surplusage, will establish forever that which as mere matter of
construction would probably have been judicially denied ten years ago and
which the committee evidently fear would be so denied now.364
C. The Omission of the (Unenumerated) Right of Suffrage
One of the most common Democratic criticisms of the proposed Four-
teenth Amendment was that it gave black citizens the right to vote.365  This
was an unpopular idea in the North at this time, and Democrats hoped to
inflame white objections to black political power in order to derail the pro-
posed amendment.366  Although some radical Republicans no doubt hoped
the amendment could be used to enfranchise blacks, most Republicans
denied that any part of the amendment could be properly construed to give
blacks the right to vote.367  As noted above, Barnett and Bernick point to
Republican explanations as to why the amendment did not protect the
unenumerated right to vote as evidence in favor of an unenumerated-rights
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  But as we have already seen,
this weak effort to draw meaning from silence is unpersuasive: it wrongly
presumes that one could not derive the right to vote from enumerated rights
364 On the Massachusetts Committee’s Majority Report, BOS. DAILY ADVERTISER, Mar. 4, 1867,
at 2.
365 See LASH, supra note 2, at 195–96.
366 See MALTZ, supra note 238, at 123.
367 See LASH, supra note 2, at 195.
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(see Bingham’s speech),368 and it wrongly presumes Republicans did not at
times make the “easy” argument (see Howard’s speech ).369
Most of all, this argument ignores the fact that Democrats pointed to
multiple clauses as potentially granting blacks the right of suffrage.  Some-
times they pointed at the Privileges or Immunities Clause,370 sometimes the
Citizenship Clause,371 sometimes Section 2,372 and sometimes Section 5.373
In the face of these myriad claims, Republicans found it easiest to simply
point out that there was nothing about the term “citizen” that necessarily
368 Supra note 305 and accompanying text.
369 Supra note 334 and accompanying text.  My answer to Barnett and Bernick on this
point applies equally to similar arguments made by Green. See, e.g., Green, supra note 71,
at 124 (“The enumerated-rights-only view of the Privileges or Immunities Clause was never
offered during 1866 as an explanation why the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not
apply to voting.”).
370 See Hendricks, supra note 339, at 9 (“What are the privileges and immunities of
citizens?  The word ‘privilege’ is of comprehensive meaning in such connection; perhaps
more comprehensive than the word ‘rights.’  Privileges include rights, and also whatever
else the State permits at her discretion.  But does it here include political rights and privi-
leges?  To vote is a privilege usually enjoyed in the State by the adult male citizen.  Why,
then, is it not a privilege which the State can not abridge if this amendment becomes a part
of the Constitution?”).
371 See JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF INDIANA DURING
THE FORTY-FIFTH REGULAR SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 102 (Indianapolis, Alexander
H. Conner 1867) (“Fourth.  The first section places all persons, without regard to race or
color, who are born in this country, and subject to its jurisdiction, upon the same political
level, by constituting them ‘citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they
reside,’ thus conferring upon the negro race born in this country the same rights, civil and
political, that are now enjoyed by the white race, and subject to no other conditions than
such as may be imposed upon white citizens, including, as we believe, the right of
suffrage.”)
372 See Constitutional Amendment as Submitted to the State of Mississippi: Report, WKLY. CLAR-
ION, Jan. 31, 1867, at 2 (“The amendment introduces new rules, or attempts to enforce
them on the States, in regard to citizenship and the elective franchise.  All persons, natives
of the United States, or naturalized, except Indians untaxed—are declared to be citizens of
the United States, and of the State where they reside,—and if the elective franchise is
denied or abridged to any male inhabitant of the State 21 years of age, the basis of repre-
sentation shall be reduced in the proportion such male citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens 21 years of age in such State.  It is obvious that the object is, to
compel the Southern States to accept negro suffrage, on pain of the reduction of their
representation in Congress and the Electoral College.”); see also JOURNAL OF THE SENATE OF
THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI 196 (Jackson 1867).
373 See PENNSYLVANIA LEGISLATIVE RECORD, app. at LII (1867) (statement of Rep. Kurtz)
(“[I]t is quite certain that the whole of the first section taken together, will give to Con-
gress the right, by a simple statute, to thus confer the elective franchise.  By a subsequent
clause in this section it is provided, that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.’. . . By the fifth section
of this proposed article, it is provided that the ‘Congress will have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.’  This, it seems to me, undoubtedly
confers upon Congress the power to define what are the “privileges and immunities” of
citizens . . . .”).
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involved the right to vote: women and children were citizens, but neither
enjoyed the rights of suffrage.374  This was the “easy” answer that addressed
simultaneously arguments based on the Citizenship Clause, the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, and Congress’s enforcement powers under Section 5.
Citing the work of James Fox, Barnett and Bernick criticize what they
call a “selective” use of Frederick Douglass’s essays, and claim I have ignored
portions where “Douglass gave voice to an understanding of . . . citizenship
that was not exhausted by enumerated rights.”375  The accusation illustrates a
failure to understand Douglass’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment.  Fred-
erick Douglass criticized the Fourteenth Amendment precisely because it did
not secure freedmen’s right to vote.376  Douglass believed that the Constitu-
tion, before the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment, should be under-
stood as establishing the rights of citizen-suffrage and that Congress had the
implied power to enforce this right.377  Douglass criticized the Fourteenth
Amendment because he believed its provisions amounted to “a renunciation
of [Congress’s] power to secure political rights to any class of citizens, with
the obvious purpose to allow the rebellious States to disfranchise, if they
should see fit, their colored citizens.”378  The Fourteenth Amendment,
Douglass declared, was “an unfortunate blunder,” one that “must now be
retrieved” by moving forward with a new effort to constitutionalize the right
of black citizens to vote.379  He insisted that neither the Civil Rights Bill nor
the pending Fourteenth Amendment could “reach the difficulty” facing the
freedmen in the South until they were given the right to vote.380  Rather than
relying on the protection of the federal officials, blacks “must have the power
374 See, e.g., Colfax, supra note 352.
375 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 573.  In Fox’s review of my book, he criticizes my
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause as downplaying or ignoring Frederick
Douglass’s view of the importance of the rights of suffrage. See James W. Fox Jr., Publics,
Meanings & the Privileges of Citizenship, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 567, 597–99 (2015) (book
review).  But this is nonsequitur.  Douglass himself understood that the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause (or the Fourteenth Amendment) did not establish the right to vote.  This, to
Douglass made it a “blunder” and one that Congress needed to remedy with a Fifteenth
Amendment.
376 See DAVID W. BLIGHT, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 483 (2018) (“Over the summer of 1866,
Douglass joined forces with old abolitionist friends Gerrit Smith and Wendell Phillips and
openly opposed the Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that it did not explicitly pro-
vide black suffrage.”).
377 See Frederick Douglass, Reconstruction, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1866, at 761, 765
(“This unfortunate blunder [the Fourteenth Amendment] must now be retrieved, and the
emasculated citizenship given to the negro supplanted by that contemplated in the Consti-
tution of the United States, which declares that the citizens of each State shall enjoy all the
rights and immunities of citizens of the several States,—so that a legal voter in any State
shall be a legal voter in all the States.”).
378 Id.
379 Id.
380 Id. at 761.
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to protect themselves, or they will go unprotected, spite of all the laws the
Federal Government can put upon the national statute-book.”381
Far from supporting Barnett and Bernick’s claim about the Fourteenth
Amendment protecting unenumerated rights, Douglass clearly understood
that the Amendment did not protect the unenumerated right to vote.  To fail
to understand Douglass’s criticism of the Fourteenth Amendment is to fail to
understand Douglass’s untiring effort to secure a Fifteenth Amendment to
the Constitution.
Most Republicans dismissed Democrat claims that the proposed amend-
ment established the rights of suffrage (thus, the overwhelming success of
the Republicans in the elections of 1866).382  This limited understanding of
the Amendment was a matter of some frustration to radical Republicans,383
some of whom tried to insist that the Amendment should not be read as
denying federal power to enforce the rights of suffrage.  This claim by a
minority of radical Republicans prompted a response by Democrat Reverdy
Johnson, a member of the Joint Committee that drafted Section 1.  Accord-
ing to Johnson, Section 1 protected previously enumerated rights and only
previously enumerated rights.  Explained Johnson:
Mr. Stevens, of Pa., the very head and front of the radical portion of the
republican party in the House of Representatives, in a recent letter to a Ger-
man professor, . . . maintains that, since what he erroneously says has taken
place, (the adoption of the 14th amendment) he has no doubt of the power
of Congress “to regulate the elective franchise, so far as it regards the whole
nation, in every State in the Union.”  The amendment confers no such
power.  It only provides: 1. That persons born in the United States, or natu-
ralized and subject to its jurisdiction, are citizens thereof, and of the State of
their residence.  2. That no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.  3.
That no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, or be denied equal protection of the laws.  There is nothing
in either of these provisions from which the power in question can be
implied. Under the Constitution, independent of this supposed amendment, the pro-
visions as to the rights of citizens are the same as those of the amendment.  And yet
Mr. Stevens himself admits, what no one has until lately denied, that Con-
gress had no authority to interfere with suffrage in the States.  How then can
the amendment be held to confer that authority? I have said that in relation to
this subject the Constitution and the amendment are the same.  Are they not?  Will
Mr. Stevens, or any other man of sense, maintain that under the Constitu-
tion, without the amendment, a State could, by law, “abridge the privileges
and immunities of citizens,” or deprive any person “of life, liberty or prop-
erty without due process of law.” And these are all that the amendment prohibits.
The fact is, that the provisions just referred to are wholly unnecessary.  If the
amendment had contained but the single clause defining citizenship, the
Constitution would have supplied all of the securities enumerated in the second and
381 Id. at 762.
382 See LASH, supra note 2, at 215–21.
383 See supra notes 377–81 and accompanying text.
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third clauses [of Section 1].  If, therefore, as Mr. Stevens concedes, citizenship
does not confer the right to vote, or give to Congress any power to confer it
upon the citizen, the amendment gives neither the right nor the power.384
According to Reverdy Johnson, Section 1 protects no rights other than
those previously protected in the enumerated texts of the Constitution and
no one had previously interpreted those enumerated texts as nationalizing
the rights of suffrage.  This is the “easy” enumerated-rights argument that
Barnett and Bernick claim was never made.  The fact that the Republican
John Bingham believed previously enumerated rights might be read as includ-
ing suffrage rights does not call into question the enumerated-rights reading
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  It just means Bingham held more
expansive interpretations of previously enumerated rights than did the Dem-
ocrat Reverdy Johnson.
D. John Bingham’s Speech of 1871
Barnett and Bernick spend much time discussing postratification evi-
dence—a telling choice that reveals the paucity of preratification evidence
supporting their theory.  I have discussed much of this evidence else-
where,385 and I am content to leave this issue as one of scholarly disagree-
ment.  My choice reflects both the necessary limits of a response Article and
the fact that all postratification evidence is a suspect source of original
meaning.
That said, I cannot resist ending this Article with one particular piece of
postratification evidence: John Bingham’s speech of 1871.  In this speech,
Bingham defined, in great detail, the meaning of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause.  Barnett and Bernick concede that this particular speech sup-
ports the enumerated-rights reading,386 but they warn that “we should not
overread this speech,” and they insist that the speech is, “[a]t best . . . ambig-
uous.”387  The speech, in fact, is not ambiguous at all.  It presents both a
clear rejection of Barnett and Bernick’s Corfield ian fundamental-rights read-
ing of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and an unambiguous affirmation
of the enumerated-rights reading.  No wonder Barnett and Bernick seek to
downplay its significance.
For my part, I believe Bingham’s 1871 speech is wholly unnecessary for
the argument in favor of the enumerated-rights reading.  The antebellum
evidence along with the history of the framing and ratification of the Privi-
leges or Immunities Clause is sufficient to establish the enumerated-rights
reading as the most likely original understanding of the clause.  It is only
because Barnett and Bernick rely so heavily on postratification evidence that
384 JOHNSON, supra note 348, at 14–15 (emphasis added).
385 See LASH, supra note 2, at 232–76 (discussing, among other things, the Petition of
Victoria Woodhull, the House Committee report on Woodhull’s Petition, the Slaughter-
House Cases, and the Blaine Amendment).
386 Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 575.
387 Id. at 576–77.
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they find themselves compelled to say something about this obviously conflict-
ing piece of evidence.
Unfortunately, Barnett and Bernick never tell their readers what Bing-
ham actually argued in that speech.388  I close the substantive portion of this
Article then with a brief presentation of a speech that Barnett and Bernick
believe is an important piece of historical evidence supporting the enumer-
ated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
1. The Speech
On March 31, 1871, John Bingham addressed the proposed Ku Klux
Klan Act.  In his speech, Bingham provided a detailed account of both the
history of the Privileges or Immunities Clause and its meaning.  It is an unam-
biguous defense of the enumerated-rights reading of the Privileges or Immu-
nities Clause and a refutation of the fundamental-rights theory of the Clause.
As introduced by Representative Samuel Shellabarger, the proposed Act
criminalized private conspiracies to violate the “rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties of another person.”389  According to Shellabarger, by adding the Four-
teenth Amendment to the Constitution, the “United States thereby were
authorized to directly protect and defend throughout the United States those
privileges and immunities which are in their nature ‘fundamental’ . . . and
which inhere and belong of right to citizenship of all free Governments.”390
Shellabarger then explained that defining these rights was not difficult, since
[h]ere, Mr. Speaker, we tread upon ground that, fortunately, has been
explored.  From the beginning of the Government down, the words in the
old Constitution, “privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,”
have come under judicial notice and interpretation. . . . I read from 4 Wash-
ington Circuit Court Reports, page 380, Corfield vs. Coryell.391
388 Barnett and Bernick claim that a prior committee report submitted by John Bing-
ham on behalf of a majority rejecting the suffrage petition of Victoria Woodhull somehow
impeaches Bingham’s speech. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3, at 577 & n.443.  This is
because the committee report bases its rejection of Woodhull’s claim on the grounds that
the Privileges or Immunities Clause provides nothing more than the same limited degree
of equal protection of state secured rights as did the Comity Clause of Article IV.  To the
extent that it has any relevance at all, the so-called “Woodhull Report” impeaches both the
fundamental-rights reading and the enumerated-rights reading.  Given their reliance on
postratification evidence, the report poses more of a problem to Barnett and Bernick’s
view than it does to mine.  As for whether the committee report somehow undermines the
significance of Bingham’s speech, I do not think there is any doubt that Bingham’s speech
is more indicative of his views than the reasoning of a committee report that necessarily
reflects the consensus views of a majority of committee members. See also LASH, supra note
2, at 236.
389 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 67–68 (1871) (statement of Rep. Shel-
labarger) (discussing “the bill (H.R. No. 320) to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other purposes”).
390 Id. at 69.
391 Id.
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Shellabarger then read the passage from Corfield that named the “protec-
tion by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty” etc. as “fundamen-
tal” rights guarded by the Comity Clause.392
Shellabarger’s attempt to equate the right of the Privileges or Immuni-
ties Clause with the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
rights listed in Corfield v. Coryell raised an immediate objection by Illinois
Republican John F. Farnsworth.  According to Farnsworth, Shellabarger’s
interpretation of the amendment would empower Congress to regulate the
entire subject of civil rights in the states—an outcome members had success-
fully opposed when Bingham produced his first draft of the Fourteenth
Amendment in February of 1866.  Farnsworth reminded the House that
Bingham’s first draft had used the language of Article IV, but had been
defeated by members like Giles Hotchkiss who objected to the attempt “to
authorize Congress to establish uniform laws throughout the United States
upon the subject named—the protection of life, liberty and property.  I am
unwilling that Congress shall have any such power.”393  According to Farns-
worth, “by the concerted action of the Republicans, [Bingham’s proposal]
was given its quietus by a postponement for two months, where it slept the
sleep that knows no waking.”394
At this point, John Bingham interrupted and noted that “I made the
motion myself to postpone and make it an order for that day, but I did not
choose to call it up . . . [b]ecause I put it in another form; and I am prepared
to demonstrate to the House and to the country that it is in a better form
now than it was then.”395  Later that same day, when it came his time to speak
on the bill, Bingham did exactly that.
Answering Farnsworth’s question of “why [he] change[d] the amend-
ment of February, 1866,” Bingham explained, “I took counsel, sir, of that
great man, John Marshall, foremost of all the judges.”396  He also explained
that following the withdrawal of the February draft
I had read—and that is what induced me to attempt to impose by constitu-
tional amendment new limitations upon the power of the States—the great
decision of Marshall in Barron vs. the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore,
wherein the Chief Justice said, in obedience to his official oath and the Con-
stitution as it then was: “The amendments [to the Constitution] contain no
expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments.
This court cannot so apply them.”397
Bingham understood Marshall’s ruling in Barron to mean that, despite
the fact that the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights
392 Id. (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)).
393 Id. at 115 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1095 (1866) (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss)).
394 Id.
395 Id. (statement of Rep. Bingham)
396 Id. at 84.
397 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250
(1833)).
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“secured . . . all the rights dear to the American citizen,” the Court could not
rightfully read them as impliedly binding the states.398  Bingham then
explained the importance of these enumerated rights:
Jefferson well said of the first eight articles of amendments to the Constitu-
tion of the United States, they constitute the American Bill of Rights.  Those
amendments secured the citizens against any deprivation of any essential
rights of person by any act of Congress, and among other things thereby
they were secured in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, in the inviolability of their homes in times of
peace, by declaring that no soldier shall in time of peace be quartered in any
house without the consent of the owner.  They secured trial by jury; they
secured the right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusations
which might in any case be made against them; they secured compulsory
process for witnesses, and to be heard in defense by counsel.  They secured,
in short, all the rights dear to the American citizen.  And yet it was decided,
and rightfully, that these amendments, defining and protecting the rights of
men and citizens, were only limitations on the power of Congress, not on the
power of the States.399
Note that the above passage not only contains a clear example of the
consensus understanding of the federal Bill of Rights, it also defines these
rights as “all the rights dear to the American citizen.”  Returning to his discus-
sion of Barron, Bingham explained that he had reexamined Barron v. Balti-
more “after my struggle in the House in February, 1866.”400  At that time, he
“apprehended as I never did before, certain words in that opinion of Mar-
shall,” in particular Marshall’s assertion that “[h]ad the framers of these
amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State gov-
ernments they would have imitated the framers of the original Constitution,
and have expressed that intention.”401  Bingham now realized his first draft
relied upon an implied application of the Bill of Rights against the states (his
“ellipsis” reading of Article IV).  As Marshall pointed out, this violated the
rule of construction set out by the Framers of the Constitution.  When the
Framers wished to bind the states, as they did for example in Article I, Sec-
tion 10, they did not rely on implication but instead expressly declared “no
State shall emit bills of credit, pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts.”402  Therefore, explained Bingham:
Acting upon this suggestion I did imitate the framers of the original
Constitution.  As they had said “no State shall emit bills of credit, pass any bill
of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligations of contracts;”
imitating their example and imitating it to the letter, I prepared the provi-






402 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10).
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“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of the citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
I hope the gentleman now knows why I changed the form of the amend-
ment of February, 1866.403
Bingham’s decision to embrace Marshall’s advice and add the words “no
state shall” was only one of the changes Bingham made in the second draft.
He also abandoned the language of Article IV, which he had insisted con-
tained an implied “ellipsis” containing the words “of citizens of the United
States.”  In his second draft, Bingham simply declared: “No state shall make
or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States.”  These privileges, Bingham now explained, were altogether dif-
ferent from those protected by the bare language of Article IV:
Mr. Speaker, that the scope and meaning of the limitations imposed by
the first section, fourteenth amendment of the Constitution may be more
fully understood, permit me to say that the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States, as contradistinguished from citizens of a State, are
chiefly defined in the first eight amendments to the Constitution of the
United States.  Those eight amendments are as follows[.]
Bingham quoted the first eight amendments, then continued:
These eight articles I have shown never were limitations upon the power
of the States, until made so by the fourteenth amendment.  The words of
that amendment, “no State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,” are an
express prohibition upon every State of the Union, which may be enforced under
existing laws of Congress, and such other laws for their better enforcement
as Congress may make.404
There are a number of important aspects about these passages.  First,
Bingham expressly distinguishes the “privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States,” from the privileges and immunities of “citizens of a State.”
This echoes a distinction one can find as far back as the Missouri debates,
and one that was clearly implied by Bingham’s decision to replace the initial
Article IV language of the rights “of citizens in the several states” with the final
drafts’ language referring to the rights “of citizens of the United States.”  These
phrases refer to two distinct sets of “privileges and immunities.”
But Bingham was not finished explaining why we should not read the
Privileges or Immunities Clause as referring to the kinds of rights protected
under Article IV and listed as “fundamental rights” in Corfield v. Coryell.  Shel-
labarger had tried to argue that privileges and immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment were the same as the “fundamental” rights listed by
Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, only now transformed into rights
applicable against one’s own state.  Although Bingham had already impliedly
403 Id. (emphases added).
404 Id. (emphasis added).
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rejected that view, he went on to expressly reject Shellabarger’s claims.
According to Bingham:
Mr. Speaker, that decision in the fourth of Washington’s Circuit Court
Reports, to which my learned colleague [Mr. SHELLABARGER] has referred is
only a construction of the second section, fourth article of the original Con-
stitution, to wit, “The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several States.”  In that case the court only
held that in civil rights the State could not refuse to extend to citizens of
other States the same general rights secured to its own.
In the case of The United States vs. Primrose, Mr. Webster said that—
“For the purposes of trade, it is evidently not in the power of any State
to impose any hinderance or embarrassment, &c., upon citizens of other
States, or to place them, on coming there, upon a different footing from her own
citizens.”
The learned Justice Story declared that—
“The intention of the clause (‘the citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States,’) was to con-
fer on the citizens of each State a general citizenship, and communicated all
the privileges and immunities which a citizen of the same State would be
entitled to under the same circumstances.”
Is it not clear that other and different privileges and immunities than those to
which a citizen of a State was entitled are secured by the provision of the fourteenth
article, that no State shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, which are defined in the eight articles of amendment, and
which were not limitations on the power of the States before the fourteenth
amendment made them limitations?405
As had members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress every time a member had
tried to press a nontraditional reading of Corfield and Article IV,406 Bingham
in 1871 similarly responds with irrefutable caselaw and antebellum legal trea-
tises.  The “fundamental” rights of Corfield involved nothing more than a lim-
ited set of state-secured rights that, if granted to state citizens, must be
equally extended to out of state citizens.  Not only was Shellabarger wrong
about the Fourteenth Amendment, he was wrong about the meaning of
Corfield v Coryell.407
405 Id. (citations omitted) (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; then quoting,
with minor variations, 6 Daniel Webster, The Bank of the United States Against William D.
Primrose, in THE WORKS OF DANIEL WEBSTER 106, 112 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 7th ed.
1853); and then quoting, with minor variations, 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 605 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 3d ed. 1858)).
406 See LASH, supra note 2, at 162–63.
407 See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 26 (1871) (statement of Sen. John
Sherman) (linking the Privileges or Immunities Clause to the common law and the “other
rights” of the Ninth Amendment and calling for judicial identification and enforcement of
the same); see also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY 66–67 (2004) (using Sherman’s postadoption speech as evidence of the
original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause); Barnett & Bernick, supra note 3,
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Over and over again, John Bingham stressed the enumerated nature of
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States:
Mr. Speaker, this House may safely follow the example of the makers of
the Constitution and the builders of the Republic, by passing laws for enforc-
ing all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as guar-
antied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in the
Constitution.  Do gentleman say that by so legislating we would strike down
the rights of the State?  God forbid.  I believe our dual system of government
essential to our national existence.  That Constitution which Washington so
aptly said made us one people, is essential to our nationality and essential to
the protection of the rights of all the people at home and abroad.  The State
governments are also essential to the local administration of the law, which
makes it omnipresent, visible to every man within the vast extent of the
Republic, in every place, whether by the wayside or by the fireside,
restraining him by its terrors from the wrong, and protecting him by his
power, in the right.
. . . .
The people of the United States are entitled to have their rights guaran-
tied to them by the Constitution of the United States, protected by national
law.  I enter upon no new construction. . . .
. . . .
The States never had the right, though they had the power, to inflict
wrongs upon free citizens by a denial of the full protection of the laws;
because all State officials are by the Constitution required to be bound by
oath or affirmation to support the Constitution.  As I have already said, the
States did deny to citizens the equal protection of the laws, they did deny the
rights of citizens under the Constitution, and except to the extent of the
express limitations upon the States, as I have shown, the citizen had no rem-
edy.  They denied trial by jury, and he had no remedy.  They took property
without compensation, and he had no remedy.  They restricted the freedom
of the press, and he had no remedy.  They restricted the freedom of speech,
and he had no remedy.  They restricted the rights of conscience, and he had
no remedy.  They bought and sold men who had no remedy.  Who dare say,
now that the Constitution has been amended, that the nation cannot by law
provide against all such abuses and denials of right as these in States and by
States, or combinations of persons?
. . . .
. . . It is competent for the Congress of the United States to-day to
declare that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble together and petition for redress of grievances, for
these are of the rights of citizens of the United States defined in the Consti-
at 506 n.46.  Even if Sherman had spoken prior to the adoption of the Amendment,
instead of years later, his views would represent a decided minority.  This is especially true
regarding Sherman’s use of the Ninth Amendment. See supra notes 196–98 and accompa-
nying text (explaining the consensus understanding of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
in 1866).
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tution and guarantied by the fourteenth amendment, and to enforce which
Congress is thereby expressly empowered.  It is clear that if Congress do so
provide by penal laws for the protection of these rights, those violating them
must answer for the crime, and not the States.  The United States punishes
men, not States, for a violation of its law.408
Without a single exception, Bingham describes the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States as those rights enumerated in the Consti-
tution but that Congress never before had the power to enforce.  Bingham
closed by emphasizing that both federal and state governments were obli-
gated to respect “American liberty” and that all men, ultimately are responsi-
ble before God:
Liberty, our own American constitutional liberty, is the right “to know, to
argue, and to utter freely according to conscience.”  It is the liberty, sir, to
know your duty and to do it.  It is the liberty, sir, to work in an honest calling
and contribute by your toil in some sort to the support of yourself, to the
support of your fellow-men, and to be secure in the enjoyment of the fruits
of your toil.  Justice, sir, to establish which this Constitution was ordained,
the people themselves being witness, is to give every man his due.  The jus-
tice to be established by the Constitution is the attribute of God, as to do
justice is the perpetual obligation of men and nations.  Let justice for all, by
the power and majesty of American law be established for all, so that the
poorest man in his hovel on the frontiers of your widely extended domain,
bearing with him toward the setting sun the symbols of civilization, and lay-
ing in the wilderness the foundations of new commonwealths, may be made
as secure in his person and property and the prince in his palace or the king
on his throne.
. . . .
“States are born, live, and die upon the earth; here they accomplish
their destiny; but they contain not the whole man.  After the citizen has dis-
charged every obligation he owes to society, every obligation that he owes to
the State, there abides in him the nobler part of his nature—his immortal
faculties, by which he ascends to God, to a future life, and to the unknown
blessings of an invisible world.”
[Applause.]409
Even in this final passage, with his rhetoric stretching heavenward, Bing-
ham limited himself to naming rights specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution.  As we know from our study of Bingham’s antebellum speeches, his
reference to the rights “to know, to argue, and to utter freely according to
conscience,” were references to rights protected by the First Amendment.410
408 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84–86 (1867) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
409 Id. at 86 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting, with
slight variations, 1 F. GUIZOT, THE HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION FROM THE FALL OF THE ROMAN
EMPIRE TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION 30 (William Hazlitt trans., New York, D. Appleton &
Co. 1854)).
410 See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 124 (1856) (statement of Rep. Bing-
ham); see also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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We also know, and for the same reason, that his reference to the rights “to
work in an honest calling and contribute by your toil in some sort to the
support of yourself, to the support of your fellow-men, and to be secure in
the enjoyment of the fruits of your toil” were references to the Fifth Amend-
ment right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law.411
In this remarkable speech, Bingham explains why he abandoned the lan-
guage of Article IV and embraced language expressly calling on the States to
respect the enumerated rights of citizens of the United States.  It explains
how the amendment satisfied what Bingham for years had insisted was the
“want” of the original Constitution—federal authority to enforce the Bill of
Rights against the States.  It also explains how someone as committed to con-
stitutional federalism as was John Bingham would draft and support such a
clause.  Its scope was limited to protecting the enumerated rights of citizens
of the United States.  It hath that effect, nothing more.
CONCLUSION
I side with John Bingham.  Not because we should follow this particular
framers’ intent or any of his particular speeches.  But because the historical
evidence strongly suggests that the author of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause best understood the original meaning of his handiwork.  Bingham is a
constitutional founder, one who should be studied and celebrated by us all.
Few people better fit the times into which they were born—in Bingham’s
case, a time that welcomed an indefatigable and unshakeable advocate of
extending the constitutionally enumerated rights of American citizenship
into every hamlet in every State in the Union.
Listen once more to John Bingham’s enumerated-rights theory of the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States:
Mr. Speaker, this House may safely follow the example of the makers of the
Constitution and the builders of the Republic, by passing laws for enforcing
all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as guaran-
tied by the amended Constitution and expressly enumerated in the
Constitution.412
411 See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app. at 140 (1857) (statement of Rep.
Bingham).
412 CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 84 (1867) (statement of Rep. Bingham).
